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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a tradition of biracial 
unionism sprang up among waterfront workers in Gulf Coast including Galveston.  
According to historian Eric Arnesen’s study of New Orleans, the racial practices of 
these southern longshoremen were distinct from those of other trade unionists and 
“violated some of the central tenets of the age of segregation.”  Biracial unionism was 
an imperfect but significant strategy that broke racial barriers and revealed much 
about how both black and white workers balanced their class and racial identities.  
However, neither class nor race are, by themselves, sufficient categories for analysis.
v
  Rather, it is through understanding the connections between economic and racial 
issues that we can reach a fuller knowledge of why any particular component of these 
identities operated at any one time. Thus we must study the intersection of class and 
race a period of time, and across a range of social, political and economic 
developments.  While economic self interest was always at the forefront of white 
workers’ motivation, a range of factors shaped the particular course followed in each 
port.  The character of employment relations, the power of employers, the prior 
history of racial division or segmentation of labor, the strength of black unions 
themselves, and the culture of longshoremen both black and white all played a part.  
No one has covered the early history of Galveston’s waterfront from the 
broad perspective given by Arnesen yet some of Texas’ earliest and strongest 
labor organizations began on Galveston’s waterfront.  These organizations provide a 
study in how a particular laboring community dealt with the transition from benevolent 
societies to job-conscious unions; the role of the broader labor movement such as 
the Knights of Labor, the American Federation of Labor and International 
Longshoremen’s Association; new technology and the struggle for workers control; 
and the open shop movement.  This history provides a study of black and white 
worker’s consciousness and how the conflicts between race and class were worked 
out in practice, adding to our knowledge of race and the labor movement, the course 
of biracial unionism in the South, and Texas labor history.
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INTRODUCTION
“A significant strategy.”
Here was a remnant of haunted beauty—gray, shrouded, crumbling . . . of
what did the city remind me?  Miss Haversham of course.  That was it.  Miss 
Haversham the spectral bride in Great Expectations.
Edna Ferber, A Kind of Magic.  1940
Although an air of ossified Dickensian glory haunts Galveston to this day, 
Edna Ferber’s image of Galveston belies the time when the city was the most 
important commercial center in Texas and one of the nation’s leading seaports.  At 
the end of the Civil War, city boosters declared their expectation of turning 
Galveston into “the seaport of the Great Southwest.”  Their vision of a Galveston 
era flourished over the next several decades as railroads advanced the frontier of 
commercial agriculture, particularly cotton, across the Southwest.  Cotton shipments 
rose steadily and The Strand, Galveston’s commercial center, became known as the 
“Wall Street of the Southwest.”  The port, the docks and wharves at the core of 
Galveston’s rise, earned the title of the “Queen of the Gulf.” Ornate mansions and 
sturdy mercantile buildings arose as the symbols of burgeoning prosperity.  By 
1900, a large percentage of the Texas cotton crop as well as wheat and other 
produce from as far away as California and Colorado left Galveston for destinations 
around the world.  For the next quarter of a century, Galveston reigned as the 
nation’s leading cotton shipping port.    
Many factors contributed to Galveston’s commercial success.  The port’s 
location; the vision and commercial acumen of local businessmen; investment by 
northern capital and the federal government; expanding railroad networks; the 
production and demand for cotton all played their part.  The literal driving force, 
however, was provided by the waterfront workers: the men who loaded the three 
million-plus bales of cotton exported a year and unloaded incoming agricultural and 
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commercial goods.
Galveston’s waterfront provided a lively scene in the decades around the turn 
of the twentieth century, particularly during the cotton season from September to 
March.  Sailing vessels and steamships lined docks along the island’s sheltered 
western shore where wharves were piled high with thousands of bales of cotton.  
Teams of freight handlers, cotton pressmen, yardmen, weighers, checkers and 
draymen moved the cotton from freight cars to ship side where cotton screwmen 
took the bales on board to stow:
    In one slip six mighty ocean liners with a total capacity of nearly one hundred 
    thousand bales of cotton are clustered.  The sound of the great steam hoist 
    dragging the great bales aboard, the heave of the “cotton-jammer” as he screws 
    the packages into the smallest space possible in the vessel’s hold, the rattle of the 
    hand truck as the “gobbler” comes rolling the bales to the slings, the rumble of the 
    drays bringing loads of oil-cake, flour and other cargo from car to ship side.1 
The puffing of locomotives and the crashing of railway cars as they switched 
from pier to pier added to the general clamor and the industry of the hundreds of 
dockside laborers.   
These men, their muscle, sinew, sweat and sometimes blood, propelled the 
Galveston era yet their labors have not received the attention they deserve. 
Histories of Galveston have tended to focus on the city’s commercial success, its 
great mercantile families and their architectural legacy, the Great Storm of 1900, or the 
city’s high tolerance for illegal gambling, liquor and other vices.2  Some recent works 
have included the social history of the island but even these give scant attention to 
the waterfront or the men who toiled there.  Yet the history of these men provides an 
important chapter in the underdeveloped field of Texas labor history in a place that 
was very different from other Texas cities, and even other ports such as Houston, 
Beaumont and Texas City.  Some of the state’s earliest and strongest labor 
organizations began on Galveston’s waterfront as, uncoincidentaly, did the state 
1 Galveston Tribune, in Bixel and Turner, Galveston and the 1900 Storm, 76.
2 For example: McComb, Galveston; Hyman, Oleander Odyssey; Bixel and Turner, 
Galveston and the 1900 Storm; Payne and Leavenworth, Historic Galveston.
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government’s policy of staunch antiunionism.  These waterfront organizations 
provide a study in how a particular laboring community in an industry with its own 
contours and intricacies dealt with such issues as the transition from benevolent 
societies to job-conscious unions; the role of the broader labor movement such as 
the Knights of Labor, the American Federation of Labor and International 
Longshoremen’s Association; new technology and the struggle for workers’ control; 
and the open shop movement.  Historians have paid attention to certain aspects, a 
particular organization or individual strike, but no one has written from a broad 
perspective and across a substantial time period.  Moreover, no one has paid full 
attention to one of the central topics in labor history, the interaction between black 
and white workers and the intersection of race and class.  
Steam winches and locomotives aside, mechanization had little effect on the 
waterfront until containerized cargoes drastically reduced the labor force in the latter 
part of the twentieth century.  Waterfront work relied upon large amounts of casual 
labor where the main requirement was manual strength, particularly when handling 
bulky raw materials such as cotton.  Such tasks required a certain experience but not 
the lengthy apprenticeship associated with a craft industry.  The work was irregular, 
and depended upon such variables as seasonal and economic fluctuations, and the 
tide and winds.  The characteristic pattern of dock work was “hurry up and wait”-- 
periods of idleness followed by long hours of hard and hazardous labor when a ship 
docked.  Earnings were similarly erratic and, on average, low.  The ready availability 
of unskilled, casual labor as well as ethnic and racial divisions only added to the 
economic insecurity of longshoremen.  In many ports, the early morning ritual of the 
‘shape-up’ came to characterize the intense competition for jobs.  Men seeking work 
formed a rough semicircle or “shape” at the pier gates each morning for the foreman 
to select the number of workers required for that day, a system as much open to
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favoritism and bribery as it was to skill or seniority.3  
Waterfront labor was generally regarded as unskilled but the work itself could 
be highly specialized and the workforce highly stratified.  Longshoreman is a broad 
term that covers a wide variety of tasks and skills as workers usually handled only 
one class of goods, often at a particular stage of the loading process, and were 
employed by a small number of firms.  Every major port developed its own 
particular division of labor, its own working practices and language, and its own 
hierarchy of specialized tasks and wage differentials according to the types of cargo 
handled.  In addition to specialization by cargo, the workforce was divided into deep 
sea, or foreign trade, longshoremen and coastwise workers for shipping lines serving 
only American ports.  Longshoremen usually worked in gangs with three gangs per 
hatch: pier men prepared the cargo on the dockside to be hauled aboard ship by 
the deck gang who transferred the cargo to the hold gang for stowage.  The work 
required coordination and judgment, particularly when moving heavy, bulky staples, 
to avoid damaging the cargo or injuring oneself or one’s fellow workers.  The hold 
gang, in particular, required a high level of experience to securely stow the maximum 
amount of cargo into an often irregularly-shaped hold.  In 1915, sociologist Charles 
Barnes, in one of the first studies of American longshoremen, recognized that such 
work could require judgment, responsibility and years of training.  Historian Eric 
Hobsbawm compared the qualities of nineteenth-century British dockworkers to 
those of the skilled iron puddler:
    strength and dexterity in a limited range, and very frequently the qualities of the all-    
    round craftsman or supervisory worker-initiative, wide experience, the ability to 
    make a variety of decisions to fit the necessities of loading and unloading the 
    hundred and one non-standardized ships, the ability to supervise men.
Moreover, even if longshoremen were not skilled by conventional standards they 
3 Barnes, The Longshoremen, gives one of the earliest and fullest accounts of the nature 
of longshore work in the port of New York at the turn of twentieth century.  See also: Russell, Men 
Along the Shore, 8-10; Poole, “The Ship Must Sail on Time;” Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of 
New Orleans, 38-42; Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, 204-230; Lovell, “Sail, Steam and Emergent 
Dock Unionism in Britain, 1850-1914.”
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nevertheless held considerable bargaining strength.4   
As John Lovell explained in his account of early dock unionism in Britain: 
“Since ordinary dock operations were little affected by technology and attendant 
deskilling the organization of work conformed to craft principles of administration in 
which a heavy reliance was placed by management on the expertise of the 
workforce.”  With little technological or managerial structuring of work, dockworkers 
were able to establish their own control over wages and, especially, working 
conditions.  While the ready availability of casual labor made the replacement of 
longshoremen an easy matter in theory, even the limited skills of a general cargo 
longshoremen could take many weeks for a new hand to learn.  A ship’s turnaround 
time in port was a major factor in profitability and employers could ill-afford the time 
necessary to train green hands.  Using untrained hands risked at best, loss of time, 
damaged cargo and inefficient stowage, which ultimately cost money.  At worst, a 
badly-stowed cargo could shift in transit and even cause a ship to sink.  According to 
Barnes, steamship companies dreaded hiring untrained men whose inefficiency 
incurred heavy losses.  Occupying a strategic link in the transportation chain, 
longshoremen could use collective action to pressure employers into making 
concessions.  While a determined employer with a large reserve of casual labor held 
the long-term advantage over most longshoremen, the skills of some groups made 
them almost irreplaceable.  The specialization of tasks and the associated skills 
enabled some waterfront workers to form some of the earliest and strongest labor 
organizations.5 
One such group in Southern cotton ports such as Galveston were the cotton 
screwmen.  Before the introduction of high density cotton compresses, screwmen 
used large jackscrews to force the maximum number of cotton bales into a ship’s 
hold thus playing a vital role in maximizing the cargo’s profitability.  Cotton screwing 
4 Barnes, The Longshoremen, 54; Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, 207.
5 Lovell, “Sail, Steam and Emergent Dockers Unionism in Britain, 1850-1914;” Barnes, 
The Longshoremen, 6.
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required a particular strength and experience that attracted high wages and earned 
screwmen the respect of employers and fellow longshoremen alike.  Organized 
screwmen were able to exercise a similar degree of control over their working 
practices and wages as a more traditional craft union.  Like many craft unions, 
screwmen’s organizations sought to protect their position by controlling the labor 
supply through strict membership requirements and the closed shop.  Although 
immigrants, sailors and migrant labor provided competition in Southern ports, the 
screwmen’s main challenge came from black labor.  While Southern racial mores 
supported the exclusion of black labor from skilled or highly-paid labor, white labor 
sometimes recognized that exclusion was not the only policy open to them.
C. Vann Woodward outlined the pattern of Southern labor and race relations 
in his seminal study, Origins of the New South.  Two challenges confronted white 
labor as the Southern economy slowly recovered in the decades following the Civil 
War.  From above, a new commercial and industrial class allied with Northern capital 
sought to establish a new social, political, and economic order across the South.  
From below, a newly-freed black labor force directly competed for work with white 
labor.  The renewal of large-scale immigration further heightened the competition for 
jobs.  Woodward argued that white labor had two options to meeting the challenge 
from black labor: “eliminate the Negro as a competitor by excluding him from the 
skilled trades either as an apprentice or a worker, or take him in as an organized 
worker committed to the defense of a common standard of wages.”  Woodward 
recognized that race consciousness would divide far more than class consciousness 
could unite but, still, Southern labor wavered between these two contradictory 
policies.  The South’s racial ideology sanctioned the exclusion of Negroes from 
many occupations, but in certain industries the Negro presence was too strong to be 
ignored.6    
Between 1865 and 1913, a tradition of biracial unionism developed in the 
6 Woodward, Origins of the New South, 205-234.  See also: Spero and Harris, The Black 
Worker, 44; Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 89-92.
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South, particularly among lumberjacks, miners and longshoremen.  White and black 
workers were organized into separate locals, but these locals crossed the racial 
divide by working together in a common economic cause.  Biracial unionism thus 
both upheld and pushed the boundaries of white Southern racial practices.  
Moreover, biracial unionism was symptomatic of the broader popular discontent 
aroused against the new order.  This discontent found its widest expression through 
the Knights of Labor and Southern Farmer’s Alliance in the 1880s, and the American 
Federation of Labor and Populist Party in the 1890s.  At times, these movements 
pushed the races towards cooperation.  These fragile experiments in white-black 
working-class unity ran counter to the racial assumptions of the South yet all-told they 
involved many thousands of Southerners.  Perhaps no group of workers pushed 
these assumptions further than the longshoremen in Gulf Coast ports such as 
Galveston and New Orleans.
Historian Eric Arnesen has revealed much about the development of biracial 
unionism in Gulf Coast ports, particularly New Orleans.  Arnesen, like Woodward, 
concluded that: “southern longshoremen adopted racial practices that differed sharply 
from those of other trade unionists and that violated some of the central tenets of the 
age of segregation.”  Biracial unionism developed relatively early in New Orleans 
with the formation of a Cotton Men’s Executive Council in 1880.  This initiative was 
led by the all-white Screwmen’s Benevolent Association which was forced to 
confront the issue of race when employers tried to to break their control by using 
black screwmen.  The Cotton Council, which included most of the port’s white and 
black labor organizations, provided an institutional framework for regulating wages, 
working conditions and work-sharing agreements.  The council successfully mediated 
racial tensions until the mid-1890s when, under the pressure of a severe economic 
downturn, cooperation foundered amid a series of strikes and racial violence.  The 
Cotton Council reemerged in 1901 with the International Longshoremen’s 
Association providing a broader institutional base for such local organizations.  The 
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ILA, perhaps more than any other labor organization of the time, pursued a policy of 
overcoming occupational and racial divisions through interracial collaboration.  With the 
ILA acting as mediator, efforts towards biracial unionism sprang up in ports all along 
the Gulf Coast, including Galveston.  Biracial unionism was an imperfect, but 
nevertheless significant, strategy that broke racial barriers and revealed much about 
how both black and white workers balanced their class and racial identities.7   
Labor historians have been slow to investigate this intersection of race and 
class in the past although, as Arnesen points out, the topic is now central to the field 
of labor history.  Race is also a central topic in the field of American Studies and, 
moreover, labor histories by scholars such as Eric Lott and David Roediger span 
both disciplines by emphasizing the cultural dimension of race and class.  Herbert 
Gutman and his followers were among the first historians to examine race and class 
and Gutman himself pointed to the urgent need for a more detailed knowledge of 
the interaction between black and white workers and particularly of the ‘local world’ of 
the black worker.  However, early studies in the “new” labor history tended to 
emphasize the role of skilled white artisans to the exclusion of unskilled and black 
workers.  Critics such as Herbert Hill and David Roediger, among others, have 
argued that the emphasis placed on class  by Marxist scholars ignored white racism 
altogether or replaced it with a mythologized past of working-class solidarity.  As 
Barbara Fields and Arnesen have pointed out, however, such critics have 
themselves been guilty of turning class and race into wholly separate and 
deterministic categories.  Stressing white racism alone ignores the ideological 
perspective of those black workers who participated in the labor movement, 
whether in wholly independent unions or through biracial unionism.8   
7 Arnesen, “Biracial Waterfront Unionism in the Age of Segregation,” 20.
8 Gutman , “The Negro and the United Mine Workers of America,” 116-7; Arnesen, 
“Following the Color Line of Labor,” 54-6; Hill, “Myth-Making as Labor History;” Fields, “Ideology 
and Race in American History.”  For overviews of the debate on  race and class in labor history see: 
Arnesen, “Following the Color Line of Labor,” and “Up from Exclusion;” and Roediger, Towards 
the Abolition of Whiteness.
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Although a majority of both black and white workers remained outside the 
ranks of organized labor, or even chose to act as strikebreakers, black activism 
formed “a small but important countertradition within the labor movement.”  For this 
significant section of black workers, labor unions represented a means to further their 
own goals and although white labor variously reacted with hostility, neutrality and only 
occasionally support, biracial unionism was a part of that strategy.  Evidence of this 
‘local world’ of black labor is often difficult to uncover and labor historian Robin Kelley 
has suggested that we approach the topic through “hidden transcripts.”  However, 
unionism was a part of this world of black working-class culture and a part for which 
union records, newspapers and photographs provide at least some hard evidence.  
Moreover, as Arnesen emphasizes, the details of this countertradition, rather than 
broad, deterministic categories offer an opportunity to pose important questions on 
the nature of working-class relations and black labor activism.  Neither class nor race 
are, by themselves, sufficient categories for analysis—nor are they the only 
categories since we all occupy multiple and intersecting identities.  Rather, it is 
through the connections between economic and racial issues that we can reach a fuller 
understanding “not only of race and the labor movement, but of black and white 
workers’ consciousness and struggles as well.”9    
The development of biracial unionism in the South was as varied and 
complex as the industry itself.  While economic self interest was always at the 
forefront of white workers’ motivation, Arnesen also charts the range of other factors 
that shaped the particular course followed in each port.  The character of employment 
relations, the power of employers, the prior history of racial division or segmentation 
of labor, the strength of black unions themselves, and the culture of longshoremen 
both black and white all played a part. Besides these local factors, the longshoring 
industry by its nature is part of a geographically broader movement.  Local unions 
became bound to the ILA yet retained a measure of local autonomy through the 
9 Arnesen, “Following the Color Line of Labor,” 54-6 and “What’s on the Black Worker’s 
Mind?” 7-10; Kelley, “We Are Not What We Seem,” 76.
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South Atlantic and Gulf Coast District Association.  As Arnesen argued, workers’ 
experiences were not determined by abstract categories of race and class but 
instead reflected their positions within both class and race hierarchies in urban 
southern society.”  Consequently, Negro dockworkers “saw themselves as both 
black workers and black workers; whites similarly saw themselves as working men 
who were white, as whites who were workers.”  To understand why any particular 
component of these identities operated at any one time the dynamics of class and 
race must be studied “sequentially” over a period of time, and “laterally” across a 
range of social, political and economic developments.10   
The early history of Galveston’s waterfront has never been covered from the 
broad perspective described by Arnesen although the subject has not been 
entirely ignored by scholars.  In the 1930s, economic historian Ruth Allen gathered 
information on Galveston’s longshoremen for inclusion in her groundbreaking 
Chapters in the History of Organized Labor in Texas.  Allen recognized that “Racial 
recriminations and persecutions do not build the subtle shadows of the Southern 
scene.  Not bitterness but harmony limn the picture.”  Interaction between white and 
black unions depended upon local conditions and Negro unions used organizations 
such as the State Federation of Labor to push for equal rights within the union 
movement.  Philip Foner, in his extensive study of the black worker, acknowledged 
the strong commitment among many black workers to the ideals of unionism.  Foner 
uses an 1898 strike by coastwise longshoremen in Galveston to demonstrate “a 
clear case in which black workers placed union loyalty above racial identity.”  Broad 
studies by F. Ray Marshall and Lawrence Rice devoted paragraphs to the subject 
based largely on Allen’s work but Allen Taylor provided the first in-depth study of 
Galveston’s waterfront workers in his “ A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent 
Association.”  Taylor’s dissertation gives the most complete picture of the task of 
cotton screwing, particularly its economic importance, as well as covering aspects of 
10 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, x-xi.
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the association’s development as a job-conscious union.  The writings of labor 
historians James Reese and James Maroney provided further background on 
organized labor in Texas and Galveston as well as the early development of the 
SBA, the role of the ILA on the Gulf Coast, and a 1920 strike by Galveston’s 
coastwise workers.  Works by Ruth Kelly and Thomas Barker covered the 
commercial development of Galveston as a port.  Most recently, Arnesen himself 
has included sections on Galveston in several articles which begin to draw 
comparisons between Galveston and its chief commercial rival, New Orleans.11 
Robert Shelton’s dissertation contains a great deal of statistical evidence on 
Galveston’s population before 1860 and focuses on four of the strikes that occurred 
in Galveston between 1865 and 1920.  However, Shelton does little to explain the 
particular conditions that existed on Galveston’s waterfront and how these conditions 
affected white and black longshoremen.  More importantly, he relies heavily on a few 
secondary sources, rather than the extensive union records.  Consequently, 
Shelton’s work contains errors of interpretation, and does not sufficiently explain the 
motivation of these workers, particularly the black unions, and why biracial unionism in 
Galveston took the form it did after 1900.   None of these works gives a complete 
picture of Galveston’s waterfront workers over an extended period of time paying 
particular attention to the intersection of race and class.  Some were written from the 
perspective of economic, rather than labor history or focused on a particular group of 
workers or incident.  Consequently, we have a fairly detailed knowledge of the port’s 
labor aristocracy, the white screwmen, and the strikes of 1898 and 1920.  Strikes, 
however, were not typical of Galveston and little has been written about white 
longshoremen in the deep sea and coastwise trades or, more importantly, the 
11 Allen, Chapters in the History of Organized Labor in Texas, 189-210; Foner and Lewis, 
The Black Worker, 4: 2, 63-70; Marshall, Labor in the South;  Rice, The Negro in Texas; Taylor, “A 
History of the Screwman’s Benevolent Association;” Kelly, “’Twixt Failure and Success;” Barker, 
“Partners in Progress;” Reese, “The Early History of Labor Organizations in Texas;” Reese, “The 
Evolution of an Early Texas Union; Maroney, “Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-1929;” Arnesen, 
“Biracial Waterfront Unionism in the Age of Segregation.”
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struggle of black screwmen and longshoremen to gain a place on a waterfront 
dominated by white labor.12   
The story does, however, revolve around the white screwmen.  The 
Screwmen’s Benevolent Association formed immediately after the Civil War, was 
not only Galveston’s first waterfront labor organization; it was also the most powerful, 
exercising a craft-like degree of control over wages and working conditions for many 
years.  Since cotton was by far Galveston’s most important export, the SBA was at 
the center of most major developments on the waterfront, drawing the other 
waterfront unions, white and black, into its orbit.  The SBA first set the pattern as an 
independent labor organization but later led the way in the organization of local, 
district and international associations under the auspices of the ILA.  Similarly, the 
SBA was the first union to turn away from the policy of exclusion and recognize the 
necessity of including black workers into the fold of organized labor.  The SBA’s 
manuscript archive held at the University of Texas at Austin is also the most 
extensive of all Galveston’s waterfront unions, with records of union meetings dating 
back to the very first meeting in 1866.  These minutes are often frustratingly terse 
when it comes to the details of decision making but, supplemented with local 
newspapers and other sources, they reveal an organization in an almost constant 
ideological tug-of-war.  While economic self-interest prompted union officials to 
recognize the necessity of coming to terms with organized black labor, race 
consciousness motivated rank and file members to be more reluctant to make 
concessions to black workers.  
Each chapter corresponds to a period in the development of the SBA and  is 
framed by the commercial development of Galveston as a port.  Piloted by the 
city’s leading commercial families, the period from 1865 to 1924 was one of almost 
uninterrupted growth for the port, even though underlying trends presaged its 
eventual decline.  As the port’s economy began to prosper from the westward 
12 Shelton, “Waterfront Workers of Galveston, Texas, 1838-1920.”
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spread of cotton farming from 1865 to 1880, so the SBA grew from a benevolent 
society into a fully job-conscious union.  The SBA adopted a policy of excluding 
black labor in these early years but this did not hinder the appearance of the first 
black labor organizations by mid-1870s or strikes by longshoremen and black 
laborers during the Great Upheaval of 1877.  By the 1880s, the SBA had fully 
established its control over the loading of cotton but with cotton exports continuing to 
rise, the SBA could not maintain its monopoly.  Norris Wright Cuney, a leading black 
Republican, won a contract for black cotton workers in 1883 despite a strike by the 
SBA.  Two years later, Cuney, this time aided by the antiunion Mallory shipping 
line, successfully broke the monopoly of white coastwise longshoremen.  Black 
workers had secured regular employment but in Galveston, as elsewhere, their 
world was not simply bound by “white racism, economic institutions and Negro 
middle-class organizations.”13  Black workers made choices for themselves based 
upon their own experience and situation and, again as elsewhere, one of those 
choices was unionism.  Although employed by Cuney, the leader of Galveston’s 
black middle class, black waterfront workers took their own initiative in forming unions 
and seeking recognition from the SBA and other longshoremen’s unions as well as 
inclusion in Galveston’s Trade and Labor Assembly.
In the 1890s, changes in technology and the structure of the shipping industry 
added to the  commercial pressures facing the SBA.  With cotton exports continuing 
to rise, employers began to mount their first serious challenges to the workers' 
control of the screwmen and one firm of shipping agents began to exclusively 
employ the leading black association, the Cotton Jammers and Longshoremen’s 
Association.  Employers also began using ordinary longshoremen to load cotton, 
thus bring the SBA into conflict with the other leading white union, the 
Longshoremen’s Benevolent Union.  Similar pressures during the previous decade 
had prompted waterfront unions in New Orleans to form a biracial Cotton Men’s 
13 William Toll quoted in Cantor, Black Labor in America, x-xi.
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Executive Council to successfully mediate work and racial divisions.  The SBA now 
cautiously followed a similar path by seeking a working agreement with the Cotton 
Jammers, a move welcomed by the black association.  Ironically, biracial unionism in 
New Orleans disintegrated amid mounting employer opposition and a deepening 
economic depression, further convincing the SBA of the need for some kind of 
biracial cooperation in Galveston.  In 1898, black longshoremen on the Mallory 
docks organized and joined the American Federation of Labor in their unsuccessful 
bid to win better wages.  However, not all of Galveston’s black longshoremen held 
the same faith in a white-dominated labor movement and this ideological divide 
among black workers was demonstrated in 1898 when a breakaway group from the 
Cotton Jammers formed the Lone Star Cotton Jammers Association.  The Lone 
Stars chose to secure work by working below the recognized wage scale, thus 
competing with both the SBA and Cotton Jammers.  This move created an often 
bitter divide between the two black associations and would hinder attempts to build 
a working coalition such as had existed in New Orleans on Galveston’s waterfront.  
By 1900, Galveston had achieved its long standing goal of becoming a 
deep water port serving as the “seaport of the Great Southwest.”  As commercial 
and technological pressures continued to erode the screwman’s craft, the SBA 
began to sacrifice its long-held independence by seeking a bulwark in broader 
organizations such as the State Federation of Labor and the ILA.  The SBA also 
continued to seek agreements on wages and working sharing with the Cotton 
Jammers and Lone Star Association.  In New Orleans, waterfront associations had 
not only healed the divisions of the previous decade, in 1902 they reached an 
unprecedented agreement that black and white gangs would work side by side, or 
“abreast” one another.  Similar efforts in Galveston failed, however, largely due to 
the intransigence of the Lone Stars.  In 1908, the SBA made a determined effort to 
reach a joint agreement and the two black associations used the opportunity to push 
for the adoption of the New Orleans plan of amalgamation.  Although SBA officials 
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persuaded their members that amalgamation was the only solution, black officials 
were less successful and the lengthy negotiations faltered without agreement.  The 
SBA was more successful in forming a local Dock and Marine Council comprising 
ILA locals and, in 1911, a Gulf Coast District Association.  The formation of these 
local and district ILA councils led to renewed efforts to recruit black workers and 
particularly the Cotton Jammers and Lone Stars.  The Cotton Jammers joined the 
ILA in 1911 and almost immediately used the District Association to raise the issue 
of amalgamation.  Following a directive from the District Branch, the SBA and Cotton 
Jammers reached an agreement and, despite opposition from employers, white 
and black screwmen in Galveston began the 1912 season working abreast one 
another.  However, the agreement could not last while the independent Lone Stars 
continued as a thorn in the flesh of both sides and the SBA reneged on the work-
sharing agreement after just one season.  This decision resulted in SBA’s 
suspension from ILA amid much denunciation and recriminations on all sides and the 
situation was only resolved when the Lone Stars finally agreed to join the ILA.
The war years were lean ones for the longshore industry as foreign shipping 
declined but Galveston quickly recovered its trade after 1918.  The post war years 
brought a renewed effort by employers across the country to break union power.  In 
Galveston, the Southern Pacific and Mallory companies provoked their white and 
black longshoremen into a joint strike in 1920  by refusing to implement a wage rise 
set by the wartime National Adjustment Board.  Faced by a united front of white and 
black labor, business interests leading an open shop campaign called on the power 
of the state government to impose martial law in Galveston over the protests of city 
government and citizens.  The strike was defeated and union power in the coastwise 
trade broken.  Such coercion was not required to subdue the SBA.  Since the late 
1890s, cotton screwing had been a dying craft made obsolete by high density 
cotton compresses and larger capacity steamships that rendered the time-
consuming skills of the screwman unnecessary.  Following several years of pressure 
15
from employers, the SBA finally agreed to merge with the deep sea 
longshoremen’s union to form a new ILA Local 307 in 1924.  As part of this 
agreement, the new local signed a fifty-year agreement to share work with the Lone 
Star Association on a fifty-fifty basis.  Henceforth, white and black gangs would work 
aboard the same ship but separately, taking it in turns to work the fore and aft holds.  
Ironically, it was not the unions who insisted on this work sharing-agreement, but the 
employers who had for so long tried to exploit racial divisions to their advantage.  
The employers, in fact, had been too successful by giving the larger percentage of 
work to black labor and they now wished to restore a more “equitable” distribution of 
their large payroll.  Even more ironically, the Cotton Jammers who had once led the 
push for recognition as part of the union movement, chose to remain outside this 
agreement and contract independently.
Galveston’s waterfront workers shared the same concerns as other 
longshoremen along the Gulf Coast: they held similar class and racial attitudes faced 
the same pressures from employers, and developed their own unique pattern of 
biracial unionism.  Galveston thus provides a study of how a particular laboring 
community organized to deal with issues such as class, race, changing technology 
and employer hostility.  Galveston also provides a significant point of comparison 
within the broader movement of biracial unionism along the Gulf Coast, and 
particularly with New Orleans.  Galveston’s chief rival during this period was a much 
larger port with a greater volume of trade and diversity of cargoes.  Competitive 
pressures were much greater, particularly in the deep sea sector where black labor 
presented a large and well-organized threat to the control of white unions.  With 
employers more than willing to exploit racial divisions by playing one race against 
the other, job competition threatened workers’ control over wages and working 
conditions and led to strikes and racial violence.  However, these very conditions 
also led to an early realization by white and black unions that working together was 
essential if they were to combat exploitation by employers.  With Galveston’s trade 
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dominated by cotton exports, job competition was less intense as white and black 
labor each settled into their own corners of the labor market.  Employers were less 
able to exploit racial divisions; strikes were rare and serious racial conflict almost 
unknown on Galveston’s waterfront.  Although white and black screwmen’s leaders 
came to recognize the need for interracial cooperation, rank and file members on 
both sides were often reluctant to follow.  Steps towards biracialism were halting and 
the ultimate goal of amalgamation only briefly realized.  Galveston’s longshoremen 
never reached the same depths of confrontation and racial violence as in New 
Orleans, but nor could they explore the same heights of cooperation.14 
14 Arnesen, “Biracial Waterfront Unionism in the Age of Segregation,” 33-5.
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Many publications extolled Galveston’s commercial success, particularly around the 
turn of the twentieth century.  Rarely, however, was much prominence given to 
the waterfront workers behind that success.
Courtesy of the Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas
CHAPTER ONE
“No persons of Color:” 
The Screwmen’s Benevolent Association and the white labor monopoly.
Galveston is a barrier island, created over the years by the deposition of 
sand and silt carried in by the currents of the Gulf.  Twenty-seven miles long and 
between one-half and three miles wide, and standing two miles offshore on a line 
running parallel to the Texas coast, the island protects Galveston Bay from the Gulf.  
In the early nineteenth century, the island lacked water and was isolated from the 
mainland; yellow fever and hurricanes were other perennial problems.  Yet 
Galveston Island protected the best natural harbor on the Gulf Coast and was close 
to Mexico, the West Indies, and the Gulf Stream flowing north.  Antebellum visitors 
were impressed by Galveston’s potential as a port, despite the obvious danger to 
a low-lying island from high tides.  Thomas North, a New York journalist viewing the 
island from a Morgan Line vessel in 1860, saw a “mirage” suspended in the air: 
    On nearer approach the illusion disappears, and there stands before you, on a 
    small piece of nature’s ground work, and as though painted by a fairy hand, in spirit 
    and shadows, on the low extended horizon beyond, Galveston, exciting the 
    strange beholder into the romantic feeling that it is a city of fairies.1 
Even allowing for North’s hyperbole, Galveston’s origins were steeped in 
romance.  The pirate Jean Laffite was among the first to recognize Galveston Bay’s 
advantages and legends of buried treasure are a part of his legacy.  In the 1830s, 
Galveston quickly graduated from pirate base to legitimate seaport particularly as the 
young Republic of Texas sought a vital trade link to the north.  The Morgan Line sent 
the first steamboat from New Orleans in 1837, thus linking Galveston to New York.  
Although called a city, Galveston consisted of little more than two or three houses 
and the frames of several others yet even Houston, Galveston’s great rival and 
eventual nemesis, recognized the importance of a natural harbor.  According to the 
1 Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association,” 19-23; McComb, 
Galveston, 5-6; Fornell, The Galveston Era, 246-72; North, Five Years in Texas, 54.
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Houston Telegraph, the port was destined to soon become:
    the center of a commerce rivaling in extent that of many of the first commercial cities
    in the world.  The products of many millions of acres of the most fertile lands in the 
    globe, and of many rich mines of gold, silver, and iron, will necessarily be wafted 
    to this port rendering Galveston City the commercial emporium of Texas 
The first cotton bound for Liverpool was shipped in 1839, thus establishing the 
basis of this future prosperity, as two hundred and twenty-eight vessels entered the 
port that same year bring freight and 4,376 passengers.  Although the port had 
outgrown its pirate roots, it took more time to shake off its frontier image and not all 
antebellum visitors shared Thomas North’s ethereal vision of the island.  Charles 
Hooton, visiting the island in 1841, agreed that from a distance Galveston appeared 
as a fine city:
    but its glory vanishes gradually in proportion to the nearness of the approach of 
    the spectator, until on his arrival at the end of one of the long, rude wooden 
    projections, called wharfs, which shoot out some quarter of a mile into the shallows 
    of the bay, he finds nothing but a poor straggling collection of weather-boarded 
    frame-houses, beautifully embellished with whitewash.2 
By the time of the Civil War, however, Galveston had developed into a 
busy port of several thousand inhabitants as agricultural products from the interior 
flowed out to Northern and European ports in exchange for farm supplies and 
general merchandise.  The city took on a more refined air as it grew into one of 
Texas’ principal commercial centers and became a home to merchants, bankers, 
shippers and foreign consuls.  Immigration added a cosmopolitan flair to the 
commercial and official functions as the town developed its own distinct visual and 
social character.  As one historian of early statehood described it : “In the whole 
structure and fashion of its community life, Galveston was not so much a culmination 
of Texas culture as a combination of Texas wealth and the elements of many 
cultures, a product impressive and unusual to Texans and foreigners alike.”3   
2 Houston Telegraph, Aug. 19, 1837 quoted in Hayes, Galveston, 267; McComb, 
Galveston, 68.
3 Ellis, “The Texas Cotton Compression Industry,” 52; McComb, Galveston, 68-9;  Meinig, 
Imperial Texas, 57. 
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From the first, Galveston attracted entrepreneurs keen to realize the 
extravagant vision of Galveston’s destiny.  In 1853, four dry goods merchants, 
George Ball, John H. Hutchings, and brothers John and George Sealy, helped to 
finance the construction of Galveston’s first railroad, the Galveston, Houston and 
Henderson line, which began operating in 1860.  Determined to expand 
Galveston’s commerce, the four men also founded the banking firm of Ball, 
Hutchings and Company in 1854 and the company that was to become known as 
the Galveston Wharf Company.  The object of the Wharf Company was to 
consolidate all of Galveston’s wharves under common quasi-public ownership and 
control.  The GWC paid the city an annual dividend of around six percent in 
exchange for control over almost all of Galveston’s wharves.  Hutchings acted as 
president of the Wharf Company and a director of the railroad; John Sealy was vice-
president of the railroad, and a director of the Wharf Company.  The Wharf 
Company’s monopoly, and the prices it charged for its facilities, would draw criticism 
from merchants and shippers and became a target of Granger discontent, but it was 
this firm that began to finance the integration of the port’s rail and water facilities and 
attract northern capital.  In time, Ball, Hutchings and the Sealys would be joined by 
other leading commercial families, notably Henry Rosenberg, William Moody and 
the Kempner family.  These names came to  dominate the city’s leading commercial 
and political organizations; the Cotton Exchange, Deep Water Committee, Relief 
Committee and the progressive Commission Government of the early 1900’s.  
This internecine pattern was perhaps unsurprising in such a relatively small 
community as Galveston, yet it was the willingness of these men to invest time and 
money in the port and its facilities that played a large part in the port’s success.  
However, their unwillingness to invest in and develop a broader industrial base was 
one element in the city’s eventual decline.4 
Galveston’s rise as a port was aided by a relatively quick recovery after the 
4 Baughman, The Mallorys of Mystic, 138-9; Sibley, The Port of Houston, 86; McComb, 
Galveston, 49-56.
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Civil War and its own ambition.  The port was briefly occupied and blockaded by 
Union ships throughout the war but Galveston’s isolation from the main conflict left the 
city itself largely untouched.  In contrast, Union troops occupied New Orleans, 
Galveston’s great rival on the Gulf Coast, early in 1862.  Although many citizens left 
the city for the duration, they quickly returned at war’s end.  Galveston’s leading 
newspaper, the Daily News, was soon reporting that  “All is bustle and activity, the 
wharves are crowded with shipping, the stores are filled with goods, buyers from the 
country are in force and our merchants jubilant.”  Barely a year later, the newspaper 
outlined the city’s great destiny: “It may look extravagant to hold up Galveston as 
destined . . . to be the sea-port of half a continent, and yet all the premises and 
existing facts lead to that conclusion.”  The only barrier preventing  Galveston from 
fulfilling her destiny was physical: ironically, the same sand barrier that sheltered the 
harbor from the ocean restricted the shipping lane to a shallow channel.  Larger 
vessels thus prevented from entering the port were forced to anchor in the Bolivar 
Roads beyond the sand bars where lighters ferried cargoes to them, a costly and 
time-consuming process.  Given the national importance of the project, the News 
thought it  reasonable to assume that the government would undertake the 
deepening of the channel through Galveston Bay.  There was, after all, scarcely a 
Northern harbor of any importance on which the government had not expended far 
more money than would be required to make the port of Galveston the best on the 
whole Gulf: “as it is the most convenient of access for the whole extensive, varied 
and productive region west of the Mississippi.”  The cost, estimated at two to three 
million dollars and equal to the amount spent per day in the late war, was trifling when 
compared to the benefits.  Despite its faith in the justice of Galveston's claim on the 
national purse the News could not help but goad the federal conscience by playing 
the injured party: “But the policy of the party in power is to bring utter ruin to the 
South, even though the North must suffer almost as much, rather than give 
prosperity to the whole country by a just and liberal course towards the Southern 
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people.”5   
It would be several decades before Galveston received the necessary 
federal aid and until then the city’s leading businessmen relied on their own efforts in 
attracting northern capital to invest in the port.  Galveston’s prosperity would be 
based upon cotton: the demand for cotton was growing; the crop was easy to raise; 
and railroads were opening up large new areas of production, particularly along the 
Texas-Arkansas frontier.  Moreover, it was also the one crop an impoverished 
South could grow on credit.  Cotton production in Texas approached its prewar level 
by 1870, and then approximately doubled every decade reaching a high of 3.5 
million bales in the 1900-01 season.  However, rivers in Texas were largely 
unnavigable, and haulage by freight was slow and expensive, as were the few 
railroads built prior to the Civil War.  Before Galveston could begin to tap the 
developing market, new railroads and cheaper transportation were required to open 
up the hinterland.  The Galveston, Houston and Henderson Railroad was just a first 
step towards the railroad boom of the 1880s which pushed the line of commercial 
agriculture further west.  In the meantime, the port’s own transportation and 
commercial facilities had to be developed in order to attract and handle trade.  To this 
end, the Ball, Hutchings and Sealy partnership sought to attract northern capital and 
while railroads would be a key factor in the development of the New South, in the 
immediate postwar period water transport held the advantage.6  
Shipping firms like Charles Morgan and C. H. Mallory and Company 
benefitted from the construction of steamships during the war, and the slow speed at 
which Southern railroads were rebuilt and integrated in the postwar period.  Mallory 
based its trade upon providing regular coastal services.  This liner service had the 
advantage of regularity, but it was more expensive to run than a tramp fleet that 
relied upon special charters or chance to pick up a cargo.  As James Baughman, 
5 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 8, 1865, May 3, 1866; Kelly, “’Twixt Failure and Success,” 
44-53.
6 Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association,” 2, 20-1. 
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historian of both Morgan and Mallory Lines, explained: “Since success depended 
on maintaining a regular volume of mixed trade, [Morgan and Mallory] worked 
constantly to attract and hold permanent customers and to concentrate traffic at ports 
most convenient to themselves and to a majority of shippers.”  Although most of 
Galveston’s cotton would be shipped to Europe and elsewhere by tramp vessels 
and, by the 1890s, liner service, a regular coastwise service provided an important 
link to markets in the north.  Moreover, since Galveston would never attract a large 
volume of foreign imports, this service remained especially vital for bringing finished 
goods to merchants in the city and interior.7 
Prior to the Civil War, the Galveston Wharf Company offered preferential 
treatment to the Morgan Line which had run a regular service between Galveston 
and New Orleans since 1837.  Charles Morgan dominated the coastal trade of the 
Gulf and the quick resumption of his Texas services after the War required the 
enlargement of his port facilities in that state.  In 1867, Morgan received exclusive 
four-year rights to Galveston’s best wharves, Central and Brick wharves, and to one 
warehouse.  In the longer term, however, Galveston’s businessmen planned to end 
their traditional dependence upon New Orleans as a supplier, consumer, and re-
exporter of gods by linking a direct service to New York.  As the Wharf Company 
later revealed: “It became an object of the first importance to our company to get the 
[New York] steamships to land at our own wharves, and at the same time to get 
more and more and better vessels in the business.”  Morgan remained the GWC’s 
main customer until 1870 while other New York to Galveston lines docked at Bean’s 
Wharf.  During the first months of 1870, the GWC negotiated with the GHH railroad 
to extend its tracks directly to the waterfront and appointed a committee to report on 
the best ways “to secure the NY trade.”  With improvements to its facilities in hand, 
the GWC entered into an agreement with the Mallory line to use those facilities.8   
7 Baughman, The Mallorys of Mystic, 131.
8 Baughman, Charles Morgan, 106, 128, 191-2.
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The Mallory company had focused business on both New Orleans and 
Galveston after the war but Galveston offered less competition and more potential.  
Through determination and superior vessels, Mallory quickly overcame most of its 
competition and secured a large share of the port’s trade.  The next step was to 
improve Galveston’s dock facilities and develop railroad connections to the 
hinterland.  Together, Mallory, the Galveston, Houston and Henderson Railroad, and 
the Wharf Company constructed a rail and water terminal in 1873, and negotiated 
expeditious through-freight handling at favorable rates with connecting railroads.  
Improving the port’s shipping capacity was also essential.  The Wharf Company 
offered the Mallory Line favorable wharf rates, and the Ball, Hutchings company 
bought a $20,000 interest in three Mallory vessels.  Moreover, the Wharf 
Company and its financial friends took a quarter interest in financing the construction of 
four new Mallory steamships.  On 12 August 1871, the City of Houston, an iron 
steamship specially constructed to navigate Galveston’s shallow shipping channel, 
made its first voyage to the port.  As Baughman points out, Mallory emerged as the 
winner among half a dozen rival steamship lines partly as a result of expertise in ship 
operations but mostly from the pooling of their interests with those of GWC and the 
Galveston, Houston and Henderson.9   
One unlooked-for consequence of Galveston’s alliance with Mallory was to 
push the Morgan company towards rival Houston.  Although Galveston was Texas’ 
most important connection to the outside world it relied on nearby Houston, whose 
better location made it a hub for railroads, for its connection to trade with the interior.  
Commercial rivalry between the two cities began as early as the 1840s when inland 
planters and Galveston merchants tried to save time and handling costs by shipping 
cotton directly to Galveston, using steamship lighters to avoid Houston altogether.  
From that point on, each city sought to bypass the other, Galveston by using 
railroads and Houston by ship canal.  The Houston Direct Navigation Company 
9 Baughman, The Mallorys of Mystic, 138-43.
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began taking cotton by ship and barge to be loaded directly onto ocean vessels in 
Galveston Bay, thus avoiding Galveston altogether.  Beginning in 1870, vessels 
arriving in Galveston from the ports of Brashear and New Orleans were subject to a 
twenty-five day yellow fever quarantine.  The quarantine, timed to hit as the start of 
the commercial season, was clearly intended to favor Mallory’s direct service from 
New York at the expense of Morgan’s New Orleans route.  Morgan won a court 
decision against the quarantine but then found that rebates granted by the Galveston 
Wharf Company were withdrawn in 1974 thus again placing the line at a 
disadvantage to Mallory.  Frustrated with his treatment in Galveston, Morgan turned 
his attention to Houston.10 
When the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway reached Denison, Texas, in 
1873, railroads could now offer a through route to New York.  The Galveston, 
Houston and Henderson, meanwhile, refused to alter to standard gauge tracks until 
1876.  In 1874, Morgan invested in the new routes and in the Buffalo Bayou Ship 
Channel Company, an operation run by many of the same men involved in the 
Houston Direct Navigation Company.  Morgan provided a dredging fleet to deepen 
the ship channel from Houston to Bolivar Channel east of Pelican island in Galveston 
Bay, thus bypassing Galveston’s quarantine, wharf company and railroad.  The Ball, 
Hutchings Company responded to this challenge with its own four-point plan.  The 
strategy involved further improvements to the physical facilities of Galveston’s 
dockside and the Galveston, Houston and Henderson line, and closer financial and 
traffic ties to Houston railroads in competition with Morgan.  Further financial support 
was given to the Mallory Line to help offset losses from price competition with 
Morgan at sea.  Lastly, a new Mallory liner service began to challenge Morgan’s 
monopoly in the other Gulf Coast ports.  A rate war, however, served neither 
shipping line’s purpose in the high-cost liner trade and competition turned to 
cooperation when Charles Morgan died in 1878.  In a secret traffic agreement 
10 Sibley, The Port of Houston, 65-6; Baughman, Charles Morgan, 194-5; Baughman, The 
Mallorys of Mystic, 150-5.
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designed to exclude other competitors, Morgan’s son-in-law agreed to concentrate 
on the company’s rail link from Houston to New Orleans leaving Mallory in control of 
the coastal trade from Galveston.  According to Baughman, Morgan’s decision to 
cooperate with Mallory was decisive in the subsequent course of development in 
the Gulf Southwest.11   
Visitors to Galveston in the 1870s were impressed by signs of the port’s 
burgeoning economy.  A correspondent for Scribner’s magazine told his readers that 
“Latterly [Galveston] has assumed a commercial importance which promises to 
make it a large and flourishing city . . . . Few cities with a population of twenty-five or 
thirty thousand are more spirited; though manufacturing, as a solid basis, is 
nevertheless a supreme need.”  This caveat, which exposed one of the long-term 
weaknesses of the city’s economy, was well-founded.  Moreover, the railways still 
threatened to siphon away business and Houston’s ship canal remained another 
long term problem.  A former Louisiana planter noted both these threats when on a 
visit in 1876: the railroads were taking enough business to affect both the Mallory 
and Morgan lines; and because of the exorbitantly high wharf rates Morgan was 
vigorously pushing his scheme to make Houston a port of entry.  Overall, however, 
this fortune hunter was more impressed by the port’s wonderful growth since 1861 
and the continuing air of commerce and prosperity:
    The business portion of the city cannot be surpassed for the elegance and solidity 
    of its structures.  The private residences are neat and often showy, with tasteful 
    yards and shrubbery.  Long lines of steamers and vessels give evidence of the 
    large commercial and business transactions of the place.  Galveston is truly the 
    Queen of the Gulf.12    
Thus enthroned, Galveston typified the dynamism, economic opportunity 
and social mobility of the New South while retaining a social and cultural air that had 
more in common with older southern ports such as New Orleans, Savannah and 
11 Sibley, The Port of Houston, 92; Baughman, Charles Morgan, 196-7; Baughman, The 
Mallorys of Mystic, 150-5.
12 King, “Glimpses of Texas,” 404; Baughman, “Letters from the Texas Coast,” 501.
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“The Queen of the Gulf.”  Christmas Eve, 1870.  
Courtesy of the Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas
Charleston.  Like the city’s commercial ambition, this genteel air was cultivated during 
the antebellum period.  Galveston’s ethnic background was rooted in the Old World 
of northern and western Europe with around forty percent of residents claiming 
German, English, German, Irish or French ancestry.  Early on, Galveston became a 
city where old money did not mix with new, although both funded the city’s 
economic aspirations; a city ruled by a social elite who readily adopted European 
customs and taste.  Although Roman Catholics outnumbered Protestants by three 
to one, elite status was reserved for Episcopalian, Presbyterian or Jewish families.  
Germans were the most influential immigrant group and it was they who constructed 
the park and pavilion of the Garten Verein which became a social center for the city’s 
elite.  The Opera House, the first built in Texas, also catered to refined taste with 
performances by artists as varied as Buffalo Bill, Lillie Langtry, Sarah Bernhardt and 
Oscar Wilde.  Each ethnic group formed its own social club or benefit society to 
accompany an array of Masonic and fraternal orders, brass and string brands, and 
other clubs and societies.  Less rarified entertainment could be found at the many 
flourishing beer gardens such as Weirylouis, Dalian’s, Schmidt’s or among the 
growing scene of organized sporting events.13   
The first opera house in the state in addition to other social, economic and 
technical innovations distinguished this ascent to the throne of Texas’ most important 
commercial and cultural center.  Galveston would boast, among other things, the first 
private and national banks in the state of Texas, as well as the first cotton exchange, 
telephone, electric lighting, hospital, historical society, country club and opera house.  
This progress was also marked by the formation of some of the state’s earliest and 
strongest labor organizations as Galveston became not only the state’s leading 
commercial center but also its most strongly unionized city. 
Labor organizations in Texas, like the state’s economy in general, lagged 
behind the rest of the nation.  The ports of Houston and Galveston were the only 
13 Fornell, The Galveston Era, 87-115; Turner, Women, Culture and Community, 5-6, 25; 
Grover, “Recollections of Life in Galveston;” McComb, Galveston, 114-7.
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Texas cities to develop any kind of diversified economy prior to the Civil War.  
Even after the railroad building of the 1870s and 1880s, Texas remained a primarily 
agricultural economy with little large scale industry or concentrations of workers.  
Isolation was a further barrier to organization and newspapers carried few reports of 
labor associations and activity in other states.  Ethnicity, rather than occupation, 
provided the basis for early benevolent and social societies in Texas although from 
the 1850s on, German groups in particular formed Workingmen’s or Mechanics 
Associations to provide a range of social, educational and welfare benefits.  Houston 
formed a Workingmen’s Association in 1857 but a similar effort in Galveston proved 
short-lived and printers and carpenters were the only purely craft groups to form in 
either city prior to the Civil War.  However, postwar economic growth was matched 
by a growth in organized labor and by 1872 Galveston had a dozen or more labor 
associations.  The New York trade and cotton exports fueled Galveston’s growth, 
and it was on the waterfront where the greatest concentrations of labor were to be 
found.  And it was the waterfront where one of the first, and certainly the strongest of 
Galveston’s early labor organizations, The Screwmen’s Benevolent Association, 
formed in September 1866.14   
The primary aim of the twenty-three white screwmen who met on the 
evening of September 11, 1866, was to form a benefit society.  The association 
agreed to hold regular meetings on the second and fourth Friday of each month and 
adopted a constitution and by-laws based upon those of the New Orleans SBA.  
Membership cost ten dollars and was restricted to men over the age of twenty-one, 
and under forty-five who had worked for at least six months as a screwmen in 
Galveston.  Strict entrance requirements limited new membership, and nominees 
had to pass an investigation committee and receive fewer than four black balls from 
the general assembly before being initiated.  Fines were imposed for 
14 Reese, “The Early History of Organized Labor in Texas,” 1-13.
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recommending “unworthy” candidates.  Any member found guilty of “habitual 
drunkenness or other disorderly or dishonorable conduct,” or “wicked or notorious 
practices” was liable for suspension, loss of benefit, and even expulsion.  Meetings 
were governed by strict rules of decorum so that “the most prominent objects of our 
Association ‘Harmony, Benevolence and Union’ be not defeated.”  To ensure 
harmony, “No subject of a sectarian religious or political character shall be introduced 
before this Association.”  Fines were imposed for any infraction of the rules, including 
nonattendance at meetings and members’ funerals.  In early 1869, a permanent 
Relief Committee began to oversee the payment of benefits.  Monthly dues were 
fifty cents, with a one dollar levy on the death of a member and fifty cents for a 
member’s wife.  After twelve months, a member could receive up to six dollars a 
week sickness benefit, forty dollars in funeral expenses, and twenty-five dollars for a 
wife’s funeral.  Forty dollars went to the widow and orphans of a member who 
drowned without the body being recovered.15 
Harmony and union were not always characteristics of the SBA’s early years.  
According to Allen Taylor’s history of the association, many of the first members 
were established foremen and stevedores: men in relatively secure positions who 
primarily saw the SBA as a benefit and social society.  Membership quickly rose to 
fifty-three as ordinary gang members joined the organization, bringing with them a 
different set of priorities.  Screwmen were the highest paid waterfront workers, but 
the cotton season only ran from September to March.  High wages were offset by 
the need to find alternative work, usually as longshoremen, during the off-season.  
Screwmen were not immune from economic insecurity and “Dropped from the Rolls 
for nonpayment of dues,” frequently appeared in the association’s minute books 
throughout the next thirty years.  Consequently, many ordinary screwmen turned to 
the SBA for job protection.  In January, 1867, SBA members expressed concern 
at the amount of work going to non-association gangs.  The following March, they 
15 SBA, Constitution and By-Laws, 5-27; Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent 
Association,” 51-3; Reese, “The Evolution of an Early Texas Union.”
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resolved: That no member of this Association shall on any pretext, work sailors in a  
Gang either in, or outside the Bar, and further that no  member shall work in a ship or 
for a Stevedore who employs sailors to work in a gang for the purpose [of] stowing 
cotton.16    
Given the uncertain nature of dockwork, maintaining relatively high wages and 
restricting the labor supply were of particular importance to waterfront workers.  For 
stevedores and foremen, however, sailors provided a convenient labor supply, 
particularly in Galveston where many vessels were unable to reach the wharf until 
harbor improvements towards the end of the century.  The tension between 
foremen and ordinary gang members caused the SBA to disband for the second 
half of the 1867, but the association reformed the next January and the injunction 
against working sailors was withdrawn.  By the beginning of the 1869 season, the 
rule was reintroduced as ordinary screwmen again controlled the SBA.  That same 
year, the SBA received the first state charter given to a labor organization in Texas.  
Benefit and social functions remained important but from that time onwards members 
became increasingly concerned with issues of job protection, wages, and working 
conditions.  Two factors helped the SBA transform itself from a quasi-fraternal social 
society into a job conscious union: a sense of group solidarity and the economic 
importance of screwing cotton.17 
Cotton screwmen stood at the top of Galveston’s dock hierarchy and their 
task was to move cotton bales from the wharf onto a ship, and then stow the cotton 
into the hold.  Screwmen worked in five-man gangs, with each gang led by an 
experienced foremen who picked the men to work under him.  The screwmen were 
employed by stevedores, middlemen who either contracted with, or were 
employed by, local shipping agents and brokers to arrange the loading and 
unloading of their vessels.  Stevedores chose their foremen, supplied costly tools 
16 Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association,” 54-9; Reese, “The 
Evolution of an Early Texas Union;” SBA, Minutes, I:17.
17 Reese, “The Evolution of an Early Texas Union;” SBA, Minutes, I:20, 54.
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and equipment, supervised loading, and paid the screwmen’s wages.  Nine gangs 
worked the early sailing vessels, while up to twenty-five were used on the much-
larger steamships.  Three gangs would work at each hatchway with one gang loading 
the cotton from the wharf to the deck, another would take it to the hold where a third 
gang would stow the cotton in the hold, wedging each bale into place using a 
system of jackscrews and posts.  In larger holds, several gangs would work at 
stowing.  In an industry characterized by manual labor, the screwmen required 
particular strength and stamina.  As Allen Taylor explained in his study of the SBA, 
“In addition to moving cotton bales and 205 pound jackscrews about a ship, the 
screwmen had to be able to exert great force against the tool to properly stow 
cotton.”  In this way, screwmen could ‘jam’ the maximum amount of cotton into even 
the most irregular-shaped holds.  Their strength and experience, and the wages they 
commanded, placed the cotton screwmen at the head of the labor hierarchy in 
Southern ports.18   
 Cotton screwmen must have felt a particular sense of unity: they worked 
together in regular teams, often in confined spaces and at laborious and dangerous 
tasks.  Moreover, conditions in Galveston added to the difficulties and dangers.  For 
many years, cotton bales stored on the dockside were covered only by tarpaulins 
and rain made bales heavier, especially when a norther blew the tarpaulins away.  
Loading ships from lighters to vessels in the Bolivar Roads was anything but a 
simple matter with squalls and choppy seas making the task even more difficult.  Not 
only were ships’ holds irregularly-shaped but there was no standard size of cotton 
bale until after 1880 when the Galveston Cotton Exchange succeeded in 
standardizing the product of newer steam-driven cotton compresses.  Gangs relied 
on the industry and competence of each member to perform the work efficiently and 
safely, yet still injuries were commonplace.  Foremen usually picked the same men 
18 Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association,” 7-8, 30-9.
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Cotton screwmen pause for the camera while unloading cotton bales
from a sling.  A jackscrew sits in the right foreground.
Courtesy of the Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas
for each new job and stevedores similarly employed a regular group of foremen.19    
Beyond the physical difficulties of cotton screwing was the skill and 
experience required.  Although Taylor gives a detailed description of the tools and 
techniques of screwing taken from personal interviews with ex-screwmen, it is not 
clear to a layman quite how the screws were removed as the final bale in a row was 
jammed into place.  Gilbert Mers, a Texas longshoreman in the 1930s, also gives a 
description based upon firsthand accounts:   
    A row of bales (a “tier”) was laid from either side (“wing”) of the vessel, to meet at   
    midship.  At a certain point before that meeting the jackscrews were set.  The 
    cotton was screwed back to make a larger gap.  How they filled that gap, “keyed” 
    the bales that were to fill it, released the pressure on the screws and retrieved 
    them without that pressure in turn kicking those midship bales out of place, how 
    they forced those bales down into the tier, is the secret that made the screwmen 
    true aristocrats of labor. 
It was these mysteries that made the screwmen’s craft so important to employers.20   
 The shipping industry represented a major capital investment and profitability 
depended upon a number of fixed and variable costs.  Two of the most important 
variables were time spent in port and load capacity.  Any unnecessary time spent at 
dock was money lost, yet the more cargo taken on the more the profit.  Screwing 
cotton cost more than hand-loading and took two to three days longer, so less 
voyages were possible in any given period.  However, until the widespread use of 
high pressure cotton presses after 1900, cotton bales were soft and bulky and 
screwmen could increase loads by between 10 and 20 percent.  Profits per voyage 
increased by a similar amount.  On coastal vessels tied to a regular sailing schedule, 
cotton was generally hand-loaded because time spent in port outweighed extra 
cargo, but on the longer transatlantic routes cotton screwing yielded a four percent 
increase in yearly profits.  Thus screwmen occupied a specialized and important link 
19 Reese, “The Evolution of an Early Texas Union,” 159-60; Taylor, “A History of the 
Screwmen’s Benevolent Association,” 32-9.
20 Mers, Working the Waterfront, 15; Hobsbawm, Laboring Men, 210.
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in the chain of transportation.21   
Sociologist Raymond Miller contends that dockworkers formed an 
‘occupational community’ with a strong sense of group solidarity.  These communities 
are found in highly-skilled trades, such as printing or among isolated workers such as 
miners, sailors, and longshoremen.  Miller contends that the widely prevalent 
conditions of dockwork even created a universal dockworker subculture.  Beginning 
with the casual nature of dockwork, he identifies a number of factors commonly found 
on the waterfront.  The work was exceptionally arduous and often dangerous, and 
although work was varied, there was only a limited occupational hierarchy through 
which a worker could progress.  There was no regular contact with one employer, yet 
longshoremen were continuously in contact with foreign goods, seamen, and ideas.  
Finally, longshoremen tended to live near the docks and shared the belief that 
outsiders saw them as a low-status group.  The clearer the boundaries of job 
territory, the stronger the ties of solidarity.  Miller argues that “As casual laborers in 
constant fear of underemployment dockers learnt that solidarity was even more vital 
to them than it was to the ordinary worker; and as a tight community . . . they learnt 
the importance of loyalty and the fear of ostracism.”22    
Some historians have taken this idea a stage further, arguing that because 
these industrial communities were insulated against the conservative values of the 
surrounding society, they provided fertile ground for radical politics.  However, in his 
study of West Coast longshoremen, Howard Kimeldorf contends that while this is 
sometimes true, at other times workers were insulated from left-wing political groups 
as well, ”in which case isolation can become an obstacle to radicalism.  In short, the 
mere fact that a group of workers is isolated tells us next to nothing about the content 
of their politics.”  New York’s dockworkers, for instance, inhabited a “largely self-
contained world” yet belonged to one of the most conservative unions in the 
21 Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association,” 39-44.
22 Miller, “Dockworker Subculture,” quote, 308.
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country.  In contrast, San Francisco’s dockworkers mingled freely with the larger 
community yet they were among the most radical unionists.23 
Certainly respectable society kept longshoremen as a group at a distance, 
regarding them as being among the lower elements of society.  This undesirable 
reputation was partly due to the casual nature of dock work with its periods of 
enforced leisure and to the  “shenangoes,” the lowest and most casual section of 
waterfront labor.  According to Charles Barnes’ study of New York, “Though 
shenangoes wear longshoremen’s hooks, hang about the waterfront, and handle the 
cargoes of barges and lighters, they must be distinguished sharply from the skilled 
and semi-skilled workmen whose good name they have helped to tarnish.”  In 
contrast to this flotsam and jetsam of the pier, a regular longshoreman was a hard-
working family man—one who swore and fought hard but drank no more than any 
other worker.  With few facilities on the piers, saloons were one of the few places 
where men could gather while waiting for work or to get a meal.  This view was 
echoed in another study of New York by muckraking journalist and author, Ernest 
Poole.  Longshoremen worked long, hard hours, sometimes thirty or more at a 
stretch, in dangerous conditions.  The strenuous work caused men to wear out at an 
early age, and those who were not capable of performing this work had no place on 
the docks:
    In gangs at every hatchway the four hundred men were trundling, heaving, 
    straining, a rough crowd, cursing and shouting at the rough shouts of foremen . . . far 
    from being the drunkards and bums that some people think them, [longshoremen] 
    are like men of the lumber camps come to town—huge of limb and tough of 
    muscle, hard-swearing, quick- fisted, big of heart.24 
Cultural anthropologist and former longshoreman William Pilcher described 
the dockworker subculture in Portland, Oregon, in terms of masculine self-image.  
There are several facets to this self-image including a sense of independence.  
23 Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets?, 13-14, 24.
24 Barnes, The Longshoremen, 14, 13-27; Poole, “The Ship Must Sail on Time,” 176.
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Because dockworkers are not tied to one employer or stevedore they tend to 
identify themselves by the class of longshore work they perform rather than as 
workers for a particular employer.  Moreover, they can choose whether to work or 
not.  The most important element, however, is an air of self-confidence.  Working in 
highly-coordinated teams in hazardous conditions, a longshoreman must not only 
have confidence in his own physical abilities but be able to convey that confidence 
to his fellow workers.  This ability to take care of oneself and others is essential to 
avoiding accidents while a “devil-may-care” attitude helps to relieve on the job 
anxiety.  Longshoremen thus place a high value on physical strength and courage 
and consequently on the ability to fight.  Group norms are reinforced by hostility to 
outsiders and through work socialization such as in-group joking behavior and 
language.  The saloon and the ability to gamble and drink large quantities of alcohol 
serves similar purposes away from work.  While this rough culture reinforces group 
solidarity, it does not necessarily promote radicalism or even class consciousness.25 
Labor historian Peter Way has argued that a culture based upon “excessive 
drinking and interpersonal violence” serves to subdue, rather than promote class 
consciousness.  Way’s study of Irish immigrant canal laborers corrects the discipline’s 
focus on skilled workers whose culture served as a source of strength in their struggle 
to improve wages and working conditions.  This focus ignores the much more 
numerous ranks of the largely powerless common laborer.  As unskilled workers, 
their world was determined by material conditions of industrial capitalism and the 
struggle to maintain employment.  The culture of Way’s nineteenth-century Irish canal 
workers is much the same as that of Pilcher’s twentieth-century longshoremen.  
Arduous and often dangerous manual labor bred a culture of rugged individualism 
that valued the ability to work and play hard.  The emphasis on physical strength, 
drinking, gambling and fighting provided an important, if typically male means of self-
definition which was at the same time a means of self-exploitation.  This rough side 
25 Pilcher, The Portland Longshoremen, 21.  See also Mers, Working the Waterfront.
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of workers’ culture is “the negative side of class struggle” in which a culture 
determined by material forces directs anger and frustration inward rather than at the 
inherent exploitation of the capitalist wage labor system.26
 Seaports were notorious for catering to the rougher elements of working-class 
culture and Galveston had a reputation for providing more in the way of rough 
entertainment than many other ports.  According to one recollection of the city’s early 
years, “The saloon was the first institution in Galveston.”  The number of saloons in 
the city began to increase with the influx of German and Irish immigrants after 1850 
and especially along Water Street by the docks.  By 1880, Galveston had 489 
saloons, more than any city of comparable size and more than New Orleans or any 
other Gulf Coast port.  Certain sections of the city were known for accommodating 
this less respectable side of the port’s economy.  Fat and Tin Can Alleys in the Fifth 
Ward held a particular notoriety along with the saloons, boardinghouses, gambling 
halls, and brothels concentrated in “the district” north of Avenue E.  A section of Post 
Office Street held a reputation as a red-light district.  One contemporary account cited 
the New London Theater, a large two-story frame building on the southwest corner 
of Bath Avenue and Market Street as the principal place for the large number of 
sailors usually in port and “others of that horizon:”
    It was strictly taboo in society to even mention this place, much less speak of what 
    went on in the Theater.  Then the large number of saloons and gambling halls, for 
    gambling was legal, and other places of like character took care of the
    entertainment of those who wanted it very nicely.
Police and community leaders were generally willing to tolerate these less savory 
entertainments as long as they remained confined.  Attempts during the early 1900s 
to enforce Sunday laws and other restrictions resulted in a fall in arrests for public 
intoxication, but the city could not easily shake off its past reputation.27 
26 Way, Common Labor, 174-5,
27 Red, “Allen’s Reminiscences,” 290; McComb, Galveston, 108-9; Brown, “Free Rein,” 1; 
Turner,  Women Culture and Community, 24; Beasley, The Alleys and Back Buildings of 
Galveston, 12; Grover, “Recollections of Life in Galveston in the 1880s and 1890s;” Scull, “Black 
Galveston;” Galveston Daily News, March 20, 1906. 
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There is little direct evidence as to how far Galveston’s waterfront workers 
participated in the masculine self-image or the rougher elements of working-class 
culture, although official figures suggest that at least some were eager participants.  
Out of 2,564 white and black males arrested by Galveston’s police force in 1905, 
700 gave their occupation as either screwman or longshoreman.  More significantly, 
some of these values were transmitted through the working practices and rules of 
both screwmen’s and longshoremen’s unions.  Most of Galveston’s waterfront 
unions either owned or rented their own hall but official notices were still placed in 
dockside saloons.  Union meetings were themselves an occasion for social drinking, 
both during and after the meeting.  It was also customary for the men to drink while at 
work.  In the early 1900s, employers made several attempts to limit or end the 
practice of fetching beer at “quartering time” in the morning and afternoon, but this 
was one concession the men refused to make until Prohibition.  A similar attempt to 
ban drinking during union meetings was amended to allow beer.  The unions 
established fines for fighting at work although a man was expected to defend his 
reputation.  If a fight was caused by a member being “grossly insulted” by another, 
then only the party giving the insult would be liable to fine.28  
Although Galveston’s waterfront unions perpetuated certain less-reputable 
male values, they were also concerned with providing respectable alternatives just 
as Peter Way points out the negative impact of drink such as accidents and domestic 
violence, on a worker community.  The saloon might have provided longshoremen 
with a refuge, a “poor man’s club” providing a separate and autonomous male realm 
of leisure activities and social functions that reinforced working-class values.  A 
drunkard, however, was a liability at work and tarnished the public reputation of an 
organization.  Union members were fined for overindulging at union meetings, work 
or the annual Labor Day parade.  Unions also provided more family-oriented 
28 Galveston Daily News, March 20, 1906; LBU, Minutes, 5:11;LBU, Minutes, 6:72, 77, 
87; Local 310, Minutes, 20:62, 74; SBA,Minutes, 3:500.
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entertainment by organizing events such as annual picnics and balls.  The Labor Day 
parade was followed by a picnic at Wollams Lake with foot races and other 
competitions and a regular tug of war event pitting a team of screwmen against the 
longshoremen.  Women’s auxiliaries provided a social setting for wives who were 
otherwise excluded from the male realm of the waterfront.29 
A corollary to this respectable image was a sense of the workingman’s rightful 
place within the community.  Whatever the role of culture and working conditions in 
promoting group solidarity, the lack of space on the island made it difficult to maintain 
a wholly isolated community, and Galveston’s waterfront unions did consider 
themselves as separate.  Union constitutions sermonized on the monopolistic nature 
of capital and recited a litany of in “union is strength” and the duty to: 
    rescue labor from the condition into which it has fallen and to raise ourselves to that 
    position in society to which we, as workmen are justly entitled, to place ourselves 
    on a foundation sufficiently strong to insure us from further encroachments.
The objection to monopoly capitalism was a common refrain among American 
workers in this period but unions like the SBA had no program to achieve their 
broader aims, focusing instead on the narrow self-interest of job protection and 
working conditions.  Although several longshoremen served as city aldermen during 
the 1890s, unions themselves demonstrated an almost pathological avoidance of 
political matters.  More significantly, at heart the SBA and Galveston’s other 
waterfront unions shared a belief in the fundamental harmony of interests between 
labor and capital.  One indication of this conservative attitude came at the annual 
Labor Day celebration.  While attendance at the parade was compulsory for many 
years, the afternoon’s speeches were delivered by politicians and businessmen 
who, while allowing the right of labor to organize and receive a fair wage, spoke at 
length on this commonality of interests.  Unions did claim the right to a voice in the 
community, either singly or through local and state federations, and even on rare 
occasions to call a strike.  However, even during labor disputes, Galveston’s 
29 Kingsdale, “’The ‘Poor Man’s Club.;’” Way, Common Labor, 181-7;
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waterfront unions were usually willing to accept arbitration by a citizen’s committee 
constituted of local businessmen.  When they eventually looked beyond 
themselves by seeking ties with the broader labor movement through the ILA, and 
even agreements with black unions, Galveston’s white unions were still motivated 
by self-interest rather than class solidarity.30 
Despite its essentially conservative nature, the SBA was willing to use its 
strength to improve wages and working conditions.  In August, 1870, the SBA 
became the first labor organization in Texas to receive a state charter.  A charter 
gave the SBA the right to conduct business transactions, to sue and be sued, and to 
receive donations, legacies and bequests.  During the 1870s, the SBA’s 
membership grew to include most of Galveston’s white screwmen and as numbers 
increased, the association extended its control over working conditions, wages and 
the labor supply.  Less strict entrance requirements enabled membership to 
increase from around one hundred men in 1872 to between one hundred and fifty to 
two hundred by the mid 1870s.  In 1875, the black ball rule was raised from four to 
fifteen, increasing membership still further.  In March 1871, new work rules included 
setting a nine hour day, with seven hours for night work, and “time shall count from 
leaving to returning to the Wharf.”  By the mid-1870s, the SBA adopted the 
outward trappings of unionism with caps and badges, and an annual parade wearing 
“suitable uniform and regalia.”  In the late 1870s, employers agreed to a wage 
increase from five to six dollars a day, with seven dollars for foremen.  In September 
1880, the SBA imposed a seventy-five bale limit for a day’s work.  Any foreman or 
gang asked to do more was to leave the job forthwith.  A few months later, a special 
meeting considered the complaint of “Bro. Charles Newell and gang” who were 
replaced after quitting a ship for having no cook.  Newell’s gang returned to work, and 
stevedores were made responsible for supplying a cook to gangs working in the 
outer harbor.  These work rules were rigidly enforced, and members heavily fined for 
30 ILA Local 310, Constitution and By-Laws, 1915.
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infractions.31  
Although entrance requirements were eased, rules such as the six-month 
apprenticeship still ensured that only competent local men became SBA members.  
Moreover, screwmen remained in short supply in southern ports.  Requirements 
could be raised or lowered to meet the demand for labor but, overall, they kept only 
a limited number of skilled men available to employers.  Other rules, such as the 
injunction against working sailors, were more directly aimed at enforcing a closed 
shop.  In late 1870, the SBA notified stevedores that all stages of loading were to 
be considered as cotton screwing and tried to prevent the hiring of nonunion men 
during the slack season.  After 1875, the SBA widened its boycott of nonunion 
labor.  Another significant early ruling came when ordinary screwmen regained control 
of the SBA in 1869.  The association’s constitution was amended to read: “No 
member of this Association shall work with or for, any person or persons, who shall 
employ to work on Shipboard, persons of Color; under penalty of expulsion from 
this Association.”32    
As a cosmopolitan seaport, Galveston had a reputation for tolerance both in 
its indulgence of less reputable forms of entertainment and in race relations.  
Galveston’s black population prior to the Civil War was not as significant as in other 
Southern cities.  Slaves were illegally imported through Galveston but the city took 
measures to curtail its free black population.  According to the somewhat unreliable 
census figures of 1850, Galveston had 678 slave and 30 free blacks, or 16 percent 
of the city’s total population.  In 1860, Galveston’s 308 slave and 2 free blacks 
comprised only 4 percent of the total.  In contrast, the South’s largest free black 
community in New Orleans was well-developed and stratified.  In the decade after 
1860, that city’s black population doubled to 50,456, increasing from 14.6 percent of 
31 SBA, Minutes, I:97, 207, 378; Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent 
Association,” 60-78; Reese, “The Evolution of an Early Texas Union.”
32 SBA, Minutes, I:54, 134.
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the total population in 1860 to 26 percent by 1870.  Galveston’s slaves chiefly 
worked as domestic servants or dock laborers and indulgent owners apparently 
used their domestics for ostentatious displays of their own status.  A visiting British 
army officer noted: “innumerable Negroes and Negresses parading about the 
streets in the most outrageously grand costumes—silks, satins, crinolines, hats with 
feathers, lace mantles etc., forming an absurd contrast to the simple dress of their 
mistresses.  Many were driving about in their masters’ carriages.”33 
Like many southern cities, Galveston’s black population rose after the Civil 
War as freedmen, many of them young men, moved to urban areas to seek work.  
By 1870, the city’s black population stood at 3,007 or 21 percent of the total.  The 
number of black citizens continued to grow for the rest of the century although the 
percentage remained constant at around 20 percent.  Despite their relatively small 
numbers in the antebellum years, Galveston’s black community had already begun 
to form their own institutions.  The first black church was organized for slaves by white 
Baptists in 1840 but the congregation built their own First Missionary Baptist Church 
for around $10,000 in 1850.  The Reedy Chapel on Broadway became the first 
black Methodist Church in Texas in 1848.  After the war, the Freedman’s Bureau 
established itself in Galveston, opening the first black school in 1865.  As Radical 
Reconstruction fell away and segregation began to take its place, Galveston’s 
churches, schools, and most public buildings were racially segregated by the mid 
1880s.  While separate churches and schools were often a matter of choice, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875 encouraged black citizens to protest against discrimination on 
railroads and in other public places.  In 1875, two Negro women sued the manager 
of the Galveston Opera House after being ejected from the ladies circle.  Although 
the manager was convicted and fined the case was eventually dismissed by a 
33 McComb, Galveston: A History, 85; Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 14; 
Fornell, The Galveston Era, 115-125; Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent 
Association,” 71.
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district judge.34
Housing was less segregated than in other Texas cities, particularly among 
the laboring classes, partly because of the lack of space on the island.  According to 
one architectural historian, most houses east of Twelfth Street and south of Avenue J 
were inhabited by white and black laborers, with the poorest families living closest to 
the water.  Laborers also occupied landfill areas on the western and southern edges 
of town.  Many families lived along the city’s back alleys where converted stables 
and slave quarters stood at the rear of the large houses fronting the main street.  
Although blacks tended to live in pockets around black schools in the eighth, ninth 
and twelfth wards, there were no predominantly black wards.  The black population 
of the wards lay between 9 and 29 percent although this upper limit had risen to 47 
percent by 1890.35 
There were eight black churches and three schools in Galveston in 1882.  The 
following year, the City Directory listed twenty-one different black societies.  Some 
of these societies, such as the Knights of Pythias, Rising Sons and Daughters of 
Progress, or the Garrisson Club formed by young black men to cultivate taste for 
music and literature and all subjects that would tend to advance its members, catered 
to the small black middle class.  Other clubs, such as the Hawley Guards, Excelsior 
Band or the Colored Cadet band which was often employed at big white funerals 
and in street parades, perhaps had a less limited membership.  These societies 
served to foster cultural identity and racial uplift among the city’s black population but 
they were also a means of isolation.36 
Racial lines were perhaps less clearly drawn in the city’s lower forms of 
amusement, which were not solely reserved for the white population.  According to 
 34 McComb, Galveston, 85; Armstead, Reminiscences of  Black Church in Galveston; Rice, 
The Negro in Texas, 145.
35 Beasley, The Alleys and Back Buildings of Galveston, 7, 10; Kretzman, “A House Built 
Upon the Sand,” 183; Hardwick, Mythic Galveston, 79.
36 Galveston , City Directory 1881-1882; Galveston , City Directory 1882-1883, 101-2. 
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one of Galveston’s black middle class leaders, the Reverend Ralph Albert Scull, by 
the 1870s saloons and gaming were lucrative businesses and “The majority of the 
laborers drank and played cards or bet on monte.”  Scull listed several of the livelier 
black hang outs including Ike Rector’s “flourishing place” at Post Office and 25th 
Street, “Soup and Bully” at Market and 27th Streets, and Bailey Sparks’ “lively 
corner” at Avenue L and 28th street.  These and dozens of other smaller places in all 
parts of town providing “Drinks, women and games anything on the sport line.”  The 
most notable participant in this sport was Jack Johnson, the first black heavyweight 
boxing champion of the world who worked on Galveston’s waterfront for several 
years while developing his pugilistic skills.  Jack “Lil’ Arthur” Johnson described his 
fellow longshoremen as being:
    some of the toughest and hardest-boiled men imaginable.  To them, fighting was 
    one of the important functions of existence.  They fought upon every occasion and 
    on any pretext.  They shot craps and indulged in other forms of gambling with 
    almost as much ardor as they fought.37  
 Black laborers had worked on Galveston’s wharves since the antebellum 
period.  Before piers were constructed, black draymen would unload cargo and 
passengers in shallow water accompanied by “hosts of slouching darkies, shouting 
and dancing as they move about their tasks.”  Given the casual, unskilled nature of 
dockwork and the relative cheapness of black labor, freedmen probably found work 
on the waterfront in the years immediately after the war.  While the Daily News  
editorialized on the need to compel freedmen to work,nothing suggests that the 
SBA, or any other class of white labor, was threatened by black labor until the 
organization of the first black unions after 1870.  As in New Orleans, white labor 
dominated the waterfront and cotton screwing was a white preserve and the SBA 
were determined to keep it that way.  The SBA’s decision to exclude black workers 
appears to have stemmed from racial motives rather than a genuine economic 
37 Scull, “Black Galveston;” Johnson, Jack Johnson is a Dandy, 32. 
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threat.38 
Before the 1890s, very few of Galveston’s screwmen were native 
Southerners.  The screwmen were an ethnically diverse group and overwhelmingly 
foreign-born, coming from England and Ireland as well as Germany and Scandinavia.  
Socioeconomist Herbert Bloch suggested that “These workers, primarily German 
and Irish, came equipped with a disposition towards competition and the ideology of 
a free-labor system and an unfortunate belief in black inferiority.”  This conditioning in 
job-competition and work-scarcity derived from European conditions where a labor 
surplus and shortage of agricultural land made the perception a reality.  New Orleans 
also experienced considerable immigration even before the war and Irish and 
Germans dominated certain sectors of dock work such as screwing and cotton yard 
work.  Arnesen argued that many of these immigrants were antislavery, either 
because they came from a radical democratic background or because slavery 
competed with free labor.  They also opposed the power of the old planter-class.  
However, none of this implied sympathy or understanding for free blacks.  
Immigrants following the tradition of artisan republicanism identified labor as the 
source of wealth and civic virtue.  Blacks without independence or property did not 
possess civic virtue—an assumption reinforced by racial attitudes in the South.  
While white laborers sought to protect their jobs and raise the dignity of labor with 
the eight-hour day, blacks simply wanted the right to work and protection from 
violence.39    
 The Colored National Labor Union formed in late 1869 as a response to the 
exclusion of black workers by white unions.  The CLNU’s aim was to improve the 
working conditions of black labor but it did not discriminate against race, sex or skill, 
and even accepted Chinese labor.  The Union included industrial, agricultural and 
common laborers as well as skilled artisans and mechanics and although black 
38 King, “Glimpses of Texas,” 403.
39 Reese, “The Evolution of an Early Texas Union,” 162, n.14; Bloch, “Labor and the 
Negro,” 163; Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 4-7.
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workers were the primary focus, it knew that it could not reject sympathetic whites.  
The union made an effort to organize state associations among southern black 
workers although its principles, “the chance to work and rise in American society 
through industry, temperance, frugality, and education,” reflected the ideas of 
individual effort propounded by the black elite rather than of workers themselves.  
However, black dockworkers in Southern ports were taking collective action and 
organizing independently of the CNLU.  In Charleston, Negro longshoremen 
mounted successful strikes in 1867 and 1868 and formed a Longshoremen’s 
Protective Union Association in 1869.  In New Orleans, black screwmen and 
longshoremen had struck in 1865 and 1867.  A Screwmen’s Benevolent 
Association No. 2 formed in 1870 and a Longshoremen’s Protective Union in 1872.  
Black workers organized regardless of whether the cultural and ideological gap 
between white and black labor was too wide to be bridged by unionism.  However, 
they did see unions as a collective means to fight against exclusion by white labor 
and even to gain a measure of acceptance as organized workers with a common 
interest in wages and job security.  Political polarization also drove a wedge 
between white and black labor, with freedmen supporting the Republicans and 
Reconstruction and whites the Democratic party.  Arnesen points out that both black 
and white labor clung to party loyalty, regardless of their needs as laboring men.  
This point is illustrated in Galveston and Houston, where organizing black workers 
also served to bolster the position of black Republican leaders.40   
Incomplete or conflicting evidence obscures the origins of Galveston’s first 
black waterfront associations.  Both Galveston and Houston had formed local CNLU 
associations by 1871.  The Galveston branch was formed under the guidance of 
George Ruby, a black carpetbagger who had moved from New York to Louisiana 
before arriving in Texas.  Ruby was a state senator, an influential Republican figure 
40 Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 32; Hine, “Black Organized Labor in 
Reconstruction Charleston,” 507; Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 17-8, 22-4, 28-
30, 44, 51-3.
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and the leader of Galveston’s black community.  According to Carl Moneyhon’s 
study of early Republicanism in Texas, Ruby not only organized the black labor 
force on the docks, the Negro Longshoremen’s Benevolent Association was an 
important part of his political machine.  In a study of Texas’ black leadership, Merlin 
Pitre argues that while Ruby accepted the aims of the national CNLU, he also saw 
local organizations as a means of enlarging his own urban power base.  According to 
Pitre, black workers began to move onto Galveston’s waterfront after 1870 despite 
the hostility of white longshoremen.  Although these black longshoremen welcomed 
organizational efforts, under Ruby’s leadership “the local Union became tied to the 
Republican hierarchy.”  At the annual labor convention held in Houston in 1870, 
Ruby focused on party politics, urging black workers to vote for a party nominee 
rather than discussing the political, economic and social needs of blacks.  The 
Galveston Union proved short-lived, as did a branch of a white socialist International 
Workingmen’s Association formed in 1872.  The IWA disintegrated when some 
members argued for the inclusion of black workers.  As one opponent of the 
proposal explained, “if the colored man is to be taken into full fellowship in this 
society, socially and politically, I must decline to become a member.”  Any effort to 
organize a more permanent laborers association would have to come from within 
Galveston’s black community.41 
Ruth Allen’s Chapters in the History of Organized Labor in Texas cites both 
1870 and 1876 for the formation of a Negro Longshoremen’s Benevolent 
Association.  The latter seems the more likely date, however, given that Allen 
elsewhere claims to have seen original minutes for a Negro Longshoremen’s 
Association formed in 1876.  She repeats this evidence in The Great Southwest 
Strike and adds a Negro Screwmen’s Association from the same date.  Later 
scholars of Southern and Texas labor history, notably, Lawrence D. Rice and F. Ray 
41 Moneyhon, Republicanism in Reconstruction Texas, 134, 159; Pitre, Through Many 
Dangers, Toils and Snares, 170-1; Reese, “The Early History of Labor Organizations in Texas,” 
11-13.
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Marshall, tend to repeat Allen’s findings without further inquiry.  None of the above 
works, however, cite any direct evidence to support their findings.  Entries in the 
Galveston City Directory, the most significant source of contemporary information, 
only rarely included entries for black labor associations but 1880 is the earliest date it 
gives for the organization of the black Longshoremen’s Association No. 1.  The 
Directory for 1882-83 does list a Longshoremen’s Benevolent Association 
organized in August 1875 but this was clearly a white association, probably of 
coastwise workers.  The Directory never lists the most important black association, 
the Cotton Jammers and Longshoremen’s Association.  The generally accepted 
date for the Cotton Jammers is 1879, when the association applied for a state 
charter, although a much later account in a black newspaper suggests it may have 
begun as early as 1874.  Certainly a union would need to be well-established 
before applying for a charter.  Despite the lack of hard evidence, it seems clear that 
Galveston’s black longshoremen began to organize in the 1870s, most probably 
under the direction of the black elite.   However, the first evidence of collective action 
by black labor, which came during the Great Strike of 1877, had no apparent 
connection to either a black labor organization or the elite.42 
The labor turmoil that swept the country in 1877 was a source of some 
anxiety to Galveston’s business community.  The Galveston Daily News tracked the 
contagion and sought to quiet local fears when the strike reached railroad workers in 
Marshall, Texas, on July 25.  “Everybody seems to be busy,” reported the News, 
“and consequently happy, with not even the whispered mutterings of a strike to be 
heard along the entire sweep of the wharf.”  Despite this optimism, rumors of a strike 
were already circulating and three days later the newspaper’s headline announced, “It 
Is Here.”  The first outbreak began on the Morgan Line wharf as a crowd of white and 
back laborers, thickly interspersed with police officers, moved along the wharf hoping 
42 Allen, Chapters in the History of Organized Labor in Texas, 137, 173;  Allen, The Great 
Southwest Strike, 24, 108; Rice, The Negro in Texas, 188-9; Marshall, Labor in the South, 65; 
Galveston City Directory, 1881-82, 73; Galveston City Times, Sept. 10, 1904.
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to persuade other workers to join them.  Police offered protection to non-strikers but 
the strikers appeared in a buoyant rather than threatening mood.  After a brief 
counsel with the strikers, Morgan agent Captain Fowler acceded to their demands 
and they returned to work “laughing and looking right jolly to the discharge of their 
duties.”  The News  made no mention of any black organization but it did report a 
rumor that Morgan’s black laborers had been induced to strike for higher wages by 
white men on the upper, Mallory Line wharf.  Longshoremen’s union officials denied 
any direct involvement but expressed sympathy with the strikers: “thirty cents an 
hour was not reasonable compensation for the sort of work required of the negroes, 
and that as they were getting forty cents an hour they thought it but just that the 
colored laborers should receive the same price.”  This minor dispute is the first 
example of the two contradictory impulses within white organized labor.  On the one 
hand, the white longshoremen’s support for the Morgan workers may have been 
genuine since lower wages for one group could depress wages all round.  
Alternatively, however, the white organization could have been playing to 
employers’ racial sympathies, reasoning that at equal wage rates employers would 
choose white labor over black.43     
Rumors of further action circulated over the weekend and on Monday, July 
30, about fifty black laborers downed tools at the Giradin building.  Marching in a 
body down the Strand the men toured other sites to enlist support for their claim to a 
two dollar daily wage.  Accompanied by a police detachment, the well-ordered 
strikers patiently listened to a speech by the mayor which failed to deter them.  Later 
that day, police and citizens armed with pistols and batons quickly suppressed 
scuffles between strikers and draymen at a cotton press yard.  At a mass meeting 
that afternoon, the strike’s white leaders urged the men to remain peaceful and 
appointed a committee to meet with contractors.  That evening, black washerwomen 
joined the protest by attacking a white steam laundry and forcing the town’s Chinese 
43 Galveston Daily News, July 25, 28, 1877.
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laundries to close.  The mood of the strikers hardened the next day after a wharf front 
altercation between a white man and a black striker.  Police arrested the white man 
but when a group of strikers threatened to seize the man and lynch him, the police 
fired their pistols into the air wounding one man.  The incident prompted the 
enlistment of one hundred special police officers and the town’s “citizen soldiery” to 
patrol the town.  At a turbulent meeting that evening, 250 strikers heard that some 
contractors were paying or had agreed to pay the two dollars while others refused.  
White and black speakers condemned the police shootings but urged the 
continuance of the strike.  One black speaker, however, rose to condemn both the 
threats and the strike.44 
Norris Wright Cuney was a rising figure in the local community and state 
Republican party.  Cuney’s mother had been a slave and his father a white planter 
who made sure that Cuney received a good education.  Cuney proved to be an 
able politician and, under George Ruby’s guidance, quickly established himself in the 
Texas Republican party after the Civil War.  Cuney’s biographer, Virginia Hinze, 
suggests that for long periods in the 1860s and 1870s Cuney had no visible means 
of support, although he might have been connected to the Belle Poole 
Establishment,  the “worst set of Gamblers and whiskey men in the country.”  Cuney 
did operate a tobacco and liquor establishment in 1875 and was twice arrested by 
the United States Marshal in Galveston for violations of revenue laws.  He held 
several minor customs posts granted by the governor but this patronage ended 
with the election of a Democratic governor in 1874.  When Ruby left Galveston for 
Florida in the early 1870s, Cuney remained as heir apparent.  Cuney made his first 
bid for local respectability in 1875 when he ran for mayor of Galveston.  Cuney lost 
the race, but his demeanor and political skill won the respect of his white opponents.  
According to Hinze’s assessment, Cuney was an energetic climber and hustler 
whose hearty manner and heavy smoking and drinking were qualities well-suited to 
44 Galveston Daily News, July 31, Aug. 1; Marshall, Labor in the South, 66.
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the horse-trading of the political arena.45  
Addressing the meeting, Cuney told the strikers that three hundred men could 
accomplish nothing “except riots and bloodshed” when there were over fifteen 
hundred laboring men in the city willing to work.  Moreover, there were seven 
hundred armed men in Galveston, with one thousand more in Houston, ready to 
“annihilate them all in an hour:”  According to the Daily News reporter:
    He deprecated in the severest terms the follies into which the colored men had  
    fallen, and said they were not supported by the white men, nor by the full strength 
    of their own color . . . and in an elegant and forcible manner appealed to his
    countrymen to heed his warning and go peacefully to their homes and stay there.
Although “treated with contempt by the rabid faction in the crowd,” the strike was 
over and Cuney received credit from a grateful white business community.  Hailing 
Cuney as “one of the most intelligent of his race in the state,” the Daily News 
editorialized: “Mr. Cuney knows but too well that the poor, deluded colored men 
who are now on strike in this city are but the tools of some few designing white men 
who have aspirations—political and otherwise.”  According to the News, Galveston's 
“bona fide workingmen” were hardworking and law-abiding until led astray by the 
ideas of outside political agitators, Communist Internationals and Molly Maguires.  
Inflammatory rhetoric aside, Cuney’s speeches did demonstrate his concern for the 
consequences of black workers inciting trouble, particularly given the rabid anti-labor 
sentiment of the time.  However, he may also have had the more personal motive 
of building his own stock among the white business elite.  Cuney, however, was no 
puppet, seeking instead to advance both his own personal interests and those of 
his race.  He took a personal stand against segregation and would always insist that 
Negroes be given equal educational and work opportunities.  Within a few years, 
Cuney would lead the challenge by Galveston’s black longshoremen against the 
dominance of white labor on the waterfront.46      
45 Hinze, “Norris Wright Cuney,” 1-24, 57.
46 Galveston Daily News, July 31, Aug. 1, 2, 1877.
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Cuney would be aided by the men of the Cotton Jammers and 
Longshoremen’s Association and the first sign of a new assertiveness on their part 
came in early October, 1879.  The SBA called a special meeting to discuss taking 
action against and application by the Cotton Jammers for a state charter.  By granting 
legal rights, a state charter would recognize the black association as a well-
established institution.  The SBA appointed a special committee with full power to 
take “such action as they deem proper.”  An appropriation of one hundred dollars, 
and more if necessary, underscored how seriously the SBA took the threat from the 
Cotton Jammers.  The organization’s charter was read at the next meeting but there 
is no record of any further action being taken.  There was perhaps little action the 
SBA could take because its own success was now beginning to work against it.  As 
cotton production and exports rose so the demand for screwmen increased yet the 
SBA stuck to its strict controls, particularly the seventy-five bale loading limit.  That 
January, local businessmen had complained of the SBA’s restrictive practices and 
with the demand for skilled labor rising, stevedores were increasingly tempted to 
look beyond the SBA.    47  
The port of Galveston made great strides between the end of the Civil War 
and 1880, developing from a regional port into one of national importance.  Local 
businessmen pushed for Galveston’s success, confident that they and the city were 
destined for great things.  They built on the island port’s natural advantages by 
investing in the commercial infrastructure of banks, railroads and shipping facilities that 
attracted northern capital in the form of the Mallory Company.  Mallory’s regular 
coastwise service established an important direct link with New York but real 
economic success depended upon foreign exports of cotton.  With the Texas 
cotton crop growing exponentially and commercial agriculture spread further 
westward, the port’s future seemed all but secured.  The task over the next decade 
47 SBA, Minutes, I:345.
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would be to attract federal money for harbor improvements to ensure that Galveston 
would fulfill her destiny.  
The port’s commercial growth brought increased opportunities on the 
waterfront, particularly for the cotton screwmen.  In southern ports, screwmen were 
the aristocracy of the segmented and hierarchical world of waterfront labor and their 
skill in ‘jamming’ the maximum number of bales into a hold played a vital role in a 
ship’s profitability.  Cotton screwing was the province of white labor and Galveston’s 
white screwmen organized themselves into the first and most powerful union on the 
waterfront.  The SBA quickly developed from a benevolent society into a job 
conscious union that exercised a high degree of control over wages and working 
conditions.  Like other craft unions, the SBA also sought to control the labor supply 
and barred sailors, nonunion men and other ‘outsiders’ from working as screwmen.  
The union also enforced Southern racial mores by prohibiting members for working 
for any employer who hired Negro labor.  
Union rules alone, however, were not enough to exclude black labor in the 
South, particularly in such a segmented and expanding labor market as Galveston’s 
waterfront.  By at least the mid-1870s, black workers not only found work on the 
waterfront, they were forming their own waterfront associations.  Moreover, during 
the Great Strike of 1877, black longshoremen and other laborers demonstrated their 
willingness to strike for higher wages.  However, the most important developments 
for black labor during this time were the emergence of Norris Wright Cuney and the 
Cotton Jammers and Longshoremen’s Association.  Cuney, a black Republican 
who successfully established himself among Galveston’s white business elite, 
would play the central role in securing work for black screwmen and longshoremen 
during the next decade.  The Cotton Jammers may not have been the first black 
association on the waterfront, but it was to become the most well-established and 
long-lasting.  Within the next few years, the Cotton Jammers would emerge as a 
permanent competitor to the white screwmen: a competitor that the SBA could 
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either work with or against, but would not be able to ignore.
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CHAPTER TWO
“The colored men along the shore:” The Cotton Jammers and 
Longshoremen’s Association and the Challenge from Black Labor
Galveston’s trade grew during the 1880s as the city’s business community 
continued its efforts to expand the port and its trade.  This growth in trade was 
reflected by a growth in organized labor on the waterfront and the emergence of a 
permanent black labor force.  Aided by Norris Wright Cuney’s influence in white 
business circles, black workers successfully challenged the monopoly of the white 
screwmen in 1883 and then coastwise workers on the Mallory docks in 1885.  In 
1883, the continued rise of cotton exports strengthened Cuney’s hand by 
undermining the SBA’s ability to enforce a closed shop.  In 1885, the willingness of 
the staunchly antiunion Mallory Company to exploit racial divisions to secure 
cheaper labor gave Cuney and his men another opening.  In New Orleans, 
waterfront workers had learnt the consequences of a divided workforce by 1880 
when the port’s first biracial waterfront organization began to mediate racial divisions.  
Nationally, the Knights of Labor were organizing all workers regardless of race, skill or 
gender yet this enlightened policy was circumscribed by the structural and ideological 
weaknesses of the order.  The Knights had a strong presence in Galveston yet 
white screwmen and longshoremen continued to fight to exclude black labor from the 
waterfront and even won KOL support during the 1885 strike. A citywide boycott 
called by the Knights failed to prevent Mallory from hiring black longshoremen but 
succeeded in breaking apart Galveston’s only biracial labor assembly.  By 1886, 
Cuney had achieved his goal of securing an income for himself and work for black 
laborers.  However, these men were not simply content to find regular employment: 
almost immediately black workers under the banner of the Cotton Jammers and 
Longshoremen’s Association began to seek recognition from white unions as a 
legitimate part of the union movement.  
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Galveston’s continued economic growth faced a major challenge at the 
beginning of the 1880s as the development of a national railroad network provided 
a mixed blessing.  With over 6,000 miles of track laid in Texas during the decade, 
1,527 miles put down in 1881 alone, the port benefited from the railroad boom.  
Galveston was the only Texas port with significant connections to this network via 
Houston while smaller ports such as Beaumont and Corpus Christi remained 
relatively isolated until the turn of the century.  Cotton production in Texas also 
continued to increase, tripling to over 1.2 million bales between 1870 and 1880 and 
reaching 1.6 million before the end of the decade.  However, the expansion of a 
national railroad network also provided Galveston with increasing competition.  
Rivalry with New Orleans increased as each port’s hinterland expanded, and 
particularly once a Houston-New Orleans rail link was established.  More importantly, 
an all rail route to New York via St. Louis offered a cheaper alternative to water 
transport.  New cotton markets and presses opened in Denison, Dallas and St. 
Louis during the mid-1870s, reflecting this shift away from a reliance on seaports as 
the only conduit for trade.  Moreover, since the smaller railroad lines serving 
Galveston could not compete with the rates offered by the large networks of Jay 
Gould and Collis P. Huntington serving St. Louis, it cost less to ship through St. 
Louis to New York than through Galveston.  As the Daily News complained in late in 
1879, “We don’t wonder at Galveston getting no cotton from northern Texas, where 
rates of  freight are proportionately four times the through rates from points in 
northern Texas to New York.”1  
Galveston’s business community responded to this new threat by renewing 
its efforts to win federal support for harbor improvements.  The disadvantages of the 
sand bar that restricted the approach to Galveston Bay became more pronounced 
1  Young, Tracks to the Sea, 3-4;  Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent 
Association,” 134; 
Ellis, “The Texas Cotton Compression Industry,” 90; Williams, “The Development of a 
Market Economy,” 380, 388; Galveston Daily News, Sept. 10, 1879.
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as larger iron and steel-hulled steam vessels began to replace wooden sailing ships.  
After several failed attempts to provide a deep water channel, businessmen at the 
Cotton Exchange organized a “Committee on Deep Water” to commission an 
engineering study and lobby for federal money.  The committee’s members were 
cotton brokers,bankers, lawyers and land developers and since congressional 
support for the New South largely came from Republicans representing Northern 
capital, the election of the Republican R. B. Hawley as representative for Galveston 
may also partly be explained by a need to further the cause.  A deep water harbor 
could turn Galveston into a focal point for railroads carrying western minerals and grain 
to meet ships to transport these products to growing overseas markets.  As local 
boosters argued, a deep water harbor was vital if Galveston was to overtake its 
greatest rival, New Orleans:  
    Either Galveston or New Orleans must become the great city of the Gulf, the 
    metropolis of all the empire west of the Mississippi and Missouri . . . .  The city 
    that shall stand second at the first, will stand so far behind  it as to be wholly out of 
    comparison with it, a mere satellite, so to speak, of a great planet, entirely 
    overshadowed by it and in its power.2 
The Deep Water Committee sought support from a coalition of Western and 
Southwestern states whose grain and mineral sources, unlike the seasonal cotton 
crop, could provide year-round work for the port.  California, for example, had 
become one of the nation’s leading wheat-producing areas by the 1880s and 
Galveston had taken steps to promote the grain trade from the the mid-1870s with 
the formation of a Produce Exchange, the Galveston Elevator Company and the 
Texas Star Flour Mills.  Politicians and businessmen across the west were eager to 
find another outlet to the east coast and Europe for their produce and Galveston 
offered the shortest connection to shipping.  John Evans, territorial governor of 
Colorado, became a leading promoter of Galveston, and his portentous rhetoric 
matched that of Galveston’s business leaders in the quest for a direct route from 
“summit to sea:” 
2 Land and Thompson, Galveston, 56.
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    we will, in a short time, work a wonderful change in the relation of the mountain and 
    of the Gulf, so clearly indicated by the wise Creator when he put the treasures of 
    the mountains, and brought the great arm of the Atlantic Ocean so far West toward 
    them, for their distribution.
With the flow of Manifest Destiny thus reversed, and Galveston’s deep-
water harbor as the nearest port of entry and Denver as a central interior point of 
delivery, the two would become among the greatest cities on the Continent.”3 
A less grandiloquent, and more business-minded support came from the 
railroads as both Gould and Huntington were attracted by Galveston’s strategic 
position.  Gould planned to run a steamship line from Galveston to Vera Cruz, thus 
improving his connections to Mexico.  He hoped to persuade the Wharf Company 
and the local business community into providing terminal facilities for his proposed 
line.  More significant was the interest of Collis P. Huntington’s Southern Pacific 
railroad.  Although interested in New Orleans, Huntington also knew that Galveston 
presented a shorter haul by railroad from California.  Like Gould, Huntington made 
public his interest in Galveston as a terminal facility for the Southern Pacific.  
Huntington, however, made a deep-water harbor a precondition of his choosing 
Galveston over New Orleans.4  
The expanding railroad network also presented a threat to Galveston’s 
regular coastwise carriers, Morgan and the now dominant Mallory line.  According to 
Baughman, the two lines met this threat by plotting a step by step course from 
competition to cooperation as rail and water carriers in the southwest engaged in a 
complex web of agreements to equalize freight rates and eliminate competition 
during the 1880s..  Beginning in the late 1870s, both lines sought to improve their 
own rail connections.  Morgan promoted its Houston to New Orleans connection 
while Mallory invested in the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe.  They had also reached a 
secret agreement equalizing their respective sea rates between New York and the 
3 Axelrod, “Galveston: Denver’s Deep-Water Port,” 217-28, quote 227; 
4 Young, Tracks to the Sea, 5, 51-2.
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Gulf.  Rate cutting would henceforth only be used against third party competitors 
while Morgan and Mallory restricted their competition to services and railroad 
connections. By the mid-1880s, Mallory was linked to the Gould system while 
Huntington’s Southern Pacific had acquired Morgan’s railroad interests.  The Southern 
Pacific would also swallow up Morgan’s shipping line, although retaining the Morgan 
name.  All that remained was to equalize railroad freight rates, and this was achieved 
by a series of agreements in the late 1880s.  Freight costs were fixed around rail 
rates from St. Louis and Mallory’s shipping rates, with a change in either rate leading 
to a compensatory change in the other.  Consequently, all traffic originating west of a 
line running from Buffalo down to the lower border of North Carolina, traveled east 
via the Texas rail-sea link.  The formation of the Southern Railway and Steamship 
Association similarly equalized competition between Southern carriers.5 
The SBA was a well-established union by 1880, with assets of ten thousand 
dollars and a membership of around 225 men, rising to 300 by mid-decade.  The 
Association now included most of the port’s white screwmen and, as James Reese 
points out, operated as a craft union controlling wages, working conditions and the 
labor supply.  A new work rule introduced at the beginning of the 1879-80 season 
emphasized the SBA’s strength.  Seventy-five bales per gang would now be 
considered a day’s work and gangs would only load more if paid overtime.  
Stevedores were warned that if they discharged any foremen or gangs for working 
to this limit, they would have all their gangs withdrawn.  By restricting the amount of 
work per day, the new rule ensured that all SBA members could receive a fair share 
of available work.  New Orleans had introduced a similar limit two seasons 
previously, and through such measures longshoremen in Galveston and New 
Orleans avoided the indignities and corruption of the daily shape-up.  For 
stevedores and shipping agents, however, a seventy-bale limit increased labor 
5 Baughman, “Rail-Water Systems in the Southwest,” 373-9; The Mallorys of Mystic, 
156-8.
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costs and loading time.  Perhaps most galling to employers was the sight of 
screwmen, having stowed their seventy-five bales by midday, strolling off the wharf 
boasting of working only “banker’s hours.”  Moreover, the shortage of skilled labor 
meant even the SBA’s own foremen found difficulties reaching the limit.  In March 
1881, a Brother Wilson complained that he found it impossible to find enough SBA 
men to do the work and wanted permission to employ nonunion men.  Two weeks 
later, another foreman asked if there was a limit under seventy-five bales for 
shorthanded gangs.6  
Local cotton merchants and ship agents complained of the SBA’s restrictive 
practices and the high price of cotton screwing, but to little effect.  In January, 1879, a 
committee of the Cotton Exchange met to discuss the high cost of shipping cotton, 
particularly when compared to New Orleans.  Committee members proffered 
several causes but were most “evidently impressed” by shipping agent J. Moller’s 
attack on the SBA.  According to Moller, the loading of cotton was “one of the most 
exorbitant charges” because the screwmen were paid their six dollars from the 
moment they set foot on a lighter rather from when they began stowing.  They were 
also paid during bad weather when no cotton could be loaded yet the vessel even 
had to feed the idle men.  Moreover, the SBA were trying to expand their control 
by taking steps to prevent ordinary laborers from loading cotton.  Moller argued that 
the work could be done for half the cost by men from other ports but it would take a 
joint effort from all the ship agents to successfully challenge the SBA.7 
Although Moller declared his willingness to lead an attack, there seemed little 
to challenge the SBA’s power as long as the port’s trade continued to grow and the 
demand for skilled labor remained high.  The employment structure of the waterfront 
also helped screwmen, and to a lesser extent longshoremen, maintain their position.  
6 Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association,” 61; 100; SBA Minutes, 
1:378, 396, 399; Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 41; Mers, Working the 
Waterfront, 16.
7 Galveston  Daily News, Jan. 23, 1879.
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Waterfront workers were hired by stevedores who in turn contracted with a shipping 
line operating a regular service or agents who commissioned tramp vessels.  Only 
Mallory dealt directly with its workers at this time, giving that company a greater say 
in wages and working conditions.  Some stevedores still used sailors and other 
nonunion labor but, despite their constant appeals to the SBA to ease working 
restrictions, stevedores made no concerted effort to break the SBA’s control.  One 
reason for this reluctance was the close personal relationship between employer and 
employed.  Many of the port’s stevedores had risen from the screwmen’s ranks and 
were still active SBA members and usually employed the same foremen and 
gangs from job to job.  John Lovell points to several other factors that helped unions 
gain the ascendancy during the age of sail.  Stevedoring firms were usually small and 
in competition with one another and so lacked both the resources and will to mount 
either an individual or united challenge to union power.  Many stevedores, in fact, 
preferred to work with unions because by regulating wages and working conditions 
they eliminated competition.  The balance between employer and employed would 
shift in the next several decades as large, foreign-owned steamship companies and 
more intense commercial pressure came to dominate over the irregular tramp 
service.  These companies were more prepared to exert their influence over the 
stevedores when negotiating wages and working conditions and, most importantly, 
were more than willing to hire black labor.  For the time being, however, Galveston’s 
stevedores appeared more or less willing to maintain the status quo.8 
While stevedores were reluctant to challenge the SBA there were signs of a 
growing assertiveness on the part of black laborers.  The appearance of the Cotton 
Jammers in 1879 was the most significant of these signs but there was at least one 
other black labor organization by the early 1880s.  The City Directory for 1882-83 
lists four waterfront laboring associations besides the SBA, which included a black 
Longshoremen’s Association No. 1, organized in 1880.  The other three associations 
8 Lovell, “Sail, Steam and Emergent Dockers’ Unionism,” 239-40.
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were white: the coastwise Longshoremen’s Benevolent Association chartered on 
March 23, 1881; the coastwise New York Wharf Benevolent Association; and the 
deep sea Longshoremen’s Benevolent Union organized in March, 1882.  A later 
Directory listed a black Longshoremen’s Benevolent Association chartered March 
1881, but this may be the same association as the No. 1.  However, there were 
other signs of the growing presence of black labor on the waterfront.  In September 
1881, Negro longshoremen working for the Morgan shipping line asked for a wage 
raise to fifty cents an hour for day work and seventy-five for nights.  The raise was 
granted without any confrontation.  Draymen and street car drivers were also seeking 
wage rises.  A strike by 280 white cotton handlers the following year failed to 
prevent the hiring of Negroes.9  
Despite these gains, it would be far more difficult to break the SBA’s 
monopoly, as stevedore Gus Lewis discovered when he set a black gang to work 
loading cotton in 1882.  The black gang quit work when confronted by a white 
screwmen’s delegation, but this did not prevent a general walkout by SBA men.  
No reason was given for the walkout, although Lewis claimed the action was aimed 
at him for hiring black labor even though there were no available SBA men.  
According to Lewis, a return to work was conditional on him quitting as a stevedore 
which he would do if the SBA was willing to buy out his $2,500 investment in tools.  
Lewis’s claim of a labor shortage was probably justified, but when questioned about 
the cause of the stoppage the SBA simply replied that they were “just taking a 
holiday.”10   
Such arbitrary stoppages undoubtedly frustrated and angered employers 
and shipping interests, fueling their willingness to seek alternatives to the SBA.  
Reporting a labor shortage in January, 1883, the Daily News announced that at the 
request of the stevedores the SBA had voted to allow five additional gangs.  
9 Galveston City Directory, 1882-83, 102; Galveston City Directory, 1890-91, 60; Allen, 
Chapters in the History of Organized Labor in Texas, 20; Galveston Daily News, Sept. 2, 1881.
10 Galveston Daily News, Nov. 30, 1882.
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Despite this concession, the News hinted at a “new phase” in stevedoring labor.  
While acknowledging the strategic importance of skilled cotton labor to the port, there 
was enough work over the next several months to employ fifty extra men.  Why 
then, queried The News, should the port be subservient to the rule of one 
organization:
    The SBA  . . . has no right to assume to dictate what class of labor shall do service 
    in response to the calls of commerce.  The report is . . .  that an opposition to the 
    association is to be organized, with both capital and influence to support it.  Should 
    the report prove to be true . . . it is likely that there will be a lively stir in some 
    quarters.11 
The man providing this capital and influence was Norris Wright Cuney whose 
star had continued to rise after 1877.  His political skills within the state Republican 
party earned Cuney federal recognition with an appointment as customs inspector in 
Galveston.  By 1881, he was a chief inspector and his appointment the following 
year to the new post of special inspector reflected both Cuney’s political acumen 
and Galveston’s commercial growth.  Cuney was forced to relinquish this well-paying 
federal position in 1883 when elected as alderman to the City Council for the 
predominantly white Twelfth Ward.  Cuney served for four years, during which time 
he assumed the leadership of a state Republican party dominated by Negroes.  In 
1889, Cuney became Galveston’s collector of customs, a highly paid and important 
post, particularly so for a Negro in the South.12   
Needing to supplement his alderman’s salary Cuney entered the 
stevedoring business in 1883.  Before contracting for work, he used his influence 
with the white business community to lobby support for his new enterprise.  In a 
letter to William Moody, head of the Cotton Exchange and one of Galveston’s 
leading business figures, Cuney emphasized the commercial disadvantages caused 
by the  shortage of skilled screwmen.  With this shortage jeopardizing next season 
success, Cuney concluded:    
11 Galveston Daily News, Jan. 4, 5, 1883.
12 Hinze, “Norris Wright Cuney,” 1-22.
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    I have thought it proper to call your attention to the fact that  there are a large 
    number of laborers admirably adapted by the character of their pursuits to supply 
    this necessity.  I allude to the colored men who have a scanty livelihood by hard 
    labor along the shore.  
Cuney had, in fact, reached an agreement with these men of the Cotton Jammers 
Association to go to work for him.  Moody and the other members of the Exchange 
“heartily welcomed” Cuney’s offer, adding that in their opinion there was enough 
work to go round.  Thus reinforced, Cuney gathered about three hundred Negro 
workers from Galveston and New Orleans, purchased tools worth $2,500 and 
secured a contract on the Morgan wharf by underbidding the white stevedores.  The 
News’ prediction that such a move by black labor would create a “lively stir” among 
white labor quickly proved accurate.13 
Cuney’s men, including members of the Cotton Jammers, began loading 
cotton aboard the Albion on April 2.  The SBA responded by walking out.  Cuney 
quickly returned to Moody for support, explaining that he only sought a fair 
proportion of work for himself and his men.  The Cotton Exchange backed the 
introduction of lower-paid Negro workers, describing the SBA’s actions as 
“unreasonable and detrimental to the best interests of this port.”  At the next SBA 
meeting, a motion “to notify all Stevedores and Ship Brokers that we are ready and 
willing to proceed to work, providing that there are no negroes employed” was 
withdrawn, but the decision not to work stood.  Some members proposed that the 
SBA buy their own jacks, hoists and posts, “so that we may be prepared at all 
times to solicit for and obtain vessels to load them should necessity arise for so 
doing.”  The tools would allow the SBA to bypass the stevedores and contract 
directly with the shipping lines.  Three thousand dollars was set aside to purchase 
stevedoring equipment but it was not put to immediate use.  In addition, a request 
went out to all white cotton screwmen to join the SBA.14 
13 Galveston Daily News, March 16, April 4, 1883.
14  Hinze, “Norris Wright Cuney,” 23-26; Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent 
Association, 85-88; Galveston Daily News, April 3-5, 1883; SBA, Minutes, 1:463-7.
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Tension dissipated as the season ended and SBA members sought other 
work, but not before the SBA received an ironic lesson in the growing importance of 
black labor.  In late May, a special meeting was called by the Picnic Arrangement 
Committee.  The committee was unable to find a white band for a forthcoming picnic 
and so requested a change in rules to allow them to employ a Negro band.  The 
committee’s request was granted.  With the advent of the cotton season, however, a 
resumption of work was not so easily settled.  On August 26, a special meeting 
called to discuss a return to work grew so heated that it was forced to adjourn.  The 
next day, the SBA resolved to return to work, but not to “work in any vessel, 
consigned to or chartered by any Broker, Shipper, Buyer, or Agent, who may from 
this date employ any labor, white or black, who are not members of this 
Association.”  All “white stevedores” were to be notified of the decision, which only 
passed by a vote of seventy-nine to seventy-two.  Although clearly divided by the 
issue, the SBA accepted the presence of Cuney and the black SBA.  At a special 
meeting in October, called because “the colored Stevedore had a Steamer to load 
and had sent colored gangs on board to do the work,” the white screwmen again 
resolved to continue working, but only for stevedores who employed SBA men.15   
Cuney had established a regular place on the waterfront without provoking a 
major confrontation with white labor.  In truth, black labor still could not threaten the 
SBA’s dominance.  In Allen Taylor’s estimation, the majority of Cuney’s men were 
ordinary longshoremen rather than experienced cotton screwmen.  Longshoremen 
hand-loaded cotton onto coastal vessels, and for many years the SBA classed this 
work as screwing in an effort to maintain wages and a share of the work for its 
members.  The coastal trade provided regular work, but paid less than the larger 
oceangoing vessels loaded by skilled screwmen.  Cuney was the only stevedore 
hiring black labor while Galveston’s other stevedore firms continued to only hire SBA 
men.  Thus his organization offered little threat to white labor.  This pattern of firms 
15 SBA Minutes, 1:471, 488, 496.
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hiring either only white or black labor would continue as trade expanded in the 
1890s.16   
Racial antagonism undoubtedly played a major part in the SBA’s opposition 
to Cuney’s men, but it was also symptomatic of what Reese describes as the “craft 
syndrome” of a reluctance to participate in a broader labor movement.  The SBA 
regularly exchanged invitations to picnics, balls and other social events with local 
labor organizations, but generally rejected any more formal ties.  Perhaps the closest 
links were with the New Orleans SBA which had been the model for the Galveston 
association.  In 1878, Galveston sent five hundred dollars to its “Sister Brotherhood” 
when yellow fever struck New Orleans.  During the course of the 1883 strike, the 
SBA received messages of support from the Mobile Baymen’s Benevolent 
Association and the Galveston Knights of Labor Lodge 2376, a mixed-trade 
assembly that included longshoremen.  The New Orleans SBA also sent a telegram 
to their brother screwmen offering assistance against the “usurpers and unskilled 
workingmen” attacking their joint interests.  The SBA, however refused to translate 
these joint interests into a formal alliance.  The Mobile Association proposed uniting 
screwmen in all the Gulf Coast ports in 1878 with no result.  In June 1881, the SBA 
received a letter from the Cottonmen’s Executive Council of New Orleans 
suggesting that Galveston form a similar body.17 
In New Orleans, waterfront workers had begun cooperating across racial and 
occupational lines the previous year.  The structural core of this cooperation was the 
Cotton Men’s Executive Council, formed in December, 1880, upon a tide of 
unionization and successful strikes, including one biracial and multi-trade strike of the 
cotton presses.  The Cotton Council acted as a coordinating body for individual 
unions that initially included white and black unions of screwmen, longshoremen and 
yardmen, white weighers and classers, and black teamsters representing 
16 Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association,” 92-3.
17 SBA Minutes, 1:180, 305, 311, 402, 463.
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approximately thirteen thousand men.  The Council, according to Eric Arnesen, 
“ended the fragmentary nature of waterfront unionism, making solidarity, or at least 
collaboration, between the different dock trades possible for the first time.”  Exactly 
why this organization occurred at this time is uncertain since no union records or any 
other first or secondhand accounts survive.  Arnesen argues that collaboration made 
sense given the weakness of a largely unskilled labor force split along occupational 
and racial lines.  This segmentation and the ready supply of alternative labor, gave 
individual unions little chance of winning concessions from employers.  The cotton 
screwmen, by contrast, were able to exercise control over the labor supply and 
working conditions and so they set a significant example.  Shortly after the formation 
of the Council, the screwmen allied with black and white longshoremen and black 
teamsters to impose a uniform wage scale for the loading of cotton by both black 
and white workers.  Arnesen concludes that, although the Cotton Council did not 
eliminate job security, nor erase racial and occupational divisions on the waterfront, it 
did bring a degree of stability and improvement by codifying and enforcing work 
rules and wage rates, regulating the size of the work force, and overseeing inter-
union relations.18   
Galveston’s screwmen, however, felt that they had nothing to gain from such 
a coordinating body.  The committee appointed to consider the New Orleans’ 
proposal concluded that as the only chartered organization handling cotton in 
Galveston “it would be useless for us to amalgamate with uncorporate bodies.”  In 
1883, Mobile and New Orleans renewed the proposal of forming a joint association 
but the offer was again rejected despite the Galveston SBA being in the middle of 
the dispute with Cuney.  These decisions reflected the SBA’s strength and insularity, 
and the weakness of the port’s other waterfront organizations.  In 1884, the LBA’s 
membership stood at 104, the LBU’s at 93, and the New York Association’s at 61.  
The combined total of these organizations was less than the SBA’s membership of 
18 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 61-5.
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around three hundred.  Moreover, with a surplus of work yet Cuney as the only black 
man in Galveston with the money and influence to take up stevedoring, black labor 
did not present the same challenge as it did in New Orleans.  Although the black 
population in the two cities was similar as a percentage, New Orleans had a longer 
history as a port and a greater volume and diversity of trade.  These factors enabled 
an earlier and more significant participation by black labor on the waterfront.  A strong 
black presence and employers willing to exploit racial divisions made biracial 
cooperation in New Orleans imperative.19 
The SBA proved almost equally reluctant to associate with Galveston’s non-
waterfront locals.  In the summer of 1881, the city’s oldest labor association, the 
Galveston Typographical Union, called on other local unions to form a joint body.  
The resolution was couched in the familiar language of the craft worker whose main 
goal was to earn an independent livelihood:
    the only way to consummate this end is by putting into practical effect the old 
    axiom that in “Union there is strength” therefore be it  resolved that a committee of 
    five be appointed to confer with the different trades-unions of this city for the 
    purpose of soliciting their co-operation in uniting the interests of the working 
    classes, of whatever calling, and organizing what is known as an “Amalgamated 
    Union.”
After some initial apparent support for the idea from other unions, the GTU 
committee reported that “apathy took the place of enthusiasm.”  The idea resurfaced 
in November, 1883, when nine local organizations, including representatives from 
both the SBA and LBU, met to discuss the formation of a labor assembly.  This 
meeting led to the formal organization of a Trade and Labor Assembly, which 
included the SBA, in January, 1884.  In March, the SBA after considerable debate 
and various motions, instructed its delegates to the TLA to vote in favor of admitting 
black organizations and the black screwmen, and possibly a longshoremen’s 
association joined soon after.  This decision was the first indication that some SBA 
members were prepared to grant recognition to black organizations but clearly many 
19 SBA Minutes, 1:402-3, 469; Galveston City Directory, 1881-82; 73; Galveston City 
Directory, 1882-83, 102; Galveston City Directory, 1884-85, 82.  
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were still not ready to take this step.  A little over a year later, in May 1885, the SBA 
withdrew from the TLA.  The cost of membership and the TLA’s involvement in 
political matters and improper use of the strike defense fund, were among the 
reasons given for the withdrawal.  Given the SBA’s insularity and rigid avoidance of 
politics, these stated grievances were perhaps genuine grounds for withdrawal.  
However, the Cotton Jammers’ presence in the assembly was again heavily 
debated, indicating that race too was a factor in the decision.20 
The formation of the Labor Assembly coincided with a growing presence of 
the Knights of Labor in the city, although the Knights’ influence among the waterfront 
associations is difficult to gauge.  Galveston had at least two locals by 1882, the 
Telegraph Operators Local 2042 and a mixed Local 2376 which included 
longshoremen.  During the peak of the Knight’s national popularity from 1884 to 
1886, the city had around a dozen locals.  These locals included the all-negro mixed 
Local 3440 organized in 1884, a screwmen’s Local 4583 organized in 1885, and 
longshoremen’s Local 5057 organized in 1886.  District Assembly 78, based in 
Galveston, claimed nearly nine thousand members in 190 locals in 1886, the largest 
numbers outside of the northeast.  According to Arnesen, in New Orleans it was the 
Cotton Council and the Trades and Labor Assembly that controlled organized labor 
in the 1880s because their formation preceded the KOL’s peak years.  In 
Galveston, events appear more convergent with KOL membership figures rising 
from 35 in 1882, to 220 in 1884 and 336 by 1885.  However, Galveston’s locals 
had a high membership turnover.  In 1885, for instance, the total membership of 
Local 23767 was forty-nine, but while eighty-one members joined that year, ninety-
seven left.  Similarly, membership in black Local 3440 totaled twenty-three, with 
twelve new members and six resignations.  What is clear is that the screwmen’s and 
longshoremen’s locals had little influence in changing the racial attitudes of their main 
bodies.  Local 5057, in fact, was formed after the strike of 1885 when longshoremen 
20 Galveston Typographical Union, Minutes, 1:180, 204; II: 15, 23; SBA, Minutes, 1:515; 
Allen, Chapters in the History of Organized Labor in Texas, 174.
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on the Mallory wharf turned to the KOL for for support in their struggle against black 
labor.21
The Knights of Labor, which began organizing in the South in 1878, aimed to 
unite all labor, irrespective of skill, race, or gender.  Their intention to recruit black 
workers was unequivocal: 
    We should be false to every principle of our Order should we exclude from 
    membership any man who gains his living by honest toil, on account of his color or 
    creed . . . . Why should workingmen allow a foolish prejudice against color to keep 
    out of our organization any one who might be used as a tool to aid the employer 
    in grinding down wages? . . .  will your employer stop to inquire the color or 
    nationality of any man who will take your place at the reduction offered? 
While a few, more advanced labor leaders recognized that to degrade one section 
of labor would degrade all,.their appeal was to the self-interest of white workers.  
The reaction of white workers, however, was dominated by racism, particularly in the 
South.  The Knights’ leadership made no determined effort to overcome racism, 
preferring to avoid the stigma of promoting social equality by accepting separate 
white and black locals. Nevertheless, black labor in the South generally responded 
favorably.  Many skilled and unskilled blacks entered the ranks of a predominantly 
white labor movement even though many were forced to organize into separate 
assemblies.  At their peak in 1886, the Knights had as many as sixty thousand black 
members in a total membership between seven hundred thousand to one million.  
For Negro workers, the Knights offered the chance to improve working conditions: 
more importantly, it was perhaps seen as a means to achieve civil, if not social, 
equality.22   
According to Knights historian Melton McLaurin, the organization in the South 
trod a fine line between recruiting black members and accommodating white racism 
and so pursued a contradictory dual strategy.  On the one hand, racial divisions were 
21  Garlock, Guide to the Local Assemblies of the Knights of Labor, 497; Arnesen, 
Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 92; Allen, The Great Southwest Strike, 25.  
22 Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619–1973., 47-53; Bracey, Black 
Workers and Organized Labor, 6-21; McLaurin, “The Racial Policies of the Knights of Labor.”
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subsumed by emphasizing the purely economic nature of grievances.  At the same 
time, the Knights’ Northern antebellum reform heritage forced them to confront race 
but in ways which would not antagonize southern white laborers.  As a result of this 
dual strategy, integrated locals were rare but many district assemblies were 
integrated.  In 1886, for instance, at a meeting of District Assembly 78 in San 
Antonio, two thousand Negro and white members marched, gave speeches and 
ate together.  According to one local newspaper, “it was perhaps the most unique 
gathering ever seen in the city, white ladies and gentlemen sitting at the same table 
and eating with their colored and mexican brethren.”  However, this optimistic picture 
of racial harmony was not borne out by the District Assembly’s intervention in the 
Mallory strike.  In Galveston, as in other instances across the South, the combination 
of a weak national organization and inexperienced local leadership compounded the 
Knights’ ambivalence over race and led to ill-advised and disastrous strike action.23 
The 1885 strike began when white longshoremen working on the Mallory 
line’s New York wharf walked out in a wage dispute.  In May of that year, the 
longshoremen had accepted a temporary cut in wages from forty cents an hour for 
day work, and sixty cents for Sundays and night work, to a flat rate of forty cents.  On 
Saturday, October 11, the men demanded the promised restoration of the old rate.  
In the absence of Captain J. N. Sawyer, the Mallory Line’s long-serving agent, a 
fifty-cent flat rate was offered by the contracting stevedore.  Returning the following 
Sunday, Sawyer denied any knowledge of an agreement to restore wages, and 
refused to pay the fifty-cent rate.  The 150 white longshoremen refused to continue 
working at the forty-cent rate.  At first, Negro longshoremen on the Morgan wharf 
suggested they had no wish to take over the work of the white longshoremen, but 
by the twenty-first, Cuney was providing the Mallory line with 120 black laborers to 
unload the State of Texas.  Cuney insisted that his men would not merely be “the 
catspaws to pull the chestnuts from the fire.”  His men should receive the same rates 
23 McLaurin, “The Racial Policies of the Knights of Labor,” 569, 573; McLaurin, “Knights of 
Labor: Internal Dissensions of the Southern Order,” 7; San Antonio Light, July 22, 1886.
73
as on the Morgan wharf and were to be given an equal showing with white 
longshoremen in the future. Cuney’s men went to work protected by a squad of 
police.24   
The Mallory Company had a history of strikebreaking and anti-unionIsm.  In 
New York, Mallory combined with other steamship operators in using scab labor to 
break union strikes and impose new rates in the mid-1870s.  In 1879 and 1880, a 
series of wildcat strikes for a ten cent rate increase and union recognition hit Mallory in 
New York.  According to Baughman, Mallory’s attitude to labor relations with 
longshoremen was “violent and unenlightened,” a situation made worse by the rise 
of the Knights of Labor.  Charles Mallory himself commented that “I know of no good 
reason why I should not have the privilege of employing whomever I wish, and 
hardly think it right that I should be compelled to discharge men at their dictation.”  In 
Galveston, Mallory had to face its workers alone but the company was in a strong 
position with its virtual monopoly on the coastal trade.  The Mallory Line claimed to 
be paying forty cents for day work and sixty cents for night work in Galveston, rates 
equal to if not ten to twenty cents higher than those paid by other steamship lines in 
the coastal market, although Mallory had successfully driven down these rates in 
New York.  Convinced that the strike was unprovoked by management, Mallory 
openly condoned violence during the strike.  The striking longshoremen, perhaps 
encouraged by an easy victory against Jay Gould’s Wabash Railroad earlier that 
year, turned to the KOL to help present their case.25 
On October 18, a three-man strike committee from the New York Wharf 
society accompanied by a KOL delegation met with Sawyer.  Since the Galveston 
men were not KOL members prior to the dispute, the KOL representatives were 
only acting as advisors although they were in sympathy with the Galveston men.  
Admitting that they had made a mistake, the strikers asked to be reinstated to their 
24 Cuney-Hare, Norris Wright Cuney, 44; Galveston Daily News, Oct. 17-21, 1885.
25 Baughman, The Mallorys of Mystic, 165-8.
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former positions.  The following day, the NYWS made a further offer of sharing the 
work with black labor on an equal basis, either by working alternate weeks or ships.  
In a conciliatory letter to Sawyer, the union rehearsed the KOL’s rhetoric of equality, 
declaring that employment should be impartially distributed based upon natural right 
and justice not artificial and inequitable lines of race or color.  Ability to do the work, 
not race or color, was the sole qualification:
    Believing this we certainly could not insist upon the exclusive employment of any 
    class of labor to the exclusion of others . . . . We think that you will agree with us 
    that these views are most equitable where labor is dealing with labor.  It is true that 
    these views have no always obtained, but it has not been our fault that they 
    should not have obtained.26 
Cuney was prepared to accept this unprecedented offer of work sharing, 
despite its denial of responsibility for the exclusion of black labor.  Cuney’s men 
agreed to accept the principle of equality but, having been promised exclusive 
employment while their work remained satisfactory, they were unwilling to relinquish 
the advantage.  They determined to abide by Sawyer’s decision, arguing it was not 
the province of labor to dictate terms.  Sawyer referred the dispute to his superiors 
in New York and within the week the decision was made to continue with “colored 
laborers for the time being, to make a thorough test of their capabilities.” 27 
Cuney’s men remained at work under police protection.  The strikers offered 
no violence but Cuney became a particular target of their insults. When rumors 
circulated that a mob would attack his house, Cuney’s friends gathered to protect 
him.  While business friends waited inside, longshoremen patrolled the street in front 
of the house and hid among the salt-cedars opposite, determined to meet any lynch 
mob coming to attack their friend and leader.  According to Cuney’s daughter’s 
recollection, the men carried guitars and other stringed instruments ready to form an 
26 Mallory Steamship Lines, “Comprehensive History of the Boycott;” Galveston Daily 
News, Oct. 19, 1885.
27 Galveston Daily News, Oct. 21-22, 28, 1885.
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unlikely “serenade” if challenged by police for loitering28    
When the strike committee next met Sawyer on Sunday, November 1, their 
attitude had changed significantly.  The committee called for the reinstatement of 
those Knights dismissed from the Mallory wharf and an end to discrimination against 
KOL members.  P. H. Golden, chairman of the Knights local Executive Board, 
accused Mallory of “discriminating against this order by discharging and refusing to 
allow them to work upon the Mallory or New York wharf.”  Sawyer, mixing truth and 
sophistry in equal measure, pointed out that no-one had been dismissed.  Not only 
had the white longshoremen walked off the job, they were not even members of the 
Knights at the time: 
    We have never discharged a man because he was a Knight of Labor or 
    belonged to any other society . . . . The assumption that the Mallory Steamship 
    Line is antagonistic to organized labor is gratuitous, unjust  and unfounded.  
    Numbers of the strikers have applied to us for positions  . . . but our answer has 
    been that there were no vacancies.
As a final embellishment, Sawyer claimed a “moral obligation” to continue employing 
the black longshoremen.29 
The Knights responded by calling a city wide strike for the following Tuesday.  
According to the Daily News, between twelve hundred to fifteen hundred cotton 
pressmen, railroad men, screwmen, longshoremen, and even barbers joined the 
strike.  There were sufficient KOL members among the screwmen and 
longshoremen to force an almost total suspension of work on the waterfront.  That 
evening, a meeting attended by five to six hundred Knights called for a general strike 
throughout the state.  The Knights portrayed the strike as a struggle by organized 
labor against unorganized labor, thus ignoring the black waterfront unions and the 
refusal of the white associations to accept black members.  The Knights appealed to 
Galveston’s business community for support.  Wholesale merchants affected a lack 
of concern, preferring to wait out the strike, although railroad chiefs were less 
28 Cuney-Hare, Norris Wright Cuney, 44-5.
29 Galveston Daily News, Nov. 3, 1885.
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sanguine.  From the commencement of the strike, no freight trains on either the Gulf, 
Colorado and Santa Fe, or the Missouri Pacific companies were permitted to leave 
Galveston.  However, feeling did not run unequivocally against the strikers.  The 
Daily News commented that “the absence of agitation or disturbance is quite 
remarkable” and further suggested that although the strike was unfair and excessive, 
it was up to the Mallory line to compromise.  The newspaper, however, was in no 
doubt as to the root cause of the strike: “There is no question of labor involved in the 
present movement, and the race question seems to be the one that prevails as the 
basis of grievance.”30         
Just how far the Knights had shifted the focus of the strike from the original 
wage dispute was revealed on November 6 when the Daily News reprinted an 
interview from its sister newspaper, the Dallas News, with Henry Schuhl, Judge 
Advocate of the Texas Knights.  When questioned whether the employment of 
black labor was the cause of the strike, Schuhl emphatically denied the dispute 
concerned black labor in any way.  Instead, he characterized the dispute solely as a 
scheme by employers to break the Knights that predated the present trouble.  
Accusing the Mallory line of referring to the Knights in “language unbecoming 
gentlemen” Schuhl continued: “The words Knights of Labor are repugnant to the 
minds of many employers, who associate with the order the ideas of communism 
and revolution.”  Schuhl’s accusations were not unfounded but the Knights’ 
leadership preferred to overlook the racial dimension of the strike in favor of recruiting 
the Galveston men into their broader struggle against the railroads.  Ironically, 
because Mallory shipped mainly local freight and general merchandise, which was 
being supplemented by barges from Houston, it was the only line still operating 
during the boycott.31     
Despite the public statements to the contrary, the strike call circulated to 
30 Galveston Daily News, Nov. 4-6, 1885.
31 Ibid., Nov. 6,7, 1885.
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Galveston locals by District Assembly 78 emphasized race while again ignoring the 
efforts of black laborers to organize:
    Whereas the Knights of Labor and other white labor are being discriminated
    against on the wharves and in the cotton presses by the importation of Colored 
    Rat and Scab Labor from other counties . . . . lend us your aid in putting down and 
    breaking up unorganized labor in this city. 
Despite the widespread support for the strike, the Galveston Typographical Union, 
at least, recognized that the KOL and Labor Assembly had no authority to call a 
strike when the strikers were not affiliated prior to the strike.  When ordered to cease 
work, the GTU withdrew from the Labor Assembly, although this decision met with 
strong dissent from some rank and file members.  At least one member declared he 
was ashamed of the actions of the GTU, which would be the subject of intense 
debate over the next few months.32 
The strike was lifted on November 10, pending the outcome of arbitration 
between a Citizen’s Committee and the State Executive Committee of the Knights.  
Such citizen committees became a regular feature of labor disputes in Galveston.  
Committee members--merchants, businessmen and Wharf Company officials-- all 
stood to lose financially by a strike, thus demonstrating the importance of trade to 
Galveston’s economy and the spending power of longshoremen to local merchants.  
Workers’ acceptance of these committees also indicated the essentially conservative 
nature of Galveston’s unions.  The Mallory Company, too, was willing to abide by 
the joint committee’s decision.  The black longshoremen were represented by 
Cuney who took the opportunity to push the claims of all black labor.  The division of 
work was only just, argued Cuney, and should be applied to other areas such as the 
almost exclusively white cotton presses as well.  His men, however, may have 
been less willing than ever to accept work sharing.  The Knights had demanded that 
Mayor Fulton dismiss four policemen, three of them black, for endeavoring to “incite 
violence among the colored people.”  The mayor dismissed the request but the 
32 Galveston Typographical Union, Minutes, 2:86-90.
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incident aroused hostility among longshoremen on both sides.33     
On the twelfth, the Arbitration Committee announced its decision: there 
should be “no discrimination against any one on account of race, color, or 
organization.”  The Committee would further “recommend and request” that Sawyer, 
in addition to men already on the rolls, employ the men working before the strike 
when needed.  The decision was ambiguous, allowing Sawyer to continue hiring 
only Negro longshoremen while claiming adherence to the Committee’s decision.  
The Knights interpreted the ruling to mean the reinstatement of the striking men.  
Mallory only saw an obligation to rehire those men if and when vacancies occurred, 
meaning there was no need to discharge black labor.  The strike was lost but, in a 
display of persistence if not realism, the Knights continued to press their cause.  A 
token force of Knights continued to present themselves at the Mallory wharf thus 
maintaining a cause for grievance.  On January 27, 1886, the Knights called for 
another boycott of the Mallory line.  Wholesale merchants dismissed the call as an 
absurdity, and even workers seemed reluctant to heed the order.  As the 
Typographical Union’s minutes revealed, the Labor Assembly was now solely 
composed of two longshoremen’s societies.  The Typographical Union had been 
refused reentry and all other societies had withdrawn thus leaving the longshoremen 
isolated.34    
1886 proved to be a pivotal year for the Knights of Labor, partly because of 
the reluctance among the state and national leadership to act against locals that 
maintained the color line.  The issue came to a head at the Richmond convention in 
October.  Frank J. Ferrell, a black delegate from New York, appeared at a local 
theater seated among the white audience.  Ferrell also introduced the Knights’ 
president, Grand Master Workman Terence Powderly, onto the convention platform.  
While the Negro press praised the Knights, Southern papers attacked the incidents 
33 Galveston Daily News, Nov. 10, 11, 1885.
34 Galveston Daily News, Nov. 13, 1885; Jan. 28, 1886; March 6, 1886; Galveston 
Typographical Union, Minutes, 2:112.
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as an effort to force social equality on the South.  A typical reaction came from a “now 
and henceforth” ex-Knight of Labor who wrote to Powderly: “Since you have 
changed from a Knight of Labor advocate to a nigger social equality man I hereby 
denounce you as a low, vulgar buffoon than whom there is none more contemptible.  
A decent nigger would shun you.”35  Powderly publicly praised the actions of white 
delegates from New York who had supported Ferrell, but he also wrote to the 
Richmond Dispatch disclaiming any intention of interfering with social relations in the 
South.  The Knights suffered two other major setbacks that year.  One was the 
Haymarket bombing in Chicago, which employers exploited to level charges of 
anarchy against organized labor.  The other setback was the Great Southwest Strike 
in which the Texas Knights lost their ongoing battle against Jay Gould.  White 
membership declined nationwide after these events leaving a concentration of 
segregated locals.  For the next few years, southern black labor continued to join the 
fading organization in some numbers but this support fell away as segregation and 
racial violence increased.  Galveston’s Trade and Labor Assembly was another 
casualty, although individual KOL locals, including the screwmen’s, survived until at 
least 1890.  The strike had, for the time being, only succeeded in destroying any 
hope of cooperation between trades and races.36  
The introduction of black labor did little to ease the pressure on the SBA and, 
despite a steady flow of applications from new and former members, the 
association still struggled to provide enough gangs.  In October of 1885, 
stevedores were given permission to select foremen to make up new gangs and 
even use LBU members. The following September, foremen who released men to 
form a new gang were allowed to hire a nonunion ‘outsider’ but were told to use 
“such men as are already broken in thereby avoiding the breaking in of any green 
man that can be avoided.”  Restrictions on Sunday working were also eased.  These 
35 Foner and Lewis, The Black Worker, 3:114.
36 Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619-1973, 53-63; Foner and Lewis, 
The Black Worker, 3:114; SBA, Minutes, 2:9.
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concessions were prompted by concern over work going to black labor.  In 
September, 1886, the names of the SBA No. 2 were read out and a committee 
was appointed to revise the working rules so “as would best serve this Assn with 
regard to the question of the SBA No. 2.”  This concern however, was misplaced: 
rather than competing with white labor, the black association sought to gain 
acceptance within the world of organized labor.37
On August 26, 1887, the SBA received a communication from “an 
organization styling and calling themselves the colored screwmen and longshoremen 
asking and petitioning us to admit them and organize a trade and labor assembly.”  
The petition, at any rate, seems to have taken the SBA by surprise since it was 
considered “not being very plain and the object intended being more obscure.”  
However, the application was received and referred to a committee who met with 
the black screwmen, the first recorded meeting at this level.  The committee’s report 
understandably caused a great deal of discussion, although the minutes gave no 
details.  There was a further meeting at which the black screwmen raised several 
questions.  Again, no details were given but the committee’s answers were “gladly 
received” by the black screwmen.  Moreover, the committee was empowered to 
furnish the black screwmen with a copy of the SBA constitution and bye-laws.38 
  Several authors have assumed that Cuney formed the No. 2 Association in 
1883 and that he acted as its president.  However, when Cuney referred to a “new 
association” in his letter to the Cotton Exchange that year, he meant new relative to 
the SBA.  It is clear from contemporary accounts that No. 2 was not a new 
association but, following the practice of New Orleans and elsewhere, simply 
another designation for the leading black organization, the Cotton Jammers and 
Longshoremen’s Association.  Moreover, beyond his role as stevedore there is no 
direct evidence linking Cuney to the formation or running of the Cotton Jammers, 
37 SBA, Minutes, 1:571, 620, 622, 685; LBU, Minutes, 1:23
38 SBA, Minutes 1:687-96,731-3.
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although he did personally supervise his screwmen until 1894 and several Cotton 
Jammers’ officials acted as pallbearers at his funeral.  More importantly, whatever 
Cuney’s role in the formation of a black organization and the procurement of work, 
there is no mention of his involvement in the approach to the SBA or in any 
subsequent negotiations between the Cotton Jammers and white labor.  The 
initiative to approach the white association came from the ranks of the black workers 
themselves.39 
According to one historian, Cuney’s actions in 1883 and 1885 demonstrated 
the need for middle-class blacks to assist black laborers in their workplace struggles: 
“Black elites used their education, community influence, and resources, and often 
resorted to controversial protest strategies to achieve their goal of a well organized 
and racially unified black laboring class.”  Cuney not only built himself a lucrative 
stevedore business, by one estimate he also provided work that added from 
$75,000 to $100,000 to the income of Galveston’s black population.  However, 
even before Booker T. Washington’s rise to prominence in the 1890s, black leaders 
were stressing an ideology based around anti-unionism, individual effort, economic 
self-improvement, and a reliance on the good offices of the better class of whites.  
Journalist T. Thomas Fortune, a political associate of Cuney’s, was one of the few 
prominent blacks to speak in favor of labor unions.  Black Republicans in Texas did 
put forward the most comprehensive and foresighted labor program in the state, 
including the need for legislation to protect the dignity and rights of labor and the right 
of labor to share in the profits that it helped to create.  Cuney himself, however, 
viewed unions as a means to an end of exploiting white racial attitudes to black 
advantage.  According to his most recent biographer, Cuney “did not foresee blacks 
becoming an important part of a Southern labor movement that whites dominated.”  
This account brings Cuney into line with most other members of the black middle-
class, many of whom saw little value in unions, particularly given the exclusionary 
39 Taylor, “A History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association,” 97; Foner and Lewis, 
The Black Worker , 4:  n24;  Hales, “The Cuneys,” 86; Galveston Daily News, Jan. 30, 1898.
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policies of white unions, and even advocated strikebreaking as a means of breaking 
through the white labor monopoly.  According to Arnesen, it was working-class black 
activists who “contributed distinct ideas about the relationship between labor and 
capital that contrasted sharply with the ideology espoused by middle-class black 
politicians and journalists of the era.”40 
The Cotton Jammers’ approach to the SBA was followed by a similar 
overture to the white longshoremen when committees from the Longshoremen’s 
Benevolent Union and Cotton Jammers met in September 1887.  The LBU had 
represented Galveston’s white deep sea longshoremen since 1882 and, next to 
the SBA it was the largest white union with around two hundred members.  The 
black committee stated that they did not aspire to the Morgan or Mallory docks, 
although they may have been expecting the black coastwise workers to join their 
association.  However, the Cotton Jammers were perhaps more interested in 
making inroads into the more lucrative and prestigious deep sea work since they 
were willing to work for forty and sixty cents per hour, the LBU’s rates.  More 
ominously from the LBU’s point of view, the Cotton Jammers were prepared to 
take work where they could find it.  Rather than confrontation, however, the Cotton 
Jammers wanted to find the “ways and means that the laboring men could be a little 
closer committed,” beginning with their applying to join the Trade and Labor 
Assembly.  At the next meeting, the LBU informed the black committee that they 
had nothing against their joining the Assembly.  However, they had nothing else to 
offer them or any other organized body and “were opposed to letting any colored 
men in the union.”41   
Clinging to a policy of exclusion, however, did nothing to lessen the threat of 
40 Obadele-Starks, “Black Labor, the Black Middle Class, and Organized Protest,” 53; 
Rice, The Negro in Texas, 190; Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 52; Gibson, 
“Organized Labor in Texas from 1890 to 1900,” 32; Hales, “The Cuneys, ” 46-7, 51; 
41 LBU, Minutes, 1:42, 43, 48; Galveston City Directory, 1886-87, 52; Galveston City 
Directory, 1888-89, 59.
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black competition.  The issue resurfaced in 1889 when the LBU was forced to 
confront the possibility of work going to the Cotton Jammers.  The union’s only 
solution was a resolution that “any member of this union who shall at any time work 
along . . . with these men that is known as No. 2 be expelled from this union.”  The 
less skilled deep-sea longshoremen of the LBU had more to fear than the 
screwmen from outsiders or undercutting of wages by another organized group.  
However, their rejection of working with the Cotton Jammers came  amidst regular 
complaints about the use of nonunion labor, including the loading of coal barges by 
nonunion blacks.  A more secure SBA seemed more willing to at least accept the 
presence of an organized black association but if this seeming acceptance marked a 
shift in official policy, there was certainly no change in racial attitudes.  In early 1888, 
Brother Charles Newman was charged with injuring the reputation of the Association 
by living with a negro woman.  Newman was found guilty and called to the center of 
the Hall “and in a few but well chosen words severely reprimanded on the bad 
example and immorality of leading such a life.”42  
The decade thus ended as it had begun with Galveston’s white unions 
pursuing narrow self-interest and exclusion; and this despite mounting evidence that 
these policies were no longer tenable.  In 1883, Cuney promoted black labor as an 
alternative to the shortage of skilled screwmen caused by the restrictive practices of 
the SBA.  Cuney, with backing from the white business community, secured a 
contract and set his men to work loading cotton.  The SBA responded with a brief, 
almost halfhearted strike before accepting that Cuney’s presence offered no great 
threat to its dominance.  In 1885, the Mallory Company used Cuney’s men when 
white longshoremen stopped work over a wage cut.  The longshoremen’s union 
appealed to the KOL for support but lost the strike despite a citywide boycott.  
Mallory had successfully exploited black labor to break union power and lower 
42 LBU, Minutes, 1:152; SBA, Minutes, 1:731-3.
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wages; policies that would continue in the next decade, thus ironically forcing a now 
all-Negro workforce into their twenty-five year struggle for union recognition and 
better wages.   
While the failures of 1883 and 1885 demonstrated that neither white privilege 
nor union power were sufficient to prevent the hiring of black labor, New Orleans 
and, to lesser extent, the KOL provided alternatives to exclusion.  The Knights, 
however, chose to make race the central issue of the Mallory strike, thus 
demonstrating the organization’s structural and ideological weaknesses in the South 
rather than its promise of accepting all workers.  The success of the New Orleans’ 
Cotton Council in regulating wages, working conditions and racial tension provided a 
more compelling example of biracial unionism.  The Cotton Council was born out of 
intense competition between black and white labor but in Galveston an expanding 
labor market readily absorbed the limited introduction of black screwmen.  As an 
employer, Cuney was satisfied with securing regular work but the men working 
under him, the Cotton Jammers, wanted white unions to recognize them as a 
legitimate labor organization.  In New Orleans, job competition and employer 
pressure had created the conditions that fostered biracial cooperation but until those 
pressures approached the same levels in Galveston, the SBA could continue to be 
guided more by race consciousness rather than economic self-interest.  Over the 
next decade, changes in technology and the shipping industry would increase these 
pressures as Galveston fulfilled its destiny of becoming the nation’s leading cotton 
shipping port.  Within a very few years, the SBA would be forced to recognize that 
in order to maintain its position it would have to develop some kind of working 
relationship with the Cotton Jammers. 
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CHAPTER THREE
“For our mutual benefit and protection.”  The Emergence of a 
Biracial Class Consciousness.
All of Galveston’s citizens had good reason to be optimistic at the start of the 
new decade as the Deep Water Committee’s lobbying finally won federal 
approval.  Galveston’s waterfront workers particularly stood to gain from the 
expected increase in the port’s trade although greater opportunities for black 
longshoremen meant a greater potential for racial conflict.  In addition, changes in 
technology and the structure of the shipping industry were beginning to erode the 
power of the skilled screwmen and shift the balance of power towards the 
employers.  In New Orleans, these changes coupled with a deteriorating national 
economy aggravated local conditions, causing racial violence on the waterfront and 
the disintegration of the biracial Cotton Men’s Executive Council.  Employers 
aggressively exploited the situation, playing one race against the other as workers’ 
power to control wages and working conditions vanished with the Cotton Council.  
The depression had less affect on Galveston although the port’s white screwmen 
faced the same challenge from changes within the industry.  However, rather than 
forcing the races further apart, conditions in Galveston pressed the SBA into taking 
its first steps towards biracial cooperation with the Cotton Jammers Association.  
Conversely, as employers began using ordinary longshoremen to load cotton, the 
SBA was forced into a demarcation dispute with the white deep-sea longshoremen.  
The power of employers in the coastwise industry, was once again demonstrated 
on the Mallory docks where workers lost a prolonged and bitter strike against the 
company in 1898.  The Mallory workers had affiliated with the American Federation 
of Labor during the dispute thus demonstrating a commitment to class principles not 
shared by all black workers.  While the Cotton Jammers welcomed negotiations with 
the SBA on wages and work-sharing, black longshoremen who disagreed with this 
policy formed a breakaway group, the Lone State Cotton Jammers Association.  
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The Lone Stars chose to take advantage of the black worker’s racial position as 
cheap labor to secure work by undercutting the wage rates of both the SBA and 
Cotton Jammers.  This ideological difference exposed a long-lasting and often 
acrimonious split in the ranks of the port’s black waterfront labor.
Galveston’s twenty-five year long campaign for a deep water harbor ended 
in September 1890, when President Harrison signed the Galveston Harbor Bill 
appropriating six million dollars for improvements.  Galveston’s citizens greeted the 
news with two days of street celebrations with fireworks, bonfires, whistles, bells and 
shouts of “Hurrah for Galveston and Deep Water” filling the air.  It would be another 
six years before the port reaped the full benefits from the jetty-building and 
dredging operations that ensured a deep water channel.  In the short term, the 
severe economic depression that gripped the nation from 1893 to 1897 threatened 
the stability of both the port and organized labor.  Galveston, however, usually 
weathered such downturns more successfully than competing port cities because it 
relied so heavily on cotton exports.  Ports such as New Orleans were more 
vulnerable to economic cycles because they handled a greater percentage of 
general freight and imported goods.  While some areas of Galveston’s trade did 
suffer from the economic downturn, cotton exports continued to grow as cotton 
production in Texas far outstripped the previous decade, rising from 1,471,242 
bales in 1890 to 3,364,055 bales by 1898.  Exports from Galveston also rose as 
work on the harbor progressed and the increasing depth of the channel allowed 
larger and larger vessels to enter the port.  Each year, 300 to 400 coastal vessels 
visited the port, as well as 375 foreign steamships and 130 sailing vessels.  Annual 
trade figures released in 1894, reported a record year both in the number of vessels 
entering port and the amount of cotton shipped and the the following year set 
another record for cotton shipment.1  
1 Barker, “Partners in Progress,” iii-iv; Ellis, “The Texas Cotton Compression Industry,” 
158; Galveston Daily News, Nov. 24, 1894, Sept. 1, 1895.
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Between 1893 to 1896, the Wharf Company spent close to $2 million on 
wharf improvements, deepening slips, extending railway tracks along docks and 
piers, and building storage sheds for one million bales of cotton.  At the same time, 
two stone jetties were built on opposite sides of the channel extending eastward 
towards the Bolivar Roads, a project that finally cost $8,700,000.  In 1896, the 
world’s largest cargo vessel, the British steamer Algoa, navigated the completed 
deep water channel and tied up alongside in what was now one of the best 
equipped harbors in the country.  The effect of the deep water harbor on 
Galveston’s trade was immediate.  A booklet publicizing  the port’s success and 
facilities proclaimed that, “Over 71,000 miles of railroad connect with the Texas 
Systems, all of which terminate at Galveston.”  The network of railroads included the 
Southern Pacific, which now agreed to construct terminal and wharf facilities covering 
five blocks from Forty-first to Forty-fifth Streets.  Products from the entire West 
Coast, especially California’s wheat would now come through Galveston at 
Southern Pacific’s piers A and B.  Over twenty steamship lines served ports in 
northern Europe (particularly Liverpool), the east coast of America, southern Europe, 
Japan, and South America.  “Due to deep water,” the booklet added, “the increased 
volumes of business required the construction of grain elevators, additional docks, 
increased wharf trackage, and the building of miles of expensive sheds to protect 
goods.”2   
Exports from Galveston in 1898-99 were valued at $78,470,375, more than 
double the 1895-96 figure of $36,397,09.  Foreign imports increased by an even 
greater percentage from $602,770 to $2,921,016.  The total cotton shipment went 
from 1,664,129 bales in 1894-95, to 2,318,995 bales in 1898-99.  That same 
season, Galveston surpassed New Orleans as the nation’s top cotton port, handling 
about two-thirds of the Texas crop and one-third of the total national shipment . This 
was the climax of Galveston’s thirty-five year campaign to become the seaport of 
2 Barker, “Partners in Progress,” 4; Scharnwebber, Facts About Galveston, 23.
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the Great West.  Surveying the port’s progress, S.O. Young, Secretary of the  
Galveston Cotton Exchange rather disingenuously remarked that, “the city and port 
have been rather dragged into prominence by the course of events, and no people 
could be more amazed by the wonderful growth of the port’s commerce than the 
people of Galveston.”3   
Secretary Young was being overly modest: Galveston’s success owed 
much to the ambition and drive of its business leaders.  The growth in trade, 
however, masked underlying weaknesses in the port’s economy.  Exports 
remained thirty times greater than imports, despite increases in both figures.  This 
imbalance indicated Galveston’s heavy reliance on the export of bulk commodities 
and its failure to develop a broader industrial base.  Small manufactories were 
established before and after the Civil War, but not on a scale to provide an 
alternative source of investment or employment.  Printing was the largest industry in 
1880, employing 107 people.  The lack of a water supply hindered growth, but 
even the completion of the water system in the 1890s failed to stimulate significant 
investment.  According to Galveston historian David McComb, even local financiers 
preferred to invest their money elsewhere.  When they did invest locally, their 
money went to commercial facilities such as the Cotton Exchange, or to 
improvements in water transport.  While these efforts ensured Galveston’s success 
as a cotton port, the failure to develop better rail connections gave inland cities a 
long-term economic advantage.  Shifts in population growth suggested this 
advantage.  Galveston was the state’s leading city in the immediate post war period 
but by 1890, population growth began to stagnate.  Galveston’s population was 
outstripped by both Dallas and San Antonio and, by 1900, Houston whose location 
had made it a more natural hub for railroads.4 
3 Scharnwebber, Facts About Galveston, 33-5, 47;  Ousley, Galveston in 1900, 151.
4 McComb, Galveston, 47-9, 65-6.
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After the completion of the deep-water harbor, Galveston exported over three 
million bales of cotton per year.
Courtesy of the Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas
Whatever the future prospects, Galveston’s white screwmen shared in the air 
of prosperity that hung over Galveston at the beginning of the decade.  A local 
commentator spoke of the balmy winter season, “when the cotton ‘is moving’ and 
the streets are alive with ‘samplers’ and ‘screwmen,’ spending prodigally a weekly 
stipend that would be considered a handsome recompense in many of the learned 
professions.  Nothing apparent here that the retail trade of the city is circumscribed at 
all by its insular position”  Insularity, however, still characterized the screwmen’s 
attitude towards the Cotton Jammers.  In the fall of 1890, the reorganized Trade and 
Labor Assembly invited the SBA to rejoin the association.  Other labor 
organizations “very much desired” the SBA’s cooperation but the SBA refused to 
affiliate unless any TLA delegates belonging to the “so-called No. 2 Screwmen” 
were expelled.  SBA delegates attended TLA meetings soon afterwards, although 
there is no evidence whether the Cotton Jammers were members of the assembly 
and if so, whether the SBA’s demands were met.  In the early years of the decade, 
however, the screwmen faced other pressing problems, besides competition from 
the Cotton Jammers, that threatened their control over wages and working 
conditions.5  
 The SBA had always tried to restrict the supply of skilled labor by limiting 
membership to men of good character who fulfilled residency and apprentice 
requirements.  Cuney and the Cotton Jammers had successfully exploited the 
shortage of skilled labor in the early 1880s and the SBA, itself, had been compelled 
to officially sanction the use of outsiders at the beginning of the 1886 season.  
Foremen who were required to release a regular hand to help form another gang 
could replace him with a nonunion man, but giving preference to local men a over 
migrant laborer.  Working rules also stipulated that foremen should hire men “such as 
are already broken in thereby avoiding the breaking in of any green man that can be 
avoided.”  As cotton exports continued to rise, however, the shortage of skilled 
5 Morrison, The Port of Galveston and the State of Texas, 9; SBA, Minutes, 2:44.
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labor became more acute, and the SBA’s restrictive practices became more 
counterproductive.6  
By the early 1890s, stevedores, and even SBA foremen were increasingly 
forced to hire “outsiders,” men with no affiliation to the association or even the city of 
Galveston.  Longshore work had always provided a useful source of employment 
for off-season agricultural workers and other casual laborers but from 1893, the 
deepening economic depression created growing pools of surplus labor and tramps 
in cities.  Cotton prices fell as production rose, creating the conditions that gave rise 
to the Southern Farmer’s Alliance and Populism and forcing many, mostly landless 
Negro farmers to move to towns. For employers, the ready availability of cheap, 
casual labor now offered a means to circumvent the restrictive practices of screwmen 
and longshoremen.  To screwmen, outsiders threatened a loss of income and 
workers’ control and the SBA introduced several temporary measures to counter 
“the competition of cheap labor that is becoming well-established.”  Four thousand 
dollars were set aside for purchasing tools and procuring vessels, thus bypassing 
the stevedores.  Two walking delegates were appointed with the power to make 
decisions regarding the distribution and composition of gangs, which now only need 
include two full SBA members.  By settling disputes on the spot, the walking 
delegates avoided the delay of work stoppages while grievances were referred to a 
full SBA meeting.  Finally, nonunion gang members were levied two and a half 
percent of their wages for the privilege of working cotton.7 
Cheap labor was not the only threat facing screwmen, however as changes in 
technology and the shipping industry also threatened to undermine their control over 
the workplace.  Mechanization had little effect on the handling of cargo itself, or the 
way in which vessels were loaded and unloaded. Steam winches were now used to 
haul cotton bales up the wooden stages and lower them into the hold, but the final 
6 SBA, Minutes, 1:622.
7 SBA, Minutes, 2:99-103, 109, 138, 170.
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stowing still relied heavily on the strength and skill of the men involved.  By the mid 
1890s, however, cotton compresses were turning out experimental bales of cotton 
tightly rolled in layers around a core.  These round bales achieved a density of 
between 35 and 45 pounds per cubic foot as compared to the 221/2 pounds of the 
standard bale.  The more compact round bale cost less to transport and was less at 
risk from fire or water damage which lowered insurance rates.  More significantly, the 
round bale required little or no screwing.  The round bale was not widely accepted 
by the cotton industry, but it was an indication of the longer-term threat to the skills of 
the screwmen.8 
The appearance of the round bale coincided with changes in the shipping 
industry.  Vessels were becoming larger and while deep water allowed these iron-
hulled steamships to enter the harbor, the increased stowage capacity of these 
vessels also significantly reduced the advantages of screwing cotton.  While early 
sailing vessels held eight hundred to one thousand bales, later steamships held as 
many as twelve thousand bales.  Wooden vessels remained a common sight in 
Galveston throughout the 1890s and sailing vessels were still in the majority as late 
as 1897.  By 1900, however, sail and steam vessels were almost equal and steam 
dominated thereafter.  In his study of British ports, John Lovell explains that, 
besides the increased capacity, the emergence of steamships had two important 
effects on the employment structure.  Firstly, larger vessels usually went hand in 
hand with larger companies.  While sailing vessels and smaller tramp steamers with 
no set sailing schedule benefited from the extra time it took to screw cotton, the 
larger steamships of foreign-owned companies were more interested in a regular 
schedule and a quick turnaround time in port.  Secondly, some of these companies 
assumed a more direct control of the loading and unloading of their vessels and were 
more hostile towards unions than local stevedoring companies.  This direct control 
broke the personal tie between stevedores and screwmen that was an important 
8 Ellis, “The Texas Cotton Compression Industry,” 187, 196-7; 
93
element in workers’ control.  By mid-decade, employers were beginning to use 
ordinary longshoremen to stow cotton by hand for longshoremen’s wages and with 
no bale limit.9    
These companies were also prepared to circumvent the power of the white 
screwmen in ports such as New Orleans and Galveston by hiring black labor.  In 
August, 1893, a new firm of cotton brokers, Freeman and Parr, announced that they 
would employ Cuney and his men rather then white screwmen.  The SBA 
immediately appointed a five-man committee to meet with the brokers and to try to 
persuade the Cotton Jammers to work for the same hours and wages as the SBA.  
The use of ad hoc committees, however, was growing increasingly inadequate as 
the outside pressures mounted and the need to negotiate with other parties grew 
more compelling.  That same month, the SBA selected an Executive Committee of 
twenty-one elected members to handle all matters pertaining to wages and working 
rules, and to conduct all negotiations with employers and other unions.  The 
committee met regularly and reported back at each full meeting where any 
recommendations could be amended before approval or rejection by a vote of the 
whole.  
The committee’s first task was to continue negotiations with an executive 
committee from the black screwmen.  The SBA’s main concern at the first meeting on 
September 15 was still to persuade the Cotton Jammers to bring their wages into 
line with the SBA’s rates.  Equalizing wages served two purposes: it maintained 
existing rates by preventing undercutting; and for the same rates, stevedores would 
prefer to hire white labor.  The Cotton Jammers seized the initiative by suggesting 
the appointment of two committees to reach an agreement on joint action.  The 
Cotton Jammers, however, appeared more concerned with the threat from outsiders 
than equalizing wages and several more joint meetings failed to produce any 
significant accord.  Both sides, with some reservations, appeared willing to agree not 
9 Francaviglia, From Sail to Steam, 260; Lovell, “Sail, Steam and Emergent Dockworkers’ 
Unionism in Britain,” 238-41.
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to take work from each other, but the Cotton Jammers were not prepared to raise 
their scale of wages arguing that they were already bound by a contract for that 
season.  The Cotton Jammers were probably also more concerned with protecting 
their own position rather than having to compete on equal terms with the white 
screwmen.  Consequentially, the only resolution fully agreed to was “that both 
organizations employ Galveston labor exclusively in preference to outside labor, 
and that both organizations act in conjunction with each other in doing the same.”10  
Despite the initial lack of success, the appointment of executive committees 
formalized the relationship between the two associations and allowed the Cotton 
Jammers into the fold of organized labor.  However, even this limited contact 
appeared to be too much for some white screwmen.  During the course of the joint 
negotiations, a Brother Boyd complained that “some of the members seemed to 
be familiar with and conversing with the No. 2 Screwmen rather frequently of late.”  
This discontent among rank and file members continued to be reflected by official 
policy particularly when competing for work.  In October, 1894, stevedore John 
Young appealed to the Executive Committee to raise the day’s work from seventy-
five to eighty bales.  Young argued that with this concession he could secure the 
work of the McFadden Brothers now being done by Cuney.  The committee 
agreed to raise the limit provided that Young got the work, yet the SBA was still 
struggling to meet the current demand for labor.  Just two weeks later, Young was 
requesting six more gangs, warning that he had already been forced to turn one ship 
over to the black screwmen and would lose another without the extra men.  The 
SBA was prepared to use all means to prevent any ship being given to Negro 
labor and again resorted to temporary concessions to meet the emergency.11 
Rumors circulating in the summer of 1894 presented a more serious threat to 
the fragile accord between the SBA and Cotton Jammers.  According to one rumor, 
10 SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 1:3-5; SBA Minutes, 2:221, 229.
11 SBA, Minutes, 2:228 313, 329; SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 1:8-9, 
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some black screwmen were going into the stevedoring business for an unnamed 
Galveston broker by undercutting the present wage rates.  The second rumor was 
that a Thomas Gallagher was contemplating setting up as a stevedore and that his 
work would come from William Parr and Company.  Parr had always employed 
black screwmen but, If successful, Gallagher wanted to have the work done by white 
labor.  However, events in New Orleans would intervene before the substance of 
either rumor could be established.  New Orleans had reached a high water mark in 
biracial unionism two years previously when forty-nine AFL unions and twenty-five 
thousand workers held a four-day general strike in support of three unions carrying a 
high percentage of black members.  Moved by this display of biracial solidarity, 
Samuel Gompers declared it a unique moment in world history as white workers 
risked their livelihoods defending their black fellow wage workers:  
    With one fell swoop the economic barrier of color was broken down.  Under the 
    circumstances I regard the movement as a very healthy sign of the times and one 
    which speaks well for the future of organized labor in the “New South.”12   
Circumstances, however had changed by 1894 as biracial cooperation on New 
Orleans’ docks collapsed amid the worst economic crisis of the century and rising 
levels of employer aggression and racial antagonism.  
As in Galveston, New Orleans’s screwmen faced increasing pressure from 
employers to alter working practices, particularly lifting their seventy-five-bale limit.  In 
addition, black screwmen were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the division of 
work.  Rather than an equal division of work, such as existed between longshoremen 
and yardmen, black screwmen were limited to a twenty gang, or one hundred men 
limit by the white association.  In 1892, the black union split into two factions: a 
Screwmen’s Benevolent Association No. 1 of around one hundred men stuck with 
the status quo while a much larger No. 2 Association rejected the gang limit.  The No. 
2 Association was prepared to work for fifteen cents a bale below union scale and 
12 SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 1:17, 25-9; SBA, Minutes, 2:325; Bracey, Black 
Workers, 30.
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abolish the  seventy five bale limit and they quickly found an agent willing to hire 
them.  The white screwmen responded with increasingly harsh denunciations of all 
black screwmen, making no distinction between either black association.13   
By October, harsh words had turned to a policy of exclusion as the New 
Orleans SBA notified stevedores it would no longer work for employers who hired 
black labor.  The Cotton Men’s Executive Council, now dominated by white 
screwmen and longshoremen, disbanded soon after the ultimatum.  From that point 
the situation rapidly deteriorated into open conflict as black workers sought to regain 
their jobs and white screwmen retaliated with strikes and violence.  The situation grew 
even worse as white longshoremen followed the screwmen in attempting to exclude 
black workers.  While some employers wanted a return to stability, others were 
eager to exploit racial divisions to lower wages and break the control of the white 
screwmen.  The No. 2 Association continued to be willing to accept lower wages 
and less job control in exchange for more work and security.  When the No. 1 
Association resisted an offer of reduced wages, employers simply replaced them 
with black nonunion labor.  The white screwmen, while denying that race was an 
issue, continued to ignore this division within the ranks of black labor, choosing 
instead to label all black labor as “untrustworthy” and “the parasite of black labor.”14  
The racial and economic tensions on the waterfront reached a climax in March, 
1895.  In a series of violent actions over several days, white mobs destroyed tools 
and assaulted black workers.  The riots, which left nine black laborers dead and many 
more wounded, only ended when Governor Murphy Foster called in the state militia.  
The militia’s intervention proved a turning point and by the start of the next cotton 
season few whites found employment along the New Orleans waterfront.  With their 
respective associations split by internal dissent, white screwmen and longshoremen 
were forced to admit defeat.  As Arnesen concludes : “Their repudiation of the 
13 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 120-45.
14 Ibid.
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interracial alliance led to a rapid decline of all union power, complete loss of control 
over the labor supply, widespread elimination of work rules, and severe wage 
reductions.”15 
Galveston’s white and black screwmen closely monitored the situation in New 
Orleans.  The SBA’s Executive Committee discussed the deteriorating conditions in 
February, 1895, and contacted James Shaw, president of the New Orleans SBA, 
offering “him and his organization favors or assistance that it was in our power to 
convey.”  By March, the committee was discussing the settlement of the labor 
troubles ”at greatly reduced rates of stowing cotton.”  Anxious to prevent a similar 
result in Galveston, the committee sent a delegate to New Orleans to gather 
information.  There were already signs, however, that the balance of power between 
employers and employees in Galveston was tilting in favor of the stevedores and 
shipping companies.16 
In the midst of the New Orleans troubles, the SBA asked stevedores to 
sever their connection as working members of the association.  With the commercial 
pressures growing increasingly heavy on all sides, not all members were prepared 
to welcome stevedores such as Ben Dolson, John Young and Charles Suderman 
to SBA meetings.  The purchase of sixty pairs of jackscrews also again came up for 
discussion, and plans to retain control of the labor supply by allowing apprentices 
and nonmembers who had worked cotton for only thirty days to join.  Despite these 
and several earlier measures, the SBA felt compelled to allow one other significant 
concession to the stevedores.  With New Orleans in mind, the SBA acknowledged 
that working rules in other ports allowed cotton to be loaded much cheaper than in 
Galveston.  The bale limit had already been raised to eighty bales but after two 
hours of discussion the SBA notified stevedores and ship brokers that they would 
15 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 120-45.
16 SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 1:25.
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remove this limit.17 
The removal of the daily limit was another temporary measure, but it was still 
a significant one that coincided with a shift in the SBA’s attitude towards the Cotton 
Jammers.  As well as sending a delegate to New Orleans, the SBA appointed a 
committee to meet in secret with the Cotton Jammers to get ”the views of the 
Galveston Negro Screwmen what in their opinion would be the outcome of the 
settlement of the strike in New Orleans and its effect if any on the future business of 
Galveston.”  The committee reported back that the black screwmen had promised 
“in case of a strike in Galveston that they would stand by us and uphold us.”  The 
shift was small, but It was the first time that the SBA sought this level of support from 
the black screwmen.18 
The growing understanding between white and black screwmen was soon 
tested when the unresolved issues surrounding Parr and Company’s work 
resurfaced ahead of the 1895-96 season.  Joe Benson, a stevedore who worked 
“all the colored gangs of any account,” had told the Cotton Jammers that a committee 
of white screwmen had offered to work for thirty-one cents a bale.  When the Cotton 
Jammers complained, the SBA’s Executive Committee assured them of all 
protection and that they would stand firm and not touch any of Parr’s work.  The work 
was offered to the SBA that September but they stood by the agreement and 
refused to take it.  The incident convinced both sides of the need for a written 
agreement and when the black committee was invited to hear the SBA’s decision 
both sides “mutually agreed that an agreement or Covenant be entered into for our 
mutual benefit and protection.”19  
   The covenant had limits, not least that it only ratified the previous 
understanding that neither side would take the work of the other under any 
17 SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 1:25-8, SBA, Minutes, 2:351, 372-3.
18 SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 1:25-8.
19 SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 1:26-8, 38-9; SBA, Minutes, 2:379, 382.
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circumstances.  Nor did it end the uneasiness of many rank and file members at 
giving such recognition to a black union.  The following season, a new SBA 
resolution prevented any man who had worked with No. 2 from working with SBA 
members unless he provided a sworn affidavit that he was not member of No. 2.  
After considerable discussion at the next the meeting, the resolution was overturned, 
“permitting several members of the No. 2 society to work with our members.”  This 
was one of several similar resolutions which raise the possibility that the Cotton 
Jammers accepted white members.  More probably, the resolutions were aimed at 
stevedores and apprentice workers who had employed or worked alongside the 
black screwmen.  As one petitioner explained, he was now barred from working with 
SBA men “on account of him being made in his youth to work with the No. 2 
Screwmen against his will.”  After much explanation and discussion, a motion 
prevailed “to allow all members of the No. 2 Association to work except those who 
had formerly been members of this Association or who affiliated with it.”20 
Despite the limitations, a written agreement was a step forward in biracial 
cooperation on Galveston’s waterfront.  Moreover, the new accord came at a time 
when racism and Jim Crow was surging to a crest across the South.  As C. Vann 
Woodward points out, Jim Crow was not the legacy of the post-Reconstruction 
Redeemers, but rather paralleled the rise of white democratic movements during the 
late 1880s and into the 1890s.  The rise of movements such as the Farmer’s Alliance 
and segregation laws were, in fact, linked by the economic rivalry at the heart of Jim 
Crow.  As Woodward explains, with white and black labor increasingly competing 
for meager wages in cotton fields, mines and wharves, “ It took a lot of ritual and Jim 
Crow to bolster the creed of white supremacy in the bosom of the white man 
working for black man’s wages.”  In a five year period between 1887 to 1891 
Florida, Mississippi, Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky and Georgia all 
enacted the benchmark of Jim Crow, the separate coach law for railroads.  This law 
20 SBA, Minutes, 2:440, 446, 561.
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was, in fact, almost the only Jim Crow law enacted by Southern states before 1900 
but such laws usually only codified existing practice in broad range of public and 
private institutions.  Moreover, a series of Supreme Court decisions, culminating in 
Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, were paving the way for further segregation and the 
political disfranchisement of Southern Negroes in the early 1900s.  Another feature 
of the New South, the convict lease system, replaced the penal function of the 
plantation and turned it into a source of revenue by leasing convict labor to private 
corporations or individuals.  The police and law courts ensured a steady supply of 
mostly black inmates and conditions for the convict laborer were often worse than 
slavery.21   
Like many other Southern cities, Galveston had been largely segregated by 
the 1880s but it did not begin to enact Jim Crow laws until after 1900.  In fact, the city 
maintained its reputation for tolerance by building the first Negro hospital in the state 
in 1891.  In 1895, however, changes in the city charter effectively disfranchised the 
town’s black citizens.  Galveston was governed by a mayor and twelve alderman 
representing each ward.  This system was commonplace and enabled small 
businessmen, workingmen and Negroes to be elected as aldermen for their ward.  
Norris Wright Cuney and several longshoremen had served as aldermen.  In 1895, 
the Chamber of Commerce successfully challenged this system of ward politics by 
proposing to elect alderman at large.  The Chamber, supported by members of the 
Cotton Exchange, formed a Good Government Club to run suitable pro-business 
candidates.  Candidates having to court citywide appeal made the election of a 
working men’s slate more difficult but it virtually ended black participation in city 
government.22   
Perhaps the most grievous blow to Galveston’s black population was the 
21 Woodward, Origins of the New South, 211-15; Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim 
Crow, 31-5, 70-1, 82-3, 97; Rice, The Negro in Texas, 140-150.
22 Rice, Progressive Cities, 4-5
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decline of Norris Wright Cuney.  Cuney stood at the height of his power at the 
beginning of the decade.  He was chairman of the state Republican Party and had 
been appointed inspector of customs for Galveston by President Harrison, the 
highest federal post awarded to a Southern Negro in the late nineteenth century.  
Cuney had always used his position to challenge segregation and he was one of the 
first Negroes to challenge the legality of the separate coach law passed by Texas in 
1890 when he was refused a sleeping berth on an interstate train.  His appeal failed 
and he was equally powerless to prevent the loss of his federal appointment when 
Grover Cleveland defeated Harrison in 1892.  Despite growing opposition from a 
rising ‘Lily-white’ faction, Cuney held on to his position in the Republican Party until 
1896 when he failed to support William McKinley's nomination as presidential 
candidate.  With his health failing from tuberculosis, Cuney was unable to fight the 
rising tide of racism within the Republican party and slipped from power.  When 
Cuney died in 1898, Galveston’s black community would lose its most powerful 
voice.23   
The SBA’s agreement with the Cotton Jammers did not resolve all problems 
on the waterfront as the introduction of the round bale brought the SBA into 
increasing conflict with the white Longshoremen’s Benevolent Union which handled 
general cargo on deep sea and some coastwise vessels.  The LBU was fighting its 
own battle against the use of sailors and other nonunion outsiders and the lowering of 
wages but, as less skilled workers, ordinary longshoremen could not exercise the 
same degree of control over wages and working conditions as the SBA and were 
more vulnerable to the growing power of employers.  By 1895, stevedores were 
using longshoremen to stow round bale cotton at their rate of forty cents per hour, 
two dollars per day less than the SBA rate.  The SBA sent a warning letter  to the 
LBU:   
    If stowing cotton is permitted to be done at 40c per hour it will inevitably bring 
    disaster to your association as well as ours as there are a great number of your 
23 Hales, “The Cuneys,” 172-81. 
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    members who are also Screwmen.  It is needless to remind you that it is to your 
    interest as well as ours to keep up the established wages of our respective 
    Associations and to prevent if possibly any one working at scab wages.
The LBU responded with its own grievance against screwmen who were also 
working as longshoremen.  The LBU sent a request asking that these men either 
stop work or apply for LBU membership.24 
This exchange settled nothing and employers continued to use 
longshoremen and black screwmen to load the round bale.  Unable to reach 
agreement with the LBU, the SBA tried to pressure stevedores.  When William 
Morris directed longshoremen to load two hundred round bales aboard the British 
steamship Navarro, seven gangs of screwmen walked out.  Morris argued that he 
was not attempting to reduce wages, but that he was short of screwmen and with 
longshoremen loading cotton on other wharves he expected the same right.  The 
SBA characteristically offered no explanation for the “misunderstanding,” but again 
the action did nothing to resolve the situation and these demarcation disputes would 
continue to mar relations between screwmen and longshoremen for the next 
decade.25 
Coastwise longshoremen for the Mallory line also faced pressure from their 
employer to lower wages.  When Mallory announced a five cent reduction in the 
hourly wage to thirty-five cents for days and forty cents for nights in January, 1894, 
workers refused to unload the newly docked steamship Comal.  One hundred and 
fifty men were locked out from the Mallory dock and replaced by twenty-five scabs.  
According to the Daily News, Mallory longshoremen in New York received only 
twenty-five cents an hour and no overtime.  The striking men acknowledged that they 
received three dollars for days and four dollars for nights, but Mallory ran only two 
liners a week.  Since it only took eleven to eleven-and-a-half hours to discharge a 
ship the leading twenty wage earners had averaged only $10.80 a week over the 
24 LBU, Minutes, 1:428-9, 443, 447, 459; SBA, Minutes, 2:415.
25 Galveston Daily News, Dec. 10, 1897.
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previous month.  The next highest gang made $7 a week and the lowest earners 
only $3.50.  As a strike leader explained, “Ten eighty a week don’t go far with a man 
who has house rent to pay and a wife and three or four children to support.  I have 
been on the Mallory pier three or four years and am in debt and can’t get out of 
debt.  We have simply struck against a reduction in our already small wages.”26 
The strike continued for the next month with Mallory ships being loaded and 
unloaded by their crews and a small number of outsiders.  The strikers were 
generally peaceful although there were some attempts to intimidate the 
strikebreakers during the first days of the strike.  Police arrested Elias Parker, a 
foremen of the longshoremen, for carrying a pistol and two strikebreakers were 
attacked.  Sam Warren, a Negro night watchman, boasted that he would not be 
intimidated by the strikers but was chased off the job that evening.  According to the 
Daily News, the troublemakers were: “young fellows who have only themselves to 
look out for, and that men who have families and others dependent upon their labor 
are not inclined to engage in any violent demonstrations.”  Mallory’s agent, Captain 
Sawyer, upheld the men’s right to refrain from work, but added when “a number of  
men attempt to dissuade others from working by threats or intimidation, I think that 
they have stepped pretty close to the danger line.”  No further trouble was reported 
after police were called in although they had to escort Sam Warren to his post past a 
crowd of jeering strikers that included several women.27  
Over three hundred and fifty black laborers attended a mass meeting in early 
February to discuss continuing the strike.  Leading the meeting, Howard Hill warned 
that Mallory was preparing to ship laborers from New York as sailors to do work and 
then ship them home, thus Galveston would lose trade to which she was legitimately 
entitled.  Other speakers said that strikers were suffering hardship but they would not 
accept work at the sacrifice of a principle.  Almost to a man, the meeting favored 
26Galveston Daily News, Jan. 14-16, 1894
27 Ibid., Jan. 15-17, 1894.
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opposing the introduction of foreign labor and continuing the strike.28  
Two LBU representatives, John Dwyer and Thomas Gallagher, also spoke 
at the meeting, but if Hill and the other strike leaders had been hoping for support 
from the white longshoremen they were disappointed.  The following day, Dwyer 
denied supporting the strike at the meeting.  He had, in fact, said that he “sincerely 
regretted the causes that led to the strike and deprecated in strong terms the 
resorting to these methods as a means of settlement between labor and capital.”  
According to Dwyer, strikes and boycotts had signally failed to help the people in 
whose interests they were inaugurated, so in order to understand the remedy for the 
evils in the body politic the working classes must keep themselves thoroughly 
posted on questions of political economy.  The interests of the working classes and 
retailers were mutual since shopkeepers themselves lost revenue when wages 
were paid to outsiders.  Dwyer’s solution, therefore, was to petition the retailers for 
support in opposing outside labor.  He concluded by telling the meeting that he was 
glad to notice the absence of political heelers and leaders from the meeting and that 
the only true remedy for the laborers’ wrongs was through the intelligent use of the 
ballot.29  
A few days later, Howard Hill told a meeting of over one hundred strikers that 
a petition had been sent to retailers and that a committee had tried to dissuade those 
few men who were working.  Threats uttered against scab labor drew little support at 
the meeting but that evening around three hundred men gathered to dissuade the 
seven men working on the Mallory wharf.  One man escaped unnoticed while the 
other six preferred to remain out of sight on board ship.  The strike, however, was 
effectively over.  When the Comal arrived without the threatened extra crew, there 
were plenty of applications for work at the reduced rates.30  
28 Galveston Daily News, Jan. 16; Feb. 4, 1894.
29 Ibid., Feb. 5, 1894.
30 Ibid., Feb. 7, 13 1894.
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The strike was over but workers’ grievances continued.  In September, Lucas 
Luke complained to the Daily News that Mallory was employing outsiders in 
preference to Galveston men.  Sawyer denied the accusation, reminding everyone 
that Mallory had no favorites when it came to labor and their only requirement was 
ability.  The strike was thus in many ways a repeat of 1885, with Mallory now using 
nonunion black workers to replace organized black labor.  However, it would take the 
company another twenty-five years to fully achieve this goal as black longshoremen 
demonstrated their deep-rooted commitment to the principle of organized labor.  
Two of the strike’s leaders, George and Harvey Patrick, would emerge as leaders of 
a more protracted strike against Mallory in 1898.  Harvey, who listed his occupation 
as drayman, had been associated with union’s since at least 1880 when he acted as 
treasurer of the Longshoremen’s Association No. 1.  His brother George, along with 
Howard Hill, had worked on the Mallory docks since the mid-1880s.  George's 
occupation was also listed as screwman and it was as a screwman during the 
troubles in New Orleans that he demonstrated his commitment to unionism.31 
When stevedores and agents in New Orleans began undercutting union rates 
in 1894, white screwmen responded with their own cost-cutting proposal: they 
would buy their own tools and negotiate directly with shipping agents, thus 
eliminating the stevedores.  The stevedores, deciding that it was the screwmen who 
could be bypassed, turned to outside help and Norris Wright Cuney.  Cuney sent 
fifteen screwmen and thirty-five regular longshoremen to New Orleans.  The 
previous success of labor in New Orleans depended, in part, on the reluctance of 
the city’s ruling Democratic ring to antagonize its white labor vote.  In this case, the 
mayor denied Cuney’s men police protection.  Taken by barge, rather than the usual 
streetcars, to their ships Cuney’s men began work, but within an hour they downed 
tools and demanded to be paid at a higher rate.  A deputation from the white 
screwmen convinced the Galveston men that the situation in New Orleans had been 
31 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 12, 1894; Galveston City Directory 1882-83, 102; 
Galveston City Directory 1888-89 , 213, 309.
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misrepresented to them.  
Acting as leading foreman, George Patrick claimed that the stevedore’s agent 
Mr. Lincoln had told them that the rates in New Orleans were five dollars a day for 
screwmen, and four dollars for longshoremen.  This was one dollar less than 
Galveston rates, but believing this to be the union rate and there to be a backlog of 
work the Galveston men accepted the contract.  Patrick accused Lincoln of 
misrepresenting the situation, telling him and his men that the strike was over and that 
both white and black screwmen’s unions were working at those rates.  Finding only 
nonunion men working at those rates because of the stevedores’ attempt to 
undercut union rates, Patrick refused to work for less than six dollars.  Lincoln quickly 
agreed to pay the higher rates but Patrick decided upon another meeting with the 
white screwmen.  After further consultation that afternoon he, along with ten other 
screwmen and a number of longshoremen, accepted the offer of a free ride home.  
On his return, Patrick explained to the Galveston Daily News that the white 
screwmen “received us most cordially and showed us the injustice of our continuing 
to work.  They offered to pay our way back to Galveston and twenty-one of us 
accepted.”  Denying his men had been paid twenty dollars each to return, Patrick 
continued:
    We had all the money we wanted for eatables, drinks and cigars two bits and half 
    dollars were generously handed round.  I want the News  to express our heartfelt 
    thanks to James Shaw, the president of the white screwmen’s association and 
    Robin Hillard of the colored association, for their kind and generous treatment and 
    uniform courtesy.
Patrick also countered rumors of intimidation, denying that threats were made against 
his or his men’s lives.  The reason for their early return was simple; “I do not believe 
in interfering in labor troubles of other places.  Home men should be all employed 
before strangers are sent for.”32    
The News  report also carried an article from the New Orleans’ Picayune in 
32 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 43; Galveston Daily News, March 12, 
1895.
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which Lincoln claimed the men were aware of conditions before they left Galveston.  
Given ample protection, simply fear made Patrick and his men quit work.  Violence 
was a feature of the dispute.  On March 9, a mob had thrown one thousand dollars 
worth of screwing and loading tools used by nonunion labor into the river.  Four days 
later, two bloody riots were launched against black longshoremen breaking a work-
sharing agreement and undercutting wages.  However, Patrick’s version of events is 
supported by the official police report, which stated that the Galveston men worked 
at a five and six dollar scale for about an hour before Frank Dennis, one of the Negro 
foremen, called a halt pending the meeting with the white screwmen’s committee.  
After the meeting, Dennis spoke to a police officer, confirming Patrick’s story that the 
Galveston men had been misled: “Had they known of the trouble here between the 
white and the black screwmen they would never have come, and as soon as he 
could get them together they would try and leave for their homes.”33 
Frank Dennis would also go on to lead the 1898 strike.  In the meantime, 
Mallory demonstrated that it had lost none of its competitive edge in the business 
world.  In 1897, the Miami Steamship Company began operating the Lone Star 
service between Galveston and New York.  Mallory’s response to this new 
competition was unyielding: “there must be no compromise or admission of that line 
to the Galveston Trade and that its opposition must be met and fought to the end.” 
Thus resolved, Mallory began another rate war thus affecting rate agreements across 
the South.  Mallory’s railroad allies closed ranks against the Miami, charging the 
company higher rates and asking for prepayment.  Miami fought their case in the 
federal courts but, having lost, were forced to withdraw from Galveston after only 
nine months of operating.  According to James Baughman, the Miami Company 
either failed to understand the nature of the competition or was hoping to be bought 
off.  With this threat defeated, however, Mallory then found its own services 
suspended in April, 1898, due to the Spanish American War.  When services 
33 Galveston Daily News, March 12, 1895.
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restarted at the end of August, the company faced a renewed challenge from its own 
workers.  In the ensuing strike, Galveston’s black longshoremen would place their 
class interests above their race consciousness.34  
Mallory’s New York to Galveston service resumed when the Colorado 
berthed at the Mallory dock at about one p.m. on August 31.  Waiting at the 
dockside was a crowd of black longshoremen estimated to be over a thousand 
strong.  This was not, however, a reception committee welcoming the return of the 
line:
    for the most part it was a crowd of colored longshoremen, who were there to tell
    the Mallory people that they must employ none but union men, and must pay the 
    scale of wages recently adopted by the recently organized and chartered Colored 
    laborers’ union.
.
Organizing the demonstration, as chairman of the newly-formed Colored Labor 
Protective Union, was George Patrick accompanied by brother Harvey acting as 
union president.35   
George Patrick explained to the Daily News that the Colored Labor 
Protective Union had organized as a benevolent association, with an initiation fee of 
ten cents and monthly dues of ten cents.  These small amounts were perhaps aimed 
at encouraging as broad a membership as possible.  The union was demanding 
forty cents per hour for day work and fifty for night, against the company’s offer of 
thirty and forty cents.  Another central issue was Mallory’s use of “country negroes” to 
undermine the union’s standing.  The longshoremen, many armed with “billets of 
wood,” formed a complete cordon around the Mallory dock, covering every 
approach.  Some declared they were simply preventing their own men from 
blocking the gangways, and others suggested there was no intention of preventing 
men from working but that “we are the men who will unload that ship, and we will get 
union wages for it.”  Police on the scene denied witnessing any coercion but any man 
34 Baughman, The Mallorys of Mystic, 180-8.
35 Galveston Daily News, Aug. 31, 1898.
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attempting to work was quickly surrounded by a small group of strikers and 
persuaded to reconsider.36  
Addressing the gathered workers on the first afternoon of the strike, Harvey 
Patrick told the crowd speaking “to and for every man with an interest in the 
community and a family at home to support, be he white or black.”  Accusing the 
Mallory line of offering reduced wages, Patrick continued:  
    Now the Mallory line is charging 85 cents a hundred for freight, and they refuse to 
    pay us 40 cents an hour for unloading that freight . . . yet they will not pay us a 
    living wage . . . . We have not come here to prevent the Mallory line from working, 
    but to ask them to pay us what we pay them through our merchants.
He then declared that scab labor from the country, “which comes here for three or 
four months every year after making a cotton crop to gobble our work and make 
stake for Christmas, should not be employed at reduced wages.  We stay here all 
the year round.”  If the scabs returned to the country, and longshoremen were paid a 
decent wage, better prices could be paid for farm produce thus satisfying everyone.  
Patrick warned against violence, saying the men would retain the sympathy of white 
labor unions only so long as they remained within the bounds of the law.  Cautioning 
the men to stay away from the Mallory docks for less than forty cents, he added 
“When they are ready to consent to our terms, union men will do the work at union 
wages, we don’t want scabs to do the work at union wages, but we want union men 
and union wages.”37  
As Patrick spoke, the Mallory Line’s traffic manager, J. B. Denison was 
complaining of the situation to Mayor Ashley Fly and Deputy Chief-of-Police 
Anderson.  The police arrived in force during the middle of the afternoon with orders 
from Mayor Fly to disperse the crowd.  Fly, a good politician, was a poor 
administrator who used city hall as a club for his drinking cronies.  During the Pullman 
strike of 1894, Fly had threatened to settle the dispute with the two revolvers he 
36Galveston Daily News, Aug. 31, 1898; Houston Daily Post, Aug. 31, 1898.
37 Galveston Daily News, Aug. 31, 1898.
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carried although he also took the precaution of asking Governor Hogg for two 
hundred state militia men.  When Hogg refused, Fly ordered the Galveston artillery 
company to arms and sent a requisition for a Gatling. gun and five hundred rounds of 
ammunition.  Although pushed back by the police, many men hung around to 
prevent any attempt to unload the Colorado.  Denison, not satisfied the crowd was 
adequately dispersed, again complained to the police.  Deputy Chief Anderson 
arrived to warn the men to disperse and not to return.38  
Denison told the Daily News that he regretted not being allowed to employ 
his old hands who had suffered during the suspension of shipping.  The rates 
offered were the same as had been paid for the last five or six years with no 
complaint; wages were “liberal and which in fact are higher than we can afford.”  
According to Denison, the trouble was caused by men like George Patrick who had 
no connection with the Mallory line. Charles Scrimgeour, superintendent of the 
Mallory wharf, similarly blamed the trouble on intimidation by the Negro cotton 
screwmen.  The Cotton Jammers officially denied any involvement in the strike.  W. 
H. Davis, chairmen of the Executive Committee explained that screwmen had 
ceased to work for Mallory five or six years ago when the company refused to pay 
the recognized rates.  The union was not now trying to raise wages and retake the 
work although, rumors apart, evidence suggests that this was the goal of at least 
some rank and file members.  Certainly the numbers involved in the strike far 
exceeded the 150 to 250 men regularly employed by Mallory.  Strike leaders 
Patrick and Frank Dennis had worked as screwmen in the past and Preace 
Henderson had served on at least one Cotton Jammers delegation to the SBA.  
Patrick himself admitted that he had not worked for Mallory for several years, claiming 
instead a “general interest” in preventing Mallory’s low wages from depressing 
wages all round.  
Denison, however, refused to concede that Mallory men were purposely 
38 Cartwright, Galveston, 154; Galveston Daily News, July 9-15, 20, 1894.
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paid less than those working on tramp steamers to cut costs, arguing instead that his 
work had the advantage of a degree of permanency.  With at least one ship 
regularly every week, a man working between thirty-six and fifty hours could make 
$10.80 to $15 a week.  Denison then played the race card, claiming that if he was 
forced to pay the white scale of wages the work would be opened to white labor, 
and at an equal scale white labor was preferable to black.  Having implicitly admitted 
that Mallory was deliberately underpaying its black workers, Denison indulged in a 
act of verbal legerdemain typical of Mallory managers.  Ignoring his own striking 
workers, Denison claimed that this preference for white labor was “a fact that seems 
to be tacitly acknowledged by the negroes by their acceptance of lower wages at 
least so far as loading and unloading of ships is concerned.”  He was adamant that 
work would begin at 7.00 a.m. the next day, with Fly and Anderson promising their 
support.  Mayor Fly’s personal supervision of the police the next day would result in 
one white man shot dead and another wounded, and five negroes wounded 
including one fatality.39  
The day began peacefully with police asking George Patrick to speak to the 
crowd of strikers.  In a “pleasant talk,” Patrick warned his men it was against city 
ordinances to congregate but they should go to their appointed stations and see that 
no scabs work.  He warned against violence or creating a disturbance before linking 
the strike to a broader goal of black manhood:
    We want a larger scale of wages so we can take our women from the washtubs 
    and the cook kitchens . . . so we can educate and save our daughters from 
    prostitution.  The white man will not respect you as long as you live as we are 
    compelled to do . . . I have, thank God, quit paying rent and am now a taxpayer, 
    and that is what you all should be.  
    
The men quietly dispersed as asked, but Denison still remained unsatisfied.  Mayor 
Fly addressed the crowd, telling them they had a right to withdraw their labor, but not 
to prevent others from working.  He suggested that “some trifling white man, too 
39 Galveston Daily News, Aug. 31, 1898; Sept. 3, 1898; SBA Executive Committee, 
Minutes, 1:38; Houston  Daily Post, Aug. 31, 1898.
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indolent to work himself, has caused all this trouble among you colored people for 
political reasons, and I am sorry your intelligence has not enabled you to discover its 
full meaning.”  The end result would be no employment at all for black labor, and it 
would be their own fault.  He finished with a warning that if they used violence, the 
police would be forced to respond with violence.40  
The men divided into small squads posted at two-block intervals, but did not 
interfere as the Colorado began unloading.  The Daily News noted the crew 
“working along very well—as well as a gang of thirty to forty men could do who were 
not fully gifted in that line of work.”  The day passed without incident until 3:40 p.m. 
when a train arrived carrying sixty-five black laborers from Houston.  As these men 
disembarked the strikers advanced and shots were exchanged with the police 
escort.  Thomas Baker, a white screwman there to “see the fun,” lay dead, 
reportedly shot by a “light-skinned negro.”  Hurrying the scab workers into wharf 
sheds, the police took up a defensive position.  The Galveston men advanced 
towards the police line claiming they only wished to talk and persuade the scabs not 
to work.  Fly advised the longshoremen to leave private property, but when they 
continued to press forward he gave the order to fire.  The men temporarily retreated 
before police precipitated a further confrontation by attempting to snatch ringleaders 
from the crowd.  Warning volleys were fired before twenty policemen fired into the 
crowd.  Heavy rainfall ended the confrontation, ironically, as firemen prepared to 
disperse the crowd with water hoses.  At nightfall, an armed posse of citizens 
protected the wharf from behind a breastworks of cotton bales.41  
The next day Frank Robinson, a black longshoreman, died from his wounds 
and the Houston Light Artillery arrived with twenty-six men and two Gatling guns.  At 
the wharf, the day passed quietly with no attempt to cross the police line.  Behind 
the scenes, the strike committee asked the Cotton Exchange to intercede on its 
40 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 1, 1898.
41 Ibid.
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behalf.  Denison flatly refused an offer of compromise and arbitration.  Between 
seven hundred and one thousand men attended a meeting that night where two 
white screwmen, arguing for “ the benefits of unionism,” declared that “union labor 
would stand together regardless of race, creed or color, and that prejudices would be 
buried.”  After the meeting, George Patrick told a reporter that the shooting was 
uncalled for, and that it served to make the men more determined and loyal to the 
organization.  They would continue to rely on moral suasion.  Patrick also announced 
the Protective Union had joined the American Federation of Labor: “In our meeting 
to-night we signified our intention to stick to the scale of wages we asked for and to 
hold the union to its duty to aid us.  We are members of the American Federation of 
Labor.  Oh, we will stick.”  Mr. Patrick, the reporter noted, “misuses words 
occasionally, but on the whole speaks very well, and has no difficulty in giving full 
expression to his ideas.  He says he is not an agitator, but a conservative 
workingman; he is a grandfather and tries to be a good citizen.”42  
The CLPU joined the AFL as Federal Labor Union No. 7147.  Like the 
Knights of Labor in the previous decade, the AFL’s official policy was to organize all 
working people, “irrespective of creed, color, sex, nationality, or politics.”  AFL 
chairman Samuel Gompers expressed his personal opinion in a letter to colleague 
James H. White:
    Wage workers . . . may not care to socially meet colored people, but as  working 
    men we are not justified in refusing them the right or the opportunity to organize for 
    their common protection . . . .  We will only make enemies of them and of 
    necessity they will be antagonistic to our interests.
The AFL held to this policy at first by refusing to affiliate unions that excluded black 
workers However, the AFL had always favored craft unions over industrial workers 
and gradually Gompers began to accept the prejudices of skilled workers against 
unskilled and black labor.  The exclusionary practices of all-white unions were simply 
ignored at first but by 1900 even the facade of biracial unions had been dropped.  
42Galveston Daily News, Sept. 2, 1898.
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Yet, even as Jim Crow laws and racial violence replaced Gompers’ earlier vision of 
the New South, many black workers still turned to the AFL.43  
In his study of black labor in Richmond, Paul Wortham described Federal 
Labor Unions as a way for the AFL to circumvent the racism of white unions by 
organizing Southern black workers into associations directly affiliated to the AFL.  As 
the return to prosperity in 1897 reinvigorated the trade union movement, the AFL 
financed a nationwide organizing campaign that included the South.  Little is known 
about the number of blacks who belonged to these unions around the turn of the 
twentieth century but without a national union to bargain for them, and the AFL 
increasingly retreating from industrial workers, the FLU’s rapidly failed.  However, as 
Arnesen points out, focusing on white discrimination and racism within the AFL 
misses the question of how black workers viewed joining Federal Labor Unions. or 
other bodies.  As the actions of Galveston’s black waterfront workers demonstrated 
time and again, “It was not integration at the level of the union local but equal rights 
and equal consideration within the labor movement that topped the black unionist’s 
agenda.”  These unskilled black laborers—”conservative workingmen” like George 
Patrick or James Porter the the long-serving secretary for New Orleans’ black 
longshoremen’s union—ignored the opposition of Booker T. Washington, local black 
ministers, and regional industrial employers to unionize and seek the support of the 
white labor movement.  According to Arnesen, Patrick and Porter and their middle-
class counterparts drew on a shared language, but these working-class black activists 
“contributed distinct ideas about the relationship between labor and capital that 
contrasted sharply with the ideology espoused by middle-class black politicians and 
journalists of the era.”44
43 Bracey, Black Workers and Organized Labor, 25; Foner, Organized Labor and the Black 
Worker, 1619-1973, 65.
44 Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619-1973, 82-102; Bracey, Black 
Workers and Organized Labor, 26-40; Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 52, 85, 153; 
Arnesen, “Following the Color Line of Labor,” 62: Wortham, “Black Workers and Labor Unions in 
Birmingham,” 60-1.
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On the day following the AFL announcement, police arrested George and 
Harvey Patrick, Lucas Luke and Frank Dennis on charges of unlawful assembly and 
inciting riots.  The four men were bailed out for three hundred dollars apiece.  Earlier 
that day, Patrick had led a delegation to talk to the Houston men who remained 
unmoved.  Their agent explained that waterfront wages in Galveston were generally 
higher than elsewhere, and to the Houston men the rates represented a fair wage.  
Denison hinted that if the strike continued white labor would return to Mallory wharf: 
“There is no doubt that, with an equal scale of wages, white labor is preferable to 
colored.”  There was no evidence, however, of the work being offered to white 
labor, or of any interest among Galveston’s white longshoremen in working for 
Mallory.45  
The funeral of white screwman Thomas Baker was held on September 4.  
According to the coroner’s verdict and that of an SBA investigating committee, Baker 
was shot by an unknown assailant.  No-one, however, blamed Patrick’s men and the 
SBA was determined to make Baker’s funeral a public event.  Patrick's men and the 
Cotton Jammers joined with white screwmen and longshoremen and other 
members of the Trade Assembly in what the Daily News described as an “unusual” 
procession: 
    There were 1500 men in line, of which 1000 were negroes.  The white screwmen 
    and longshoremen, central union, composed from all the  labor unions in the city, 
    and the colored screwmen and the new organization marched in columns of fours 
    from the hall. 
Although white and black marched in separate sections, each headed by their own 
band, it was indeed an unusual and unprecedented display of labor solidarity.46 
The next few days passed quietly, but opposition to Mallory’s conduct was 
beginning to surface.  Loading on the Mallory wharf continued without interruption, 
although the strikers continued to pressure the strikebreakers with their constant 
45 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 3, 1898.
46 SBA, Minutes, 2:552, 556; Galveston Daily News, Sept. 6, 1898.
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presence, forcing the Houston men to spend their days and nights confined to their 
ship and the wharf sheds.  A striker who strayed too far received a beating or was 
thrown into the bay.  There were also rumors of men being prevented from returning 
to work by their fellow strikers.  Denison had declared his willingness to meet with 
any committee, but “positively no consideration” could be given to discussing 
wages.  The Daily News had already pointed out that, despite the determination of 
both sides, the militia and police could not be expected to keep order indefinitely, 
nor could strikebreakers be kept in sheds, yet both sides remained determined.  
Captain Roff, commander of the departing militia observed that his men “cannot 
remain here forever, especially in the face of a Mallory management not making any 
perceptible effort to adjust the differences with the strikers.”  Police Chief Jones was 
also tiring of assigning all his men to the wharf when the rest of the city was entitled to 
protection.  Galveston’s merchant community was also beginning to  express their 
concern over the strike.  Writing to his uncle George Sealy, John Sealy observed 
that: “The Mallory strike here has been a very serious one and the situation is not in 
the least relieved as yet: the negroes are very strong in their Union and will not yield 
nor will they return to work, from what I can learn, at the old rates.”47 
On September 10, a Wholesale Dealer’s association, “interested parties on 
the grounds that their freights were being delayed, and that they were otherwise 
injured” arranged a meeting between Harvey Patrick and Denison.  Denison 
regretted that money was being spent outside of Galveston, but refused to alter his 
position.  The News reported that Sheriff Henry Thomas was in Houston to 
persuade men there not to return.  According to Thomas, “The best element in 
Galveston is in favor of sustaining the men in their strike against the Mallory line for 
better wages.”  A further report suggested that white longshoremen being paid forty 
and sixty cents would not work for thirty and fifty cents: their interest was to see black 
labor paid a decent rate rather than providing cheap competition.  On September 
47 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 6-10, 1898; John Sealy, ALS to George Sealy, Sept. 13, 
1898.
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13, up to two thousand men tried to attend the meeting of affiliation with the AFL.  
George Harvey suggested that a ten-cent wage rise would mean $80,000 a year 
more to be spent among Galveston’s merchants.  By now, even Mayor Fly was 
promising to talk to Denison.  Denison responded by giving the men one week to 
return to work.48 
The City Times, Galveston’s leading black newspaper, interviewed a 
prominent union member, “a negro of more than ordinary intelligence, who is 
recognized as a champion of his race and a man who has many followers in the 
different negro organizations in the city.”  The man, who would not be named, 
declared that,“I am a negro, and am for my race first, last and always.  I am with them 
in their struggle for higher wages, and as a member of the union fully indorse the 
organization.”  Condemning the use of violence he continued: “The union is all right in 
itself, and organized labor is what the negro needs, but white politicians . . .  are now 
endeavoring to use the union, or, rather, its members, as a political catspaw.”  
Throughout the strike, vague rumors and accusations had surfaced that ‘certain’ white 
politicians were manipulating the strikers for their own ends.  This informant accused 
“Certain white men, several of them very prominent in commercial and business 
circles in Galveston,” of preying on the many illiterate union members, “for the 
purpose of feathering their own political ambitions and aspirations, at the sacrifice of 
men who have stood by the negro, and in politics have received the support of the 
colored citizens of Galveston.”  Refusing to publicly name the men involved, he 
concluded that the struggle for higher wages drew moral support from gold and silver 
democrats, republicans and populists:
    But white politicians began to work on the members, and have tried to convince 
    the negroes that certain political friends of theirs have indorsed the actions of certain 
    men, who in politics have lost a good deal of the support of the negro vote.”49 
Strike leader Lucas Luke was more forthcoming in an interview the following 
48 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 11, 14, 15, 1898.
49 Galveston City Times  in Galveston Daily News, Sept. 11, 1898.
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week.  Luke also accused anonymous white politicians of trying to make political 
capital from the dispute.  Two of these men had tried to persuade the strikers that the 
city’s leading white Republican, R. B. Hawley, was using his influence against the 
strike.  Luke denied that this trick would turn Negro voters away from Hawley, 
affirming instead that “our  people will not be gulled in this way.”  As Republican 
congressman for Galveston, Hawley had proved a useful envoy to Washington 
earlier in the decade when Galveston wanted money from the federal government.  
Clearly, some local Democratic politicians felt Hawley had outlived his usefulness 
and were using the strike to turn the traditionally Republican black voters against him.  
With no Cuney to orchestrate events, black voters would turn from Hawley because 
of his failure to support the strike and to appoint blacks to high office.50  
The strike took a more serious turn when violence flared again on the night of 
the 22nd.  At 11:15 p.m., forty or fifty masked Negroes attacked a wharf shed 
housing the Houston Negroes.  The “mobbers emptied their pistols,” wounding 
only one man and that not seriously.  However, a Galveston man, a drayman not 
longshoreman, was discovered dying nearby, the victim of an accidental shooting 
according to the Daily News.  The raid, although clearly intended only to frighten the 
strikebreakers, gave the forces of law and order an excuse to act.  On Friday 
September 24, police issued a warrant for George Patrick’s arrest.  Police searched 
for Patrick all day, finding him that evening at his home after being notified that Patrick 
himself had been shot.  Patrick claimed he was shot in the thigh that night while 
visiting the outhouse.  He recognized his black assailant but refused to name him.  
Patrick also refused to be examined or go to hospital.  He was arrested and taken to 
hospital where a doctor declared that the wound had been inflicted between 
eighteen and twenty-four hours previously.
On Saturday, authorities charged Patrick with conspiracy to commit murder 
and murder.  Initially charged only with conspiracy, Patrick was about to pay his one 
50 Galveston Daily News, Sept., 18, 1898.
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thousand dollars bail when Mayor Fly appeared in court.  After a consultation with 
judge and counsel, a murder charge was added and bail refused.  Patrick claimed to 
have worked all day Friday as a screwman, and so could not have been wounded 
on Thursday night.  A stevedore confirmed this story, adding that he had not noticed 
Patrick limping.  The stevedore later withdrew his evidence, claiming he had been 
busy when questioned and had mistaken the day.  That Saturday night, a reporter 
from the News  interviewed Patrick in jail.  Patrick asked the reporter why he was 
charged with murder.  When the reporter suggested it was because of the shooting 
incident at Patrick’s house, Patrick laughed and replied, “Well. I guess that’s it.”51  
Police released Patrick from jail a few days later on one thousand dollars bail, 
this time after an appearance in court by Chief Jones.  Jones would be rewarded for 
his support the following year when he beat Fly in the mayoral race with support 
from labor groups and black voters.  Fly was linked to the business interests behind 
the Good Government Club ticket that had lobbied for the charter amendments in 
1895.  Campaign flyers for Jones, who represented the Greater Galveston ticket, 
highlighted Fly’s anti-labor record and role in suppressing the 1898 strike.  The strike, 
however, had lost its momentum.  On the twenty-fifth, the union decided to continue 
the strike claiming a near unanimous vote.  On Monday, 135 men, many of them 
reportedly union men, began unloading the Lampasas.  Support for the strike fell 
away, despite the union’s claims, as the hardship of a prolonged strike forced the 
Negro longshoreman to return to the Mallory wharf with no gains made.  During the 
strike Daniel Ripley, general agent for the defeated Miami Company’s Lone Star 
Line, had observed: “The Mallory line was very keen to make a combination with the 
railroads to drive out the Lone Star line.  They don’t seem so keen to sustain another 
combination that is trying to make them pay a little more money.  Chickens come 
home to roost.  The Mallory line had a little better success in appealing to the law 
51 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 23-25, 1898.
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than I had.”52  
On November 26, a Grand Jury indicted George Patrick and he was again 
arrested for murder and released on bail.  In December, police arrested Roxie 
Henderson, Ida Rice, and Robert Rice, all neighbors and witnesses of Patrick, on 
charges of perjury.  The following January, a court found strike leader Frank Dennis 
not guilty of stealing  “valuable steam whistle.”  Still awaiting trial, Patrick sat on the 
first all-black jury to serve in a Galveston. April 28 court.  On May 7, an appeal court 
judge acquitted Patrick of the charge of carrying concealed weapons.  His trial for 
conspiracy to commit murder was scheduled for a few days later, but the Daily News 
carried no report of the outcome.  Patrick’s acquittal on the lesser charge, however, 
suggests that conviction would have been difficult, particularly since the police case 
relied on circumstantial evidence.  Moreover, and despite his being wounded at the 
time of his arrest, there was more than a suggestion of efforts to frame Patrick for the 
crime.  What is known is that instead of prison, Patrick and his wife moved to 
Oklahoma Territory in 1901, settling in Oklahoma City in 1904.53  
Migration was a growing option for blacks wanting to escape Jim Crow laws 
and racial violence in Texas.  The move to Oklahoma began in the early 1890s 
when Edwin McCabe, an outcast from the Republican Party like Cuney, began 
promoting all-black townships such as Langston City.  As “Oklahoma fever” struck, 
Oklahoma Clubs sprang up across the South and blacks continued to move into the 
territory.  Support for emigration  came generally from members of the large black 
lower class who faced greater problems with fewer alternatives than the much 
smaller black middle class.  Migration north involved a more varied group as the 
Dallas Express explained, “This exodus is not by any means confined to the 
worthless or the ignorant negro.  A large per cent of the young negroes in this 
52 Rice, Progressive Cities, 4-5; Kretzman, “A House Built Upon the Sand,” 86; Galveston 
Daily News, Sept. 16.
53 Galveston Daily News, April 28, 1900; May 8, 1900; Galveston City Times, Dec. 31, 
1904.
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exodus are rather intelligent.  Many of the business houses in Houston, Dallas and 
Galveston, where the exodus is greatest in Texas, have lost some of their best 
help.”  Some of those who left rose to considerable prominence elsewhere, 
including Cuney’s daughter Maud who moved to Boston to become an 
accomplished pianist, playwright, lecturer, and author.  Patrick returned to visit 
Galveston in 1904.  He gave several speeches at local churches, thus reinforcing the 
respect that he and other black union leaders, “conservative workingmen,” garnered 
from their community.54 
Not all black workers, however, shared the faith of men like the Patricks in 
white labor organizations, preferring instead to maintain their independence.  
Independence meant the ability to secure work by undercutting white labor.  
Although the alternative could be no work at all it was a devil’s bargain that played 
into the hands of employers.  In ports like Galveston, cotton screwing represented 
one of the few opportunities for black workers to enter a relatively skilled, well-paid 
and respected occupation.  The Cotton Jammers had sought to protect that status 
by seeking closer links with white labor organizations yet were reluctant to risk 
jeopardizing the gains they had made with employers by raising their scale of 
wages to equal that of the SBA.  However, some union members were prepared 
to accept even lower wages to gain work thus creating a breach in the ranks of the 
Cotton Jammers.  Walter Edmundson was one of several foremen fined ten dollars 
and expelled form the association in 1898 for working below the forty and fifty cents 
per hour scale.  Edmunson sued the association in a two-day trial that aroused 
considerable interest among the black spectators and witnesses crowding the court 
room to hear the jury find in favor of the union.  In another case, James Taylor sued 
the Cotton Jammers for one thousand dollars after he was expelled from the 
association after working for the Lone Star line.  Taylor, a self-described charter 
member and active participant in the Cotton Jammers, was now unable to get work 
54 Barr, Black Texans, 145-6; Mozell, “The All-Negro Society in Oklahoma,” 27-9; Redkey, 
Black Exodus, 292.
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because of his nonunion status.  The court found in favor of Taylor although his 
damages were reduced to eighty-five dollars.55  Amid these suits, a new Negro 
organization appeared on the waterfront sometime before the beginning of the 
1898 season. 
The disaffected former members of the Cotton Jammers formed the Lone 
Star Cotton Jammers Association, also know as the No. 3, and began working for 
Daniel Ripley, former agent of the failed Lone Star line, at rates which undercut both 
the SBA and Cotton Jammers.  The loss of the Mallory strike may have convinced 
some that a Negro’s best opportunity lay in undercutting the white man’s wages.  
The loss of Cuney’s influence through his death that year may also have helped 
precipitate the division.  Perhaps the most important factor was the tremendous 
growth in cotton exports by over one million bales per season after 1896.  Growth 
offered more opportunities for black workers but also meant more employers willing 
to exploit their situation.  A similar split had occurred among New Orleans’ black 
screwmen’s during the trouble of 1894-95, but those two rival bodies had 
amalgamated by the end of the decade.  The Galveston rift was more permanent, 
lasting until federal courts ordered the desegregation of waterfront unions in 1970s.  
Relations between Galveston’s two black organizations remained acrimonious for at 
least the next twenty years and would seriously hinder attempts to forge biracial 
cooperation.
The appearance of a second black screwmen’s organization, and one 
prepared to undercut the established wage scale, threatened the ability of both the 
SBA and Cotton Jammers to maintain wages, particularly in the case of the rounds 
bale.  At the beginning of the 1898 season, the SBA made a renewed effort to 
enforce working rules.  After a heated debate on the subject of round bales, the 
SBA resolved to enforce the rule that only screwmen should load cotton.  The 
stevedoring firm of Chase and Smith, who were using longshoremen, were told to 
55 Labor Movement in Texas Collection, Box 2E306, folder 7; Galveston Daily News, Jan. 
30, 1898, Nov. 1, 1889; Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 59.
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obey the SBA rules and were refused gangs until they did so.  Chase and Smith 
offered the work to the Cotton Jammers but when they refused the stevedores 
were forced to agree to abide by rules.  This episode demonstrated to all sides that 
when combined the screwmen still held considerable power.  However, the SBA 
had less success in winning the support of the longshoremen.  The LBU’s 
membership more than doubled to three hundred men around this time, perhaps 
partly by absorbing the coastwise white Longshoremen’s Benevolent Association.  
This increase and the promise of work on the new Southern Pacific docks created a 
new interest in coastwise work among deep sea longshoremen.  The LBU agreed 
to prohibit members from stowing cotton on ships bound for foreign ports “but that 
stowing Cotton without tools on vessels for domestic ports had always been 
considered longshore work, as the regular lines such as the Mallory and Lone Star 
are paying now and have been for years paying 40 cents per hour and less, and it 
would be suicide to their Union if members should refuse work of that kind when 
offered.”  This time, it was the SBA who had little option but to accept the decision.56 
As the Daily News noted the following year, since the round bale was gaining 
favor in the industry its use would only increase.  With black labor loading the round 
bale at forty cents and hour, or four dollars a day, compared to the six dollars earned 
by white screwmen, employers who used white labor were at a disadvantage.  As 
a group of seven ship’s brokers explained in an appeal to the SBA:
    we are not in favor of reducing the laborer’s pay, were it not for the fact that our
    opponents who are working colored stevedores will eventually drive you and us 
    out of business unless some remedy is applied and very quickly to equal matters.
The SBA’s Executive Committee called a meeting with the two black locals, hoping 
to reach an agreement on joint rates for the round bale.  Stevedores had offered ten 
cents per bale but the SBA wanted its usual rate of five and six dollars per day.  
Several meetings failed to produce any results.  The Lone Stars at first appeared 
56 SBA, Minutes, 2:510, 514, 523-30, 542, 549; Galveston City Directory 1893-94, 67; 
Galveston City Directory 1896-97, 60; Galveston City Directory 1898, 285,
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willing to work with the other two associations but at the last minute refused to ratify 
an agreement, claiming that they had already made a contract for that year.  They 
considered hand loading to be longshore work and so would continue working for 
forty cents an hour.  Committees from the SBA and the Cotton Jammers made 
repeated attempts over the next nine months to persuade the Lone Star 
Association to fall into step but to no avail.  The SBA continued trying to persuade 
the Lone Stars even after the Cotton Jammers had concluded that it would be 
“useless to humble ourselves any further.”  By June of 1900, the Cotton Jammers 
were being forced to continue accepting forty cents an hour for loading round bales 
or risk losing the work to the Lone Star Association.57 
The completion of Galveston’s deep sea harbor was both a fulfillment and 
the beginning of a new era.  Galveston now rivaled New Orleans and New York as 
one of the leading ports in the nation, a position it would hold for the next thirty years.  
On the waterfront, if not a new beginning there was at least a significant change in 
direction.  The SBA began the decade by again rejecting contact with the Cotton 
Jammers yet within three years had instigated the first official negotiations with its 
black rival.  Three factors influenced this change, beginning in 1893 when Cuney and 
the Cotton Jammers won a new contract and greater share of cotton work.  In 
addition, the balance of power between employee and employer was shifting as 
the increased cargo capacity of modern steamships and the introduction of high 
density cotton compresses began to make the screwmen’s skills redundant.  Finally, 
New Orleans provided a timely example of the consequences of a racially divided 
workforce when facing the growing power of larger, foreign owned lines.  These 
factors convinced at least some in the SBA to explore biracial cooperation in the 
name of self-interest.  The Cotton Jammers reacted with caution, balancing their 
desire for recognition with their need to protect the gains they had already made.  
57 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 21, 1899; SBA, Minutes, 2:610, 620; SBA Executive 
Committee , Minutes, 1:7-12.
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Elsewhere on the waterfront, black coastwise longshoremen began their long 
struggle for union recognition from the Mallory company.  Mallory responded by 
reenacting their tactics of 1885, introducing cheap black labor to undercut union 
strength.  The irony here was that black workers who had previously benefited from 
this tactic were now themselves its victim.  The strike’s leaders, men with a long 
record of union activity, sought support from the white union movement during the 
1898 strike by amalgamating with the AFL.  Such was their commitment that the 
most serious of the rare outbreaks of violence in the history of the waterfront occurred 
in 1898.  However, a commitment to union principles alone was not enough against 
an employer with the resources and determination to wait out a strike. 
Many rank and file workers on both sides of the color line did not share this 
belief in the benefits of biracial cooperation: a point driven home by the split in the 
Cotton Jammers in 1898.  As the Cotton Jammers and SBA began to explore the 
possibility of a joint agreement, some members of the black association preferred to 
maintain their one advantage over white workers as cheap labor to secure work.  This 
ideological difference among black workers surfaced in several court cases and 
resulted in the formation of the Lone Star Association.  There was a  similar short-
lived division among black screwmen in New Orleans but the presence of rival black 
associations would be become a permanent feature of Galveston’s waterfront.  With 
both black and white workers facing similar challenges from changes within the 
industry, the Lone Stars threatened to bring a halt to the progress made towards 
biracial cooperation.  The debate on how best to meet that challenge and reconcile 
the interests of all waterfront organizations would occupy the next fourteen years.
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CHAPTER FOUR
“Amalgamation regardless of color or race:”  
The New Orleans Plan.
After thirty-five years of uninterrupted growth the new decade started 
disastrously for Galveston when a devastating hurricane hit the city at the beginning 
of the new cotton season.  The hurricane caused great loss of life and massive 
structural damage and could have destroyed a less determined community.  
Galveston, however, disposed of its dead and rebuilt the city to withstand the 
strongest storm.  Cotton was moving on the waterfront just weeks after the storm 
and Galveston was soon restored as the nation’s leading cotton port.  As trade 
resumed so too did the problems facing Galveston’s waterfront workers.  Changes 
in the shipping industry and technology meant that speed, rather than skill, was now 
the most important economic factor when loading cargo, thus allowing ordinary white 
and black longshoremen to encroach upon the SBA’s dominance of cotton work.  
Employers were also increasingly prepared to play one race against the other in 
their efforts to wrest control over wages and working conditions from the unions.  
Faced with these challenges, the SBA increasingly sought bolster its waning power 
through closer ties with other labor associations at local, state and national level.  
The International Longshoremen’s Association was the most important of 
these affiliations and would provide the organizational framework for resolving local 
disputes and working towards biracial unionism over the next twenty-five years.  As 
always, New Orleans proved several steps ahead of Galveston in setting an 
example as the racial divisions of the previous decade were laid to rest.  At a time 
when racial segregation was becoming more absolute than it had ever been under 
slavery, New Orleans’ black and white screwmen agreed to work side by side 
aboard ship.  For Galveston’s Cotton Jammers, this New Orleans’ plan—or 
amalgamation as it was also known—quickly became the precondition for reaching 
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any substantive agreement with the SBA.  The Cotton Jammers recognized biracial 
unionism as an opportunity to press for equal rights, at least within the union 
movement; and while white and black labor leaders took care to rule out any desire 
for social equality, both sides acknowledged the necessity for an industrial equality.  
Yet, while leaders on both sides appeared ready to countenance amalgamation, 
rank and file members appeared, as they had in the previous decade, more reluctant 
to set aside their racial antipathy and take such a radical step.  Moreover, while the 
Cotton Jammers saw biracial unionism as the means to push both their class and 
race interests, the Lone Stars continued to take a more narrow view in undercutting 
the other two associations.  The Lone Stars’ presence thus impeded the cause of 
biracial unionism as demonstrated by an abortive attempt to reach a three-way 
agreement based upon the New Orleans plan in 1908.  However, as wages and 
working conditions continued to deteriorate, the Cotton Jammers joined the ILA and 
finally signed a wages and work-sharing agreement with the SBA.  This 
amalgamation contract of 1912 was to be the high point of biracial unionism on 
Galveston’s waterfront. 
Galveston entered the new century as the nation’s leading cotton shipping 
port, surpassed only by New York and New Orleans in the total value of its trade.  
Galveston was also one of the nation’s richest cities, second only to Providence, 
Rhode Island, in per capita income.  Yet the zenith of Galveston’s commercial 
triumph quickly turned into an act of hubris.  Hurricanes were a recurring danger on the 
Gulf Coast and Galveston had been struck by major storms in 1818, 1837, 1867, 
1875 and 1886.  On September 8, 1900, the “Queen of the Gulf” was torn apart 
by the worst natural disaster ever to hit North America.  The hurricane and ensuing 
flood claimed over six thousand lives, leaving another four thousand people 
homeless and eight thousand destitute.  One-third of the island’s property, valued at 
up to $30 million and including the part-constructed Southern Pacific facilities and 
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much of the waterfront, was destroyed or badly damaged.  The port of Indianola, an 
earlier rival of Galveston’s, never recovered from the storms of 1875 and 1886 as its 
citizens chose to abandon their enterprise rather than rebuild.  Indianola, however, 
had already lost the battle with the railroads for its major export of cattle.  As many as 
two thousand citizens left Galveston after 1900 but the port still had its cotton 
exports and the expanding market of the western states it had worked so hard to 
secure.1    
Galveston’s leading businessmen led the recovery effort.  With the city 
government paralyzed in the aftermath of the storm, members of the Deep Water 
Commission took control, forming a Central Relief Committee to oversee relief 
operations.  This Committee supervised the disposal of bodies, clearing of debris, 
sanitation, humanitarian aid and, before the arrival of the state militia, policing against 
looters.  After the initial clear up, Galveston’s citizens began to rebuild their shattered 
city.  The Relief Committee, backed by the Deep Water Commission and the 
Galveston Wharf Company, began by instituting a new form of city government 
with five commissioners replacing the inefficient and allegedly corrupt structure of a 
mayor and twelve aldermen.  The strong links between these several 
bodies—Isaac H. Kempner, for instance served on the Deep Water and Relief 
Committees and as city treasurer in the new government—placed control of the city 
even more firmly in the hands of a commercial oligarchy.  However, by placing local 
government on a more businesslike footing, the commission government helped to 
restore confidence and raise the funding for three great engineering projects that 
would protect the city against future hurricanes.  The most impressive of the these 
projects, completed in 1911, was raising the level of the island’s populated area by 
an average of eight feet.  Entire buildings, from small family dwellings to large 
churches, were lifted by hydraulic jacks and then infilled with silt pumped from a 
purpose-built canal.  The second project was the building of a seventeen-foot high 
1 McComb, Galveston, 121-7; Beasley, The Alleys and Back Buildings of Galveston, 
70-1; Barker, “Partners in Progress,” 1-34; Claflin, “Two Communities, Two Responses.”
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seawall, completed in 1908, to protect the ocean shore against waves and 
abnormally high tides.  Finally, in 1912, a new multipurpose, weatherproof 
causeway stretched two miles across the bay to connect the island to the mainland.  
In addition, the commission undertook the rebuilding and improvement of the urban 
infrastructure, adding new schools and water and sewer systems as well as 
resurfacing commercial and residential streets and modernizing the police and fire 
departments.  The success of the commission government in rebuilding the city 
made this “Galveston Plan” a model for other progressive cities across America, with 
arch-rival Houston among the first cities to adopt the new form.2 
Galveston’s remarkable physical recovery was matched by a swift revival of 
commercial activity.  The first load of cotton left the port just three weeks after the 
storm.  Within six weeks, the waterfront was operating near normally with the sounds 
of reconstruction adding to the regular scene of noise and commotion.  The port 
ranked second in cotton exports by the next season, regaining its leading position in 
1903-04 as well as topping the nation in wheat exports for that year.  Despite the 
danger from future storms, Southern Pacific rebuilt its facilities, despite the danger, 
and the Mallory Company also made improvements.  The deep water harbor 
continued to attract trade to the port, including new commodities such as lumber and 
bananas.  As continued growth attracted more large shipping companies, such as 
the Lykes line, to the port Galveston quickly regained the air of a prosperous city: 
and with the planned building of the Panama Canal on the horizon, a city with a bright 
future.3 
As always, however, booming trade figures belied the underlying limitations 
of the Island City.  New Orleans was no longer Galveston’s only Gulf Coast rival as 
2 McComb, Galveston, 135-45; Hyman, Oleander Odyssey, 146-72; Beasley, The Alleys 
and Back Buildings of Galveston, 72-3; Barker, “Partners in Progress,” 1-34; Rice, Progressive 
Cities, 3-19.
3 Bixel and Turner, Galveston and the 1900 Storm, 76; Bixel, Working the Waterfront, 84.
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ports such as Houston, Beaumont and Port Arthur also sought and received federal 
aid for harbor improvements.  Texas City, just a few miles directly eastwards across 
Galveston Bay, received its first deep-water vessel in 1904.  According to Wharf 
Company historian Thomas Barker, unlike the tightly-held monopoly of the “Octopus 
of the Gulf” these competitors were “invariably municipally-owned corporations 
which enjoyed tax exemptions and capital improvements funded by public 
taxation.”  Moreover, although the hurricane did not define Galveston’s future, the 
threat of future storms also favored the development of these newer ports.  When 
the Spindletop gusher signaled a new era in the Texas economy in 1901, investors 
preferred to build their oil pipelines and refineries in more sheltered locations than 
Galveston.4   
Outsiders were not the only people unwilling to invest in the island’s future.  
One indication of local reluctance was that Nicholas Clayton, whose architecture 
symbolized Galveston’s ascension, never designed another major building in the 
city after the storm.  Of more tangible economic significance was the failure to 
develop a diverse industrial base.  Between 1899 and 1909, the number of 
manufacturers in Galveston fell from one hundred to eighty-one.  In that same period, 
Houston grew from 145 to 249 places of manufacturing and increased the value of 
its manufactured goods by four times more than Galveston.  The growth of tourism 
on the island was one of the few industries supported by local money, as both Isaac 
H. Kempner and John Sealy invested in Hotel Galvez completed in 1911.  Despite 
its increasing importance over the next several decades, tourism was no substitute 
for the economic importance of the port.  Some historians have blamed Galveston’s 
business oligarchy for failing to invest in the city’s industrial base with the Wharf 
Company and the island’s three leading families, the Sealys, Moodys and 
Kempners as particular targets.  However, according to Kempner family historian 
Harold Hyman, this “Fly in Amber” thesis of the insularity and control of a business 
4 Barker, “Partners in Progress,” iii-iv, 39-40; McComb, Galveston, 150-1.
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oligarchy has been overemphasized.  The most decisive factors, David McComb 
points out, were the limitations of the island location and the forces of urban 
development that were beyond anyone’s control.5 
Although Galveston’s physical and economic recovery typified its citizens’ will 
to succeed, the immediate aftermath of the storm revealed the limitations of their 
racial attitudes.  While some black and white citizens had sought shelter together 
during the storm, racial anxieties quickly resurfaced in its wake as reports of Negroes 
looting and robbing the dead immediately circulated.  These stories and claims of the 
summary executions of seventy-five “ghouls” were largely unfounded but persisted 
in press reports and later accounts of the storm.  Many men of both races were 
reluctant to perform the awful task of recovering bodies but a party of fifty black men 
were forced at gunpoint point to load seven hundred bodies onto barges for burial 
at sea.  Yet black workers were among the first to volunteer to join the clean up, 
including men from the Cotton Jammers.  The SBA also immediately volunteered to 
assist in any way they could and donated one thousand dollars to the Central Relief 
Committee.  The Daily News praised the spirit of both organizations but while the 
SBA were armed and put to work policing the streets, the black screwmen were 
given the task of clearing debris.  However, men from both groups worked side by 
side at the funeral pyres and clearing of debris.  In the months following the storm, 
the black community continued to receive such uneven treatment in the distribution of 
relief, despite the supervision and best intentions of Clara Barton and the Red 
Cross.6 
Such discrimination was a part of the broader pattern of JIm Crow laws 
enacted at state level since 1890 and, after 1900, by local city polices.  In the 
1890s, the Solid South had experienced a bitter split between conservatives and 
5 McComb, Galveston, 47-9; Kelly, “Twixt Failure and Success,” 80-2; Hyman, Oleander 
Odyssey, 173-95.
6 Bixel and Turner, Galveston and the 1900 Storm, x-xi, 48, 59, 77-82; Kretzman,  “A 
House Built Upon the Sand,” 140-82; McComb 129-30.
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the radical Populist movement.  White supremacy served to heal that division, 
beginning with the disfranchisement of Negroes.  Property or literary qualifications for 
voting were enacted by seven Southern states between 1895 and 1910.  These 
states and four others, including Texas, also adopted the poll tax.  Texas adopted 
the poll tax in 1902 and the following year instituted the all-white primary system, an 
electoral reform that effectively turned Texas into a one-party state.  Between 1896 
and 1915, nine other Southern states adopted this final bulwark of the 
disfranchisement policy.  In Louisiana, the number of blacks qualified to vote fell by 
ninety-six percent.  In Texas, figures dropped from the peak of one hundred 
thousand in the 1890s to five thousand in 1906 and in Galveston, only five hundred 
blacks could vote out of a total population of thirty-six thousand.7   
By the early 1900s, local authorities were beginning to enact their own 
segregation laws.  In Galveston, housing was becoming increasingly segregated by 
1900, a trend aided by the storm damage of 1900.  Moreover, black home 
ownership figures compared poorly against state and national levels.  Eighty-seven 
percent of Negro homes in Galveston were rented and only eight percent owned.  
Comparable figures for white homes were 60 percent rented and 36 percent 
owned.  The storm also increased overcrowding although reform groups such as the 
Women’s Protective Health Association did try to improve some of the worst 
conditions.  Another legacy of the storm, the commission government elected at 
large rather than by district, completed the removal of blacks from the local political 
process begun in 1895.  In 1906, the city passed a streetcar law requiring blacks to 
sit at the rear of streetcars.  In fairness, not all of Galveston’s citizens supported these 
new laws or the unrest they caused among the black population.  As one citizen 
complained to the Daily News, resentment at the streetcar law was causing black 
servants to quit work.  Agreeing with the writer, the News  concluded, “The negroes 
here are the most orderly, and at the same time the highest toned, of any place in 
7 Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 82-85; Rice, The Negro in Texas, 67, 113-
39; Bixel and Turner, Galveston and the 1900 Storm, 149-50.
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the South.  It is a notorious fact that the jim crow law was passed to appease 
excursionists.”  As C. Vann Woodward pointed out in his study of the rise of Jim 
Crow, patronizing the local black community while placing the blame for segregation 
elsewhere, usually on poor whites, was a common response from Southern 
authorities.  However, while Southern conservatives would once make exceptions 
for the ‘better’ element of the Negro race—men such as Norris Wright Cuney—Jim 
Crow made no such distinction.8   
Galveston’s black citizens also protested against these new indignities.  In 
newspaper editorials and appeals to the commission, Galveston’s black community 
vigorously fought against the street car law and the decision to make the new 
Rosenberg public library an all-white institution.  As the City Times argued, the 
Negro was not seeking social equality “but he does insist upon being treated as an 
American citizen in all manner due him as such which is tendered to others.”  In reality, 
however, Galveston’s black community lacked political power or an influential leader 
such as Norris Wright Cuney, and was increasingly forced inward on its own 
community and institutions.  Among the more successful of these institutions were 
the two waterfront unions, the Cotton Jammers and the Lone Stars.9
In the first years of the new century, the City Times celebrated the number of 
black workers on Galveston’s docks and the wages they earned.  In 1903, over one 
thousand black laborers on the waterfront earned more than $332,514, which was 
less than pre-storm but still an encouraging figure.  Three hundred and fifty Cotton 
Jammers worked for the William Parr Company while a similar number of Lone Stars 
worked for Daniel Ripley.  In addition, one hundred and fifty men worked for the 
Mallory line and over one hundred on the Southern Pacific docks.  For the Times, the 
8 Beasley, The Alleys and Back Buildings of Galveston, 70-1, 83; Kretzman, “A House 
Built Upon the Sand,” 183; Galveston Daily News, Nov. 9, 1906; Woodward, The Strange Career 
of Jim Crow, 49-51, 92-3.
9 Galveston City Times, Jan. 28, 1905 .
134
waterfront was a shining example of what equal treatment could achieve:
    we cite the fact that at any place where both the whites and the blacks get their 
    share of the labor, that place is a community wherein lives peace between the 
    laboring classes of both the white and the black races.  And such action of such a 
    people does a great deal toward the general uplift of one another and the 
    community in which they labor. 
To the Times, as long as there was enough work to go round the waterfront at least, 
appeared to be one place where there was no racial friction.  This view was 
substantially correct: Galveston’s waterfront was largely free of the large scale labor 
conflict and racial antagonism experienced in New Orleans.  There were, 
however,.ripples of tension on this calm surface.10 
Employers who had failed to win any reduction in SBA wage rates in the 
previous decade were now devising ways to cut costs by circumventing 
established working practices.  In February, 1900, employers asked the SBA to 
lower their loading charges or allow longshoremen to load cotton.  The Executive 
Committee recommended the compromise of allowing LBU men to truck cotton to 
the gangways and load it into the slings, thus taking over the work of one SBA gang.  
After much debate, a full meeting of the SBA instructed the committee to consult with 
the Cotton Jammers.  The black screwmen opposed the measure, fearing that since 
they were paid by the bale it would be used to compel them to reduce their rates.  
The SBA accepted this decision and notified the brokers that no changes would be 
made.  The following November, the SBA and Cotton Jammers renewed their 
wage and work sharing agreement.  SBA rates were set at six dollars per day for 
hand stowing and seven dollars for using tools while the Cotton Jammers worked for 
the slightly lower piecework rates of ten and thirty-five cents per bale.  The two sides 
renewed their agreement not to take each other’s work and established  a joint 
committee to investigate grievances.  Rumors occasionally surfaced that an 
employer was prepared to switch his labor force from white to black, or vice versa, 
or that one group of workers were preparing to bid for the work of another.  The new 
10 Galveston City Times, Dec. 26,1903, Dec. 24, 1904, June 17, 1905.
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committee successfully negotiated such disputes and misunderstandings over 
wages and working rules that arose between the two associations.  However, 
despite the persuasive efforts of both the SBA and Cotton Jammers, the Lone 
Stars continued to reject a joint agreement and the Cotton Jammers were still forced 
to load round bales at forty cents per hour or risk losing their work to the Lone Stars.11 
The Lone Star Association was not the only divisive influence on the 
waterfront in the first years of the new century.  The SBA and LBU had to contend 
with a new general longshoremen’s union, Local 155, organized in March 1900 with 
seven hundred members.  Evidence suggests that the new local was organized to 
work on the Southern Pacific docks then still under construction.  However, the LBU, 
a deep sea union, also laid claim to the promise of regular coastwise work and even 
some SBA members sought work on the new docks.  The LBU and SBA 
opposed the new union, refusing to work with members of the new local rumored to 
be working below scale.  Even some SBA members were accused of working for 
scab wages.  The new local sought protection by joining the ILA which had been 
trying to organize in Galveston for several years.  Formed in the early 1890s in the 
Great Lakes area by an Irish tugboat captain, Daniel Keefe, the ILA and had around 
fifty thousand members by 1900.  The ILA affiliated with the AFL in 1902 but unlike 
the craft orientation of the latter, the ILA took on the character of an industrial union as 
Keefe aggressively sought to recruit any class of workers connected to marine 
transport.  Like the AFL, however, Keefe and his successor as ILA president, T. V. 
O’Connor, adopted a conservative policy of anti-radicalism and maintaining good 
working relationships with employers.12   
According to ILA historian Maud Russell, the dispute in Galveston was 
caused by independent unions opposing the ILA in order to maintain their own 
power.  The ensuing “bitter and bloody” strike was led to the murder of Local 155 
11SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:16-24, 23-4; SBA, Minutes, 3: 21, 59-60, 99-
100.
12 SBA, Minutes, 2:41, 49, 3:19, 23, 82, 99-100; Russell, Men Along the Shore, 61-71.
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secretary, L. R. Taylor, by other longshoremen or “hired killers of the shipping 
company.”  Taylor had suddenly disappeared while working aboard ship and, 
according to the ILA investigation, “His body was discovered after he was missed 
about three days in an almost unrecognizable state.  No one can account for this 
particular mystery, and some are of the opinion that he must have fallen overboard 
while going from one vessel to another.”  Russell's account, which favors the ILA, 
ignores the fact that it was the new local that was the usurper against the long-
established “independent” SBA and LBU.  There was no record of a strike or 
violence in the Daily News and the charge of murder, while melodramatic, lacks a 
clear motive and is uncharacteristic of Galveston.  Taylor’s untimely death was not 
wholly unusual in a hazardous industry without any legal safety standards.  In 1890, 
for instance, screwmen Charles Cox went missing after falling through the hatch of a 
lighter.  His body was found seventeen days later  “in a high state of 
decomposition.”  A few weeks later, John Burke died from his injuries after being hit 
by a cotton bale.  Nor were employers or union officials exempt from these hazards.  
In January 1901, stevedore John Young was nearly killed when he fell into a ship’s 
hold.  In 1907, Local 310 President Harry Michlousky was literally cut to pieces when 
caught in a steam winch cable and pinned against the winch.13   
The dispute did, however, generate ill-feeling on all sides.  Before his death, 
Secretary Taylor wrote to Samuel Gompers accusing the SBA of working contrary 
to the principles of the AFL and the Galveston Labor Council of encouraging “a lot of 
unscrupulous non-union men in their work.”  The LBU and SBA had enlisted the 
support of the Labor Council and opposed the new local’s application to join the 
council.  However, the dispute was not simply a local power struggle or a fight 
against the ILA, which both the SBA and LBU would join within two years.  The 
fundamental issues were the right to jobs and the maintenance of wage standards.  
The Labor Council made repeated efforts to resolve the conflict over the next year, 
13 Russell, Men Along the Shore, 71-2; ILA, Proceedings,1901, 47-8; Galveston Daily 
News, Jan. 2, 1901, Nov. 1, 1907.  
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inviting both Samuel Gompers and Keefe to Galveston to settle the dispute.  
Agreement was finally reached in March, 1902, when LBU members agreed to 
disband their organization and reorganize with their rival as ILA Local 310.  The SBA 
quickly followed suit by joining the ILA the following month.14  
The SBA’s traditional policy of isolationism had been softening over the past 
decade and joining the ILA was not the SBA’s first step into the broader labor 
movement In 1891, the SBA had sent delegates to the Texas Labor Conference 
organized in Galveston.  The Labor Conference was the central body of the Knights 
of Labor and Farmers’ Alliance and included over twenty of Galveston’s white trade 
unions.  This movement received further momentum when Populists sought to 
further the alliance between farmers and workingmen.  However, the effectiveness of 
these early state organizations were limited because individual unions adamantly 
refused to consider political matters.  As one contemporary newspaper explained:
    A trades union is simply a voluntary assembly of artisans formed for the express 
    purpose of limiting the competition in the labor market and thereby maintaining as 
    favorable conditions as any governmental policy, religious truth, or even moral
    conduct.  And no one is more bitterly opposed to the introduction of such 
    questions into trades union meetings than the member. 
The result, according to one historian, was that conventions would be called only to 
“announce they were nonpartisan, issue a set of demands, and disappear.”  The 
Conference was, however, a forerunner for a more effective organization, the Texas 
State Federation of Labor formed in 1900. 15 
The State Federation was composed of delegates from local labor councils 
and Galveston’s three delegates to the first convention represented some eighteen 
hundred workers, numerically the largest delegation.  The Federation was affiliated to 
the American Federation of Labor, but according to historian Grady Mullenix’s 
14 Galveston Labor Council, Records, I:12, 21, 31, 32, 52, 73, 82, 111, 115; SBA, 
Minutes, 3:71, 94.
15 Labor Movement in Texas Collection, Box 2E304, Folder Five; Galveston City Directory, 
1895-96, 67;SBA, Minutes, 2:54; Gibson, “Organized Labor in Texas from 1890 to 1900,” 179-
80.
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account its principles were closer to the Knights.  The State Federation’s main 
purpose was to pursue legislative action and it’s declaration of principles supported 
such current concerns as the eight-hour day and child labor laws.  Opinions, however, 
were divided when contemplating any more overtly political action.  The first 
convention did pass resolutions encouraging worker interest in political issues but 
some delegates were reluctant to go even this far.  
The Federation’s reluctance to engage in political debate reflected the 
staunchly nonpartisan stance of its constituents.  In Galveston, the poll tax and new 
commission government were the only political issues to arouse any action.  In 
1903, the Labor Council passed a resolution urging union members to pay their poll 
tax.  The introduction of any political topic was guaranteed to lead to a prolonged and 
fierce debate but this resolution did pass by a two to one majority.  The next year, 
Local 310 resolved to pay the poll tax for members who could not afford to, 
allowing them three months to repay.  Although passed, this resolution was 
withdrawn at the next meeting.  In 1906, the Labor Council discussed raising 
subscriptions to start a labor journal.  According to a longshoremen’s delegate, many 
of his men could not read but “when they get married they would get their wives to 
read for them and that possibly they would subscribe.”  Literate or not, at least one 
longshoreman used the new journal to rouse support for political action, arguing that 
the day had gone when trade unionism was nonpolitical: ”It is our duty to elect men 
to all offices who have the interests of the working man at heart . . . .  The forthcoming 
election will be a great opportunity to show the capitalist class what organized labor 
can do when it stands shoulder to shoulder for its rights.”  Thereafter, the Council did 
make efforts to propose labor candidates for the Commission, a move supported 
by the SBA and Local 310.  However, despite supporting labor candidates at local 
level, any attempt at forming a working-class political party was firmly opposed.  
Local 310 prohibited its members from using the name of the local in any campaign 
for political office.  However, at least some longshoreman’s leaders, including O. A. 
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Anderson and J. Gahagahan, did try to start a Progressive Labor Party in Galveston.  
Anderson brought this issue before the State Federation in 1910, proposing “to get 
control of the lawmaking body of the state and the several municipalities.”  Fricke 
opposed the idea and the Federation endorsed a declaration of principles 
supporting wage earners’ political participation but denouncing “the practice of 
indorsing political parties or candidates or indulging in partisan agitation, leaving each 
voter to act as a free citizen in these matters.”16
Although political action was forestalled, local unions did use the Federation to 
pursue legislative action of direct concern.  In the SBA’s case, this meant the Spider 
Bill.  “Spiders” were the exposed ends of metal bands, buckles and rivets that 
bound a compressed bale of cotton.  Screwmen wore a “handleather” to protect the 
back of the hand from cuts when using a cotton hook to hook and roll a bale but 
injuries from improperly bound bales were common place.  The Spider Bill passed 
in 1910, despite strong opposition from the cotton compress owners who were 
made responsible for ensuring that bales were safely bound.17 
The State Federation also followed local practices on the issue of race, rather 
than pressing for a more progressive course of action but by this time the AFL itself 
was retreating from its earlier on organizing black workers.  Gompers and the AFL 
leadership were themselves racist or, at best, unwilling to challenge the prevailing 
mood of the times and particularly in the South.  Moreover, while most black workers 
were unskilled the AFL was becoming almost exclusively a craft union.  Efforts to 
recruit black workers faded and the question of integration was left to be decided at 
local level.  In private, Gompers continued to acknowledge the necessity of 
organizing black workers.  In practice, Federal Labor Unions fell from 7 percent of 
16 Galveston Labor Council, Records, I:126, 218; Local 307, Records, 2:31; Galveston 
Labor Council, Records, 2:113; Galveston Labor Journal, March 5, 1907; SBA, Minutes 3:613, 
625; LBU, Minutes, VI: 158; LBU, Minutes, V:127; Galveston Daily News, April 15, 1910; 
Galveston Labor Dispatch, April 12, 1913.
17 Mullenix, “A History of the Texas State Federation of Labor,” 14-37, 138-44.
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AFL membership between 1897 to 1910, to only 1.3 percent by 1910.  The 
International Workers of the World was the only labor organization to fully live up to 
its rhetoric of racial equality but this radical organization had little impact in conservative 
Galveston.18
The Texas Federation supported separate Negro unions, recognizing that 
practicality and even a sense of justice dictated accepting the Negro worker “and 
moulding him to purposes of honor and advancement along parallel lines with the 
white worker.”  The first Negro delegate to the conference was seated in 1904, 
although the following year Galveston’s black laborers were still being represented 
by O. A. Anderson, a white longshoreman's union official.  The 1911 convention 
rejected a resolution to exclude Negroes from the Federation by forming a separate 
Negro Federation.  Still, the Federation’s Negro organizers were reminded of the 
need for great discretion:
    and that in all his work he should teach his people the principles of unionism in their 
    own color and crafts, and let them know that the sympathy and aid of the white 
    man will be extended to them only so long as they retain their own self-respect 
    and maintain their proper position in our society and government.19   
However, if black delegates were prepared to accept their proper place in 
society, they were less ready to accept second-class status within the union 
movement.  Yet some local trade assemblies still refused to accept black unions.  In 
1914, two black delegates, one from Waco and the other a member of Galveston’s 
Lone Stars, sought to change Federation policy by allowing the amalgamation of 
white and black unions.  These delegates demanded the full benefits of unionism 
and a reform of the rank and file to suppress the evil that divided the races:
    and is continually giving capital the advantage of both races, it is absolutely
18 Maroney,  “Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-1929,” 21-5; Bracey, Black Workers and 
Organized Labor, 30; Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619-1973, 77; Worthman, 
“Black Workers and Labor Unions in Birmingham, Alabama, 1897-1904,” 60-1; Foner, “The I.W.W. 
and the Black Worker,” 215.  According to Foner, locals of the IWW’s Marine Transport Workers 
existed in both Galveston and New Orleans.
19 Mullenix, “A History of the Texas State Federation of Labor,” 107, 185-6
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    necessary for us to cement our great labor forces together for this one explicit 
    purpose . . . and forget the question of color, which has been a stumbling block.  
    This reform cannot bring about its best results simply by affiliation, but 
    amalgamation instead.
Rather than face the issue head-on, the Federation substituted a counter-resolution 
that endorsed the organization of black workers but left the question of amalgamation 
to be decided at the local level.  Later that year, the Federation asked for the 
enforcement of the law requiring the provision of equal facilities for Negroes on trains 
and streetcars and, in 1919, urged the abolition of discrimination which, despite being 
against the AFL constitution, existed in Texas.  However, these resolutions aroused 
opposition and nothing practical was done to carry them out.20  
At the local level, the SBA’s attitude to the Galveston Labor Council had 
always been, and continued to be, ambivalent.  The SBA’s periodic withdrawals 
from the Council suggested that membership was as much a matter of convenience 
as conscience.  There were, however, signs of a greater willingness to become 
involved in local issues away from the waterfront.  The SBA offered financial support 
to a striking Carpenters and Painters local in 1900, adding that “we firmly believe the 
fight of one or more unions is the concern of all labor organizations when arrayed 
against organized capital.”  The growing number of  appeals for aid from labor unions 
across the nation and even abroad also met with a favorable response.  In 1902, the 
SBA petitioned the County Commissioners Court to employ local labor on the 
seawall project at a minimum wage of two dollars for an eight hour day.  Public works 
no doubt provided a much needed source of income for its members during off 
season but, as the SBA pointed out, a five thousand dollar subscription to the 
seawall bond issue and a one thousand dollar donation to the storm relief fund gave 
the association a right to speak on behalf of all Galveston’s manual laborers: 
    Experience has shown  . . . that men never fail to work at their full capacity when 
    the wage and time is reasonable.  There is no just reason why a private contractor 
    should reap a profit from the construction of the seawall: we do not object to a just 
20Mullenix, “A History of the Texas State Federation of Labor,” 185-9.
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    profit . . . but public works should not be private spoil.”  21 
Rhetoric aside, the SBA’s involvement in a broader labor movement was motivated 
as much by the struggle to maintain its own declining strength as genuine class 
consciousness.  
Despite the growing awareness of a broader labor movement, there were 
signs that as the SBA grew in size its internal strength was weakening.  Changing 
attitudes towards cultural functions such as Labor Day provide one telling indication of 
this falling off.  Labor Day in Galveston was usually celebrated with a morning 
parade followed by a picnic, speeches, games and dancing.  Both the SBA and 
LBU placed such significance on this holiday that attendance at the parade was 
mandatory.  Fines were levied for drunkenness and nonattendance, and members 
had to be absent from the city for a week either side of Labor Day to escape the 
fine.  Members of both associations purchased a specially selected suit of clothes to 
wear on the day.  The day was still an important demonstration of craft pride and a 
social event for Galveston’s organized workers at the turn of the century.  An 
estimated 2,300 men lined up for the 1900 parade, making it one of the largest ever 
witnessed in Galveston.  The parade included ladies auxiliaries, alderman and other 
local dignitaries, and many trades and several merchants entered decorated floats. 
The SBA’s float won third prize that year and, as usual, the marching ranks of some 
five hundred cotton screwmen made one of the more impressive displays.  The 
men had discarded their traditional working uniform of blue flannel shirts and dark 
trousers in favor of more versatile brown linen suits with matching hats.  In 1902, 
between 3,500 and 4,000 people attended the picnic held at Wollams lake to hear 
a speech on behalf of the Eight Hour Movement and a longer speech by governor-
elect Colonel S. W. T. Latham.  Latham’s theme, the common interests of labor and 
capital, was standard fare for the occasion.  In 1910, Galveston’s Mayor Lewis Fisher 
urged the assembled union men to reassure employers:
21 SBA , Minutes, 3:21, 184; Galveston Daily  News, April 27, 1900.
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     that you believe that the interests of capital are the same as those of labor, and 
    that the contract you, as a union, enter into with your employers will be carried out 
    both in the spirit and the letter.  When your organization reaches that status there 
    will be no more friction between capital and labor.”  
Such oratory, as always, received “heart applause.”22 
By the middle of the decade however, rank and file members were 
beginning to demonstrate a waning enthusiasm for the event and particularly the 
parade.  In 1907, the SBA decided to parade in Houston and Local 310 and 
several other locals did not to parade at all.  As one GLC delegate explained, Labor 
Day injured his organization as it lost members due to fines and failure to pay for 
uniforms.  The fine for nonattendance had risen to ten dollars by 1905 and Local 
310’s uniform of black serge pants, flannel shirt, black necktie, belt and gray fedora 
hat cost $6.40.  Loans were given to those who could not afford the new clothes but 
the total cost of uniforms was $1,181 plus another $130 to hire a band.  In 1909, a 
motion to parade on labor day passed by a narrow margin only after the fine for 
nonattendance was dropped to five dollars and members were allowed to wear any 
suit “providing it was respectable.”  The SBA and Southern Pacific workers did not 
parade at all that year, leaving the deep sea longshoremen to make one of the most 
impressive displays: “This organization had the greatest number in line by far and 
they were a fine body of men—muscular and healthy looking . . . the large number of 
private vehicles in this section was frequently remarked upon.  The men showed 
prosperity in every line.”  Despite the show of prosperity there was no parade at all 
for the next several years, a failing the Labor Herald  attributed to the apathy of 
younger members.23 
Juneteenth, the annual celebration of the first official  reading of the 
Emancipation Proclamation in Galveston and Texas on June 19, 1865, was the 
22 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 4, 1900, Sept. 2, 1902, Sept. 6, 1910.
23 Galveston Labor Council, Records, 1:192, 196; Local 307, Records, 3:90; LBU, 
Minutes, 2: 4-6; LBU, Minutes,5:9;Galveston Daily News, Sept. 7, 1909; Galveston Labor Herald, 
Sept. 7, 1912.
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most important annual cultural event for Galveston’s black citizens.  This event was 
also celebrated with a parade and speeches but, by the early 1900s, there were 
signs that this too was becoming less popular as many chose to go on all-day picnic 
excursions arranged for the occasion.  In 1902, a committee of black women decided 
to organize the parade because their men had allowed the occasion to drift into 
disuse: “The women . . . propose to celebrate the day in a becoming manner, as is 
done elsewhere.  They will be supported in the matter by the white citizens who 
have pledged themselves to assist them if they get up creditable displays like the 
colored people of Houston, San Antonio and Austin.”  The 1904 parade, while not 
as large as previous years was still judged “quite creditable” with over thirty 
carriages, traps and other vehicles stretching over eight or ten blocks.  Labor Day 
was also an important celebration, particularly for the black longshoremen who held 
their own parade and picnic.  In 1900, around 150 members of the Cotton Jammers 
and Lone Stars marched through the business district to Douglass Park for 
speeches, games and prize contests, and dancing that lasted until a late hour.  After 
1900, the animosity between the two black associations caused them to hold 
separate celebrations, thus turning Galveston’s day of labor solidarity into a three-
cornered affair.  Nevertheless, the event remained important to black labor.  In 1904, 
over three hundred people, including a ladies auxiliary, joined the Cotton Jammers in 
a parade followed by a picnic at Lincoln Hall.  In 1909, between five and seven 
hundred black people marched to a celebration held at the Cotton Jammers own hall 
and park on Thirty- seventh Street and Avenue S. 24  
The SBA was still far from powerless in 1900.  Savings stood at $47,000 
and other assets included sixty-five jackscrews and the Screwmen’s Hall that stood 
on the corner of Market Street and Twenty-first Street.  Although 47 men were lost 
to the storm, SBA membership grew from 464 in 1900 to 556 by mid-decade and 
was still over 500 in 1909.  Moreover, although stevedores continued to win 
24 Galveston Daily News, July 10, 1902, June 21, 1904, Sept. 4, 1900, Sept. 4, 1906, 
Sept. 7, 1909.
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concessions from the SBA, such as a no strike agreement in 1903, many employers 
still preferred to work with the SBA rather than against them.  Despite the pressure 
from employers, some SBA members still believed they could do without affiliation 
with other associations.  In 1901, the Executive Committee heard a motion to 
withdraw from the Labor Council on the basis that “we are a purely local organization 
we deem it not necessary to have representation.”  The majority of the Committee, 
however, recognized that the SBA could no longer stand alone.  Labor organizations 
in other Southern cotton ports had failed to uphold their wages because they stood 
without affiliation to a national or international body.  To avoid the same fate, the 
Committee now believed that the best interests of the SBA lay in joining the ILA.  A 
general meeting accepted the Committee’s recommendation and the SBA received 
its charter as ILA Local 317 in April 1902.25  
ILA membership did little in the short term to settle differences between the 
screwmen and deep-sea longshoremen’s Local 310, formerly the LBU.  The 
Morgan Line was about to begin a service to New York from the now completed 
Southern Pacific docks.  The stevedoring firm of Suderman and Dolson claimed to 
have the necessary six hundred men willing to to take on the work at thirty cents for 
days and forty cents for nights, the same rates as paid by Mallory.  According to the 
stevedores, Local 310 seemed to believe the work was theirs by right yet had only 
three hundred members.  Local 310 President L. G. Koen, replied that his union was 
willing to accept the offered rates but wanted an additional sixty cents for Sunday 
work since “the men do not care to work Sundays if they can avoid it.”.  Moreover, 
the union not only had the six hundred men but, “We would rather do the work for 
nothing than to put one thing in the way of this traffic for Galveston.”  Or, of course, 
risk losing the work altogether.26 
This wrangling over wages was further complicated by the SBA, which was 
25 Taylor, “History of the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association,” 101; SBA, Minutes, 3:52, 
62, 270-1, 406, 463, 646; SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:45, 54, 49. 
26 SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:53; Galveston Daily News, July 31, 1902.
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also claiming a share of the Southern Pacific work.  Some screwmen had always 
supplemented their wages with longshore work, but this was the first time the 
Association itself had actively sought coastwise work.  Local 310 accused the 
screwmen of overstepping their bounds by claiming mixed cargo work in violation of 
local protocol and ILA rules which bound each local to a specific class of work.  Koen 
declared that his men would not be driven from what was rightfully theirs and 
threatened to retaliate by contracting for cotton.  Suderman and Dolson, both former 
screwmen, asked SBA President Herman Fricke to find a solution.  Fricke was 
warned that the stevedores wanted to employ white labor but they had made their 
best possible offer: if no compromise was reached the work would go to black 
labor.27
The stevedores’ warning had the desired effect.  Faced with the threat of 
losing the work to black labor, the two ILA locals agreed on a compromise by 
forming a new organization, the Southern Pacific Transport Workers Local 851.  
Stevedores agreed to employ the new all-white local, paying thirty cents for a ten 
hour day and forty-five cents for overtime and Sundays.  Local 851 had over 1,700 
members, three times the number of any other waterfront union, but only seven to 
eight hundred men found regular work.  Clearly, many casual laborers as well as 
screwmen and longshoremen joined the new union in the hope of picking up extra 
work.  Size, however, was no indication of strength, particularly in the coastwise 
trade.  With such a large labor pool, it would be difficult to earn a sufficient regular 
wage and when it came to a  strike, the white Southern Pacific workers found 
themselves in a no better position than their black counterparts at Mallory.28  
The poor average wage was the central issue when Southern Pacific 
dockworkers struck for higher wages in September, 1907.  O. A. Anderson, 
president of Local 851, claimed the men earned an average of eight dollars a week.  
27 SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:57; Galveston Daily News, Sept. 1, 1902.
28 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 1, 1902.
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Many union members worked elsewhere and the strikers could do no worse by 
trying to do the same.  “We have everything to gain and nothing to lose,” explained 
Anderson, “It is simply impossible for a man and his family to live even in the 
coarsest manner on the wages earned in this work. The strike is a necessity.  It is a 
demand for the actual necessities that life may be sustained in the workers and their 
wives and children.”  Suderman and Dolson responded to the union’s claim for a five 
cent per hour pay raise by offering the work to the two black locals.  The Cotton 
Jammers responded by offering to consider the work but only for a higher rate than 
sought by Local 851.  Lone Star leader William Porter visited the Daily News office 
to publicly state that his association were not interested in taking the work and that 
their sympathies lay with the strikers.  Porter also appeared before 851’s Executive 
Committee to offer his association’s moral and financial support and both black locals 
promised to make every effort to prevent the use of black strikebreakers.  The strike 
was also threatening to spread to the black workers on Mallory’s docks, unorganized 
since their defeat in 1898.29   
With the stevedores’ attempt to exploit racial divisions stalled, Southern 
Pacific officials took over the handling of the strike by bringing in forty black 
strikebreakers from Houston protected by private armed guards.  A delegation of 
white and black union representatives persuaded some of those enlisted to quit and 
the company found it difficult to recruit other non-union laborers despite a 
widespread search.  When sixty more black workers were brought in, some claimed 
not to have known of the strike and asked the union for their fare home.  Dockside 
checkers refused to work with the strikebreakers, although it is unclear if this was 
because they were non-union, because they were black, or both.  The strike, 
however, was taken out of the hands of union officials when a Citizen’s Committee 
met with Southern Pacific.  Galveston’s merchants were always concerned when 
trouble flared on the docks, both because of the delay in shipments and the loss of 
29 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 11-12, 1907.
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their revenue from workers’ wages.  This time, another and perhaps greater fear 
surfaced with the possible loss of one thousand white jobs to black labor and the 
consequent increase of Galveston’s black population by several thousand.  The 
danger, explained the News, lay “with a possible shifting of political conditions, 
always more or less uncertain where the irresponsible negro voter and the scheming 
white man are afforded an opportunity for bargaining.”  Addressing a rank and file 
meeting of Local 851, the Citizen’s Committee stated that they were convinced that 
Southern Pacific would not change their position.  After just nine days, the strike 
ended with a few small concessions, but no pay raise.30  
The Galveston Labor Journal hailed the strike as a victory but made it clear 
that the threat of an influx of black labor had been decisive.  The concessions, though 
small, were important and indicated both the fragility of a longshoreman’s earnings 
and the ability of a company to gouge more out of its workforce.  The company 
agreed to no longer charge a ten percent levy when workers were forced by exigent 
circumstances to take a part of their pay before the official Thursday payday.  The 
insecurity of dockwork made such advances a necessity, the only alternative being 
the loan sharks that plagued the waterfront.  Workers would also no longer be 
charged ten cents a week for ice but could provide their own.  The Journal calculated 
that this weekly levy had amounted to far more than the cost of ice supplied to the 
men.  Other practices whereby men lost time, including losing a full fifteen minutes 
when starting a job a few minutes late or finishing early, also ended.  The Journal 
praised the dockworkers’ loyalty to Galveston and the stand taken by the black 
unions: they, unlike the Southern Pacific, had the city’s best interests in mind.  
Continuing the strike would have meant:
    the displacement of more than 2500 white people, good law-abiding citizens, 
    many property owners and the acceptance of a bunch of blacks who can be 
    bought body and soul for a few paltry dollars.  It would mean the political 
    upheaval of city and county government, to the detriment and everlasting disgrace 
    of their citizenship.  
30 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 14, 17, 19, 20, 1907.
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The Labor Journal and President Anderson tried to make the best of the settlement 
by representing the strike as an important first step in a longer struggle.  However, 
the strike again exposed the weakness of coastwise workers when faced with an 
obdurate employer.  It would be another thirteen years before Local 851 again 
challenged Southern Pacific.31  
The formation of Local 385 had settled the initial Southern Pacific dispute in 
1902 but did not end the wrangling between the screwmen and longshoremen.  
With job competition intensifying, each association became more determined to 
protect against encroachment by the other and the the long-accepted practice of joint 
membership in both unions became a contentious issue.  The dispute escalated 
when 310 expelled thirty-one members for belonging to the screwmen’s local.  
Attempts to resolve the problem failed, although ILA rules forced 310 to reinstate 
the expelled members.  In addition, both black locals remained outside the ILA with 
the Lone Star Association resisting even a local agreement.32  
New Orleans’ screwmen and other waterfront workers faced similar pressures 
to their Galveston counterparts.  In addition, employers and businessmen worried at 
the increasing cotton trade through Galveston played up the strong managerial 
control and high productivity of the rival port.  According to the New Orleans 
Picayune, cotton in Galveston was “rushed from the cars across the docks into the 
ships at a rate that would make an old-timer screwman’s hair turn grey.”  According to 
Arnesen, New Orleans’ employers “never tired” of making these unfavorable 
comparisons with Texas ports and making exaggerated claims as to their work rate.  
Whether accurate or not, employers used the rallying cry of “parity with Galveston” 
to introduce a new “shoot the chute” system for loading cotton.  This system, where 
one gang was expected to load between four hundred and seven hundred bales a 
day, was dangerous and threatened the screwmen’s control over the work process.  
31 Galveston Labor Journal, Sept. 20, 1907.
32 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 3, 1903; Local 307, Records, 2:11, 19, 35-40, 73
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Mindful of the lessons provided by the bitter racial troubles of 1894-95, New 
Orleans’ screwmen responded to this new system by forming a new Dock and 
Cotton Council in October, 1901.  Black unions were particularly strong in New 
Orleans, forming their own Central Labor Union and parading an estimated ten 
thousand men from twenty different unions on Labor Day in 1903.  Many black dock 
unions affiliated with the newly formed ILA early in the new century, often before their 
white counterparts.  James Porter, a tireless worker and organizer, led the black 
screwmen and under his guidance black waterfront unions remained committed not 
only to their own organizations but to the national labor movement as well.  White 
and black screwmen first agreed to aide by a uniform wage scale and then in 
October, 1902, entered into an agreement on what they termed “amalgamation.”  
More than simply a work-sharing agreement, amalgamation meant black and white 
working side by side, or “abreast” one another in gangs headed by either a white or 
black foreman.  According to Arnesen, this unprecedented agreement resulted in the 
screwmen reaffirming their control over the labor supply and working conditions and 
regaining their position as the aristocrats of the levee.  The New Orleans screwmen 
successfully shifted their struggle from one between black and white labor to one 
between labor and capital.33
Having reached their local agreement on amalgamation, the New Orleans’ 
screwmen tried to further strengthen their hand by renewing the call for an alliance of 
all Gulf Coast organizations.  Setting industrywide standards for wages and working 
rules would prevent employers from playing race against race and port against port.  
The SBA and Cotton Jammers sent a joint delegation to New Orleans to discuss 
setting up a Cotton Council for all Southern ports.  On returning to Galveston, the 
black screwmen agreed to adopt the recommendations of the New Orleans 
convention which included, among other things, amalgamation with an equal division 
of work and white gangs to work abreast Negro gangs.  The SBA made a counter 
33 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 153-69; 324-5, n105. 
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proposal that included lower bale limits but rejected any consideration of 
amalgamation.  The Cotton Jammers clearly felt that any meaningful agreement 
would have to include amalgamation: they rejected the counter proposal thus laying 
the issue to rest for the next several years.34 
With a formal alliance with the two black associations stalled, the SBA 
pursued the idea of forming a local association with other white locals.  In November, 
1905, the SBA approached Locals 310 and 385 with the idea of forming a Marine 
Council in Galveston.  Despite an apparent willingness on the part of all three 
organizations, little came of the idea.  The following season was a relatively good 
year for the screwmen which perhaps lessened the drive for a joint association.  By 
1908, however, there were again signs of increasing pressure.  SBA members 
expressed concern about expenditure exceeding income and recommended the 
reduction in the salaries of union officers, although the Executive Committee reported 
that union funds had in fact increased by four thousand dollars over the last five 
years.  Cost, however, may have been a factor in the decisions not to parade on 
Labor Day or to send delegates to the annual ILA conference.  In June, stevedore 
John Young asked for a change in work rules to allow gangs to make up time lost 
due to bad weather so that way, ships would be loaded and men wouldn’t lose 
pay.  Young had sought concessions before and claimed that this system, which 
operated in New Orleans, was of the “utmost importance to his firm” in competing 
with colored labor.”  That October, the Executive Committee reported that 
screwmen were working at an “even gait” but work was short for the time of year 
because most ships were loading loose rather than screwing.35  
A more exact picture of conditions on the waterfront came from members of 
the New Orleans Port Investigating Commission who visited Galveston the 
previous January.  The commission was gathering evidence on working practices 
34 SBA,  Minutes, 3:230, 235, 244-5; SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:63, 65,.
35 SBA Minutes 3:412, 441, 554, 558-60; LBU, Minutes, 3:183. SBA Executive 
Committee, Minutes, 2:296.
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and labor and shipping costs in Southern ports competing with New Orleans by 
interviewing white screwmen’s and longshoremen’s leaders and their employers.  
Two facts emerged from the commission’s findings in Galveston: the growing 
dominance of large, foreign owned shipping lines; and the consequently increasingly 
precarious position of the skilled, white screwmen.  Gentry Waldo, freight manager 
for Southern Pacific, summed up the new economic imperative for employers: “there 
is not much advantage in screwing cotton, unless the boat is waiting for cargo . . . but 
if she has all of her cargo waiting, it is better to hand stow and get out as soon as 
possible.  It is more profitable and less expensive.”36   
Charles Suderman of Suderman and Dolson spoke for Galveston’s 
stevedores.  His career followed a familiar pattern, working as an SBA foreman for 
twelve years before becoming a stevedore in the early 1890s.  Suderman still paid 
his SBA dues but took no active part in the association’s affairs.  Most of 
Suderman’s work came from Southern Pacific but he also employed one hundred 
screwmen in twenty gangs.  His weekly payroll from September to February 
averaged between $15,000 to $25,000 but this fell by around 50 percent during 
the off-season when only Southern Pacific had any work during the dullest months of 
July and August.  Suderman estimated that in the previous season, an 
“extraordinary year,” each of his gangs made two hundred days work.  That year, 
gangs were averaging four days per week which would yield an annual wage of 
$900 to $1,200.  Suderman himself cleared around five dollars per gang per day.  
Each gang stowed 200 to 210 bales per day by hand and 85 to 87 using screws.  
Of the 300,000 bales loaded by Suderman’s men in a season, a little over half were 
screwed although a gang received the same wage, thirty-one dollars, for hand 
stowing.  However, 300,000 bales was less than one-tenth of the port’s total cotton 
shipment.37   
36 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 200; New Orleans Port Investigating 
Commission, Minutes, 40.
37 New Orleans Port Investigating Commission, Minutes, 41-66.
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Suderman acknowledged that all the cotton shipped by the large companies 
such as Leyland, Harrison, and Booth and Hogan was hand stowed as were three-
quarters of the four million bales leaving Galveston the previous year.  Other 
interviewees confirmed the division between the large and small shipping lines.  Mr. 
Lengbehn, an independent agent who chartered ships rather than working for a 
particular line, estimated that 90 to 95 percent of his cotton was screwed.  His men 
were mostly Scandinavians, some of whom had worked for him for twenty years, 
and averaged 120 days per year or $720 to $750 in six months.  Lengbehn 
estimated that one third of the vessels entering port were tramp steamers and that 
these provided much-needed competition for the regular services operated by the 
large lines.  However, he also conceded that “I do know that competition drives the 
employers down to lower wages.”38 
The commission interviewed three SBA officials, Vice-President William 
Garland, President Henry Fricke and Financial Secretary Julius Schilke, as well as a 
recent president of Local 310, A. Harry.  All four agreed that property values on the 
island were high and that the already high cost of living in Galveston was rising at an 
“alarming rate” and that property values were high with house rent costing between 
twelve to fifteen dollars per month.  A report, published in 1912 by the Daily News, 
confirmed the high cost of housing and the problems of overcrowding and poor 
sanitation caused by the alley system where houses were situated at the rear of 
street front properties.  However, according to the report, conditions for the white 
working class were generally good.  There was little overcrowding in the homes of 
working people except from the inflow of itinerant laborers during the height of the 
shipping season.  There was a comparative lack of poverty in the city, and wages 
on the docks, where the majority found employment, were adequate to meet the 
cost of living.  Wages were high enough to even allow savings, so workers could not 
only afford the relatively high rents without complaint but, in time, the majority 
38 New Orleans Port Investigating Commission, Minutes, 98-114.
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became homeowners.  The report recognized that waterfront wages were seasonal 
and the part played by “the good women” of Galveston:
    They are as a class frugal, thrifty women and take care of their homes with diligent 
    pride.  They have as a rule mastered the economy of the home and have 
    assisted their husbands to put by for the hard times or investment definite 
    portions of their annual incomes.    
The one exception to these relatively high standards were, of course, the Negroes, 
who “crowd into their houses without regard for sanitation, ventilation, or decency.”  
The Daily News itself at least acknowledged that, like their white counterparts, black 
women played an important role in the household economy, working in the 
summertime to feed their men while in the wintertime the situation was reversed.39 
The report was overly optimistic and underestimated the growing problem of 
irregular work on the waterfront.  According to the three interviewees, perhaps as few 
as 3 or 4 percent of longshoremen owned their own homes.  Even allowing for error, 
this was well below the 1910 census figure for white home ownership.  Home 
ownership was higher among screwmen but even Garland, a foreman for much of 
his twenty-six years, still rented a house.  He estimated that he had worked 130 to 
140 days the previous season while Fricke gave 100 days as an average.  Schilke 
estimated ninety days as his lowest ever figure with a rarely attained high of one 
hundred and fifty.  Longshoreman averaged little better as only the coastwise lines 
had work all year round.  Both screwmen and longshoremen had to seek alternative 
work during the summer.  Some found employment on public works projects such 
as the grade raising or digging water mains.  Many screwmen worked as painters 
and carpenters, Schilke himself finding regular work during the summer months as 
house carpenter.  Many of Lengbhen’s Scandinavians owned fishing boats.  
According to Fricke, fully half the membership, particularly single men, went north for 
the summer months to work as crew during the yachting season.  Perhaps 25 
percent of the longshoremen left town for the summer.  Behind these facts and 
39 New Orleans Port Investigating Commission, Minutes, 124-44; Briggs, The Housing 
Problem in Texas, 5, 56; Galveston Daily News, Nov. 9, 1906. 
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figures, however, lay a more telling statistic.  The white screwmen worked all tramp 
steamers but held contracts with only two big lines, the North German Lloyd 
Company and the Hamburg-American.  All the other companies running a regular 
service employed only Negro labor.  The longshoremen were in a similar position, 
handling all tramp steamers but working for only one large line, Elder-Dempster.40 
The Commission was also anxious to know the state of labor and race 
relations in the port.  Employers and employees alike agreed that their relations 
were cordial.  Each side met at the beginning of the season and any differences 
were settled in an amicable manner; there had been no strikes since the early 1880s.  
Like most of Galveston’s six or seven other stevedores, Suderman hired only white 
labor but the members were keen to solicit his opinion of the “nigger’s character,” 
was he likely to do more work than the white man if paid by the piece?  Suderman 
felt that white labor paid by the day was more dependable even though he 
personally “could make more money out of the negroes.”  According to Arnesen, the 
influence of black workers on the waterfront was more important to the Commission 
than broad issues of class conflict.  The Commission was looking for ammunition it 
could use against the large shipping lines in New Orleans where the alliance 
between black and white workers was being blamed for a recent bout of labor 
militancy  According to one New Orleans agent interviewed, the system of 
amalgamation meant that “we are practically under negro government.”  The blame 
for this threat to white supremacy fell on two British-owned lines who had exploited 
racial divisions in past years, thus creating the impetus for amalgamation.  The 
Commissioners found what they were looking in the strict division of black and white 
labor in Galveston.  As Fricke assured them, “You know we do not associate with 
those fellows.  It aint like they do in New Orleans.  We don’t associate with them at 
all.”41 
40 New Orleans Port Investigating Commission, Minutes, 124-44.
41 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 201-2; New Orleans Port Investigating 
Commission, Minutes, 48-56, 112-4, 135.
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Fricke’s assessment, while glossing over events of the previous fifteen 
years, did point to a major difference between the two ports.  In New Orleans, the 
labor market was highly competitive while in Galveston, black and white labor each 
kept to their particular sectors.  Coastwise shipping lines in both ports employed a 
regular force of either white or black labor, so eliminating racial competition.  In 
Galveston, the Mallory line employed only black labor while the Southern Pacific 
employed only white and, although there were no formal agreements, each side 
refused to take the work of the other.  This tacit understanding was evident during the 
strikes of 1898 and 1907, although in 1898 white longshoremen were perhaps 
motivated by an unwillingness to work for Negro wages.  The deep sea sector, 
where contractors hired gangs from job to job was highly competitive and in New 
Orleans, far larger than the coastwise trade or Galveston’s deep sea trade.  It was 
here that the intense competition among different unions and white and black workers 
made cooperation vital to maintaining wages and working standards.  According to 
Arnesen, one of the major differences between the employment structures in New 
Orleans and Galveston was one of scale.  Between ten and fifteen thousand men 
worked on and around the docks in New Orleans while about three thousand were 
employed in Galveston.  Galveston’s deep sea work was also dominated by 
cotton and here employment relations were more settled even despite the 
emergence of competition from the Cotton Jammers and Lone Stars over the 
previous decade.  As the Commission discovered, the large, foreign-owned lines 
preferred to hire black labor—with the two black unions working exclusively for 
separate agents—while independent stevedores and agents stuck by the SBA and 
Local 310.42   
While it was true that Galveston was not New Orleans,no one knew better 
than Fricke that, however gradually, race relations on the waterfront were moving in a 
similar direction.  Galveston’s waterfront was largely free from racial tension but it was 
42 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, viii; Arnesen, “Biracial Waterfront 
Unionism in the Age of Segregation,” 35. 
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not wholly free from competition and inter-union rivalry.  Employers, mindful of the 
growing competition from other ports, continued to press the SBA for concessions in 
wages and working rules thus forcing the SBA to continue trying to maintain a working 
relationship with the Cotton Jammers and Lone Stars.  The presence of rival black 
unions, a significant difference between the two ports, had been a major stumbling 
block in reaching a joint accord but Fricke would soon be leading fresh efforts to forge 
an agreement between the major black and white unions.  At the beginning of the 
1908 season, the SBA renewed its efforts to form a local dock and marine council 
but the committee appointed for this purpose again met with little response from the 
other white organizations.  Undeterred the SBA turned to the Cotton Jammers, 
inviting a nine-man committee to meet with the Executive Committee on 
September 23.  Chairman John Hall of the Cotton Jammers sat on the speakers’ 
platform while the remainder of the two committees occupied opposite sides of the 
aisle.43   
Fricke led the meeting with a twenty-minute speech on the conditions existing 
between employers and employed on Galveston’s waterfront.  Stevedores and 
agents had wrung enough concessions from the screwmen, it was time for all the 
wharf front associations to work together.  Fricke, in fact, went so far as to propose 
some sort of amalgamation for their common interest in resisting the brokers and 
stevedores:
    As conditions are at present, the stevedores attempt to dictate to us how we shall 
    work & when we shall work but if we could form some sort of amalgamation
    regardless of color or race, we would reverse the conditions and instead would be 
    in a position to tell Mr. Agent and Stevedore how we will work and when we will 
    work.  
Working together would prevent stevedores and agents from playing one race 
against another, using each association as a lash against the other.  Fricke’s 
comments were echoed by William Manning, whose forceful speech argued for the 
absolute necessity of a definite working agreement between the white and black 
43 SBA , Minutes 3:564; SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:117-123.
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associations as the only solution from “becoming the mere slaves of the employers 
in future.”44 
The Cotton Jammers reacted with a mixture of surprise, welcome, and 
suspicion.  Delegate Williams confessed his initial surprise at the SBA’s invitation 
had turned to delight on hearing their proposition, which he supported heart and soul.  
Closer ties between the two associations would bring greater understanding and “kill 
the effect of false rumors spread by our enemies for the purpose of stirring ill 
feeling.”  Sam McCormick agreed with Williams but argued that the only successful 
plan of amalgamation was to adopt the New Orleans plan and for white and black to 
breast one another in a ship’s hold.  Daniel Baxter reacted more cautiously, asking 
whether the SBA had some grievance with the employers or the Cotton Jammers.  
Fricke replied there was no hidden motive; they were planning for the future and in 
time of peace, prepare for war.  Thus placated, Baxter joined with the other other 
members of his committee in endorsing the proposition.45 
Hall, addressed the meeting last.  Born and raised in Galveston, he had 
experienced all the ups and downs of his association but the present conditions 
were as bad as they had ever been.  At the present time, Hall said, we never know 
when we go home at night if our work will be there in the morning.  With work 
seeming to change hands at a moments notice, it has been “a regular game of hide 
and seek this last two years.”  Screwmen had been asked to give up their lunch time 
and quartering time, and to make up for lost time on rainy days.  The black screwmen 
were “down to their last ditch” and could not  last much longer under present 
conditions: if white and black were to end the uncertainty and better their conditions 
they must “stand together as one unit.” Hall then purposefully buried any connection 
between amalgamation and social equality:
    We are content to live as we do at present, socially apart from each other, but 
    when it comes to our meat and bread . . . it is necessary that the white and black 
44SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:117-123.
45 Ibid.
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    races should stand by one another and if you white folks are earnest and sincere in 
    this matter, you will find that us colored folks are as true as steel and will follow you 
    anywhere you lead, be it into the bay.  If you rise we will rise too, and if you fall we 
    will fall with you.46   
 
The meeting ended with a round of applause for Hall but at the next meeting 
the Cotton Jammers again voiced suspicions of a hidden motive, forcing Fricke to 
repeat his earlier assurances.  Hall then raised the more troublesome issue of the 
Lone Star Association.  The whites were competitors but it was the Lone Stars that 
gave him the most trouble and anxiety.  Hall considered his black rivals as “not much 
better than scabs,” having broken a scale agreement between the two 
organizations.  He also thought they were prepared to take work from the Cotton 
Jammers in a case of trouble with the agents.  Caught between the SBA and Lone 
Stars, his association was in the worse position of all three.  The two associations 
could not proceed without the Lone Star organization but the SBA would have to 
make the invitation because of the bad feeling between the two black unions.  The 
SBA wanted to first reach agreement with the Cotton Jammers since this would 
make it easier to bring the Lone Star and the other white associations into line.  Hall, 
however, insisted that they should waste no time in approaching the Lone Stars.47  
The Cotton Jammers failed to appear at the next meeting but a meeting was 
held two days later at the their association’s hall.  Each committee, having consulted 
their respective members, was to present ideas for closer ties for joint discussion.  
SBA members had watered down a motion indicating their willingness to discuss 
amalgamation.  Their priority was an agreement on wage scales.  The Cotton 
Jammers preferred payment by the bale while the SBA worked to a flat daily rate 
and bale limit.  One system favored younger, stronger men while the other was fairer 
to all members by stretching out the work.  The resulting proposal was long on the 
principles of mutuality, harmony and joint security but contained no concrete 
46 SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:117-123.
47 Ibid., 126.
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suggestions beyond “yearly agreements which will guarantee our individual and 
collective protection and welfare and satisfactory to our respective organizations.”  
However, the Executive were authorized to discuss this and any proposal, including 
amalgamation, from the other side.  The black committee were disappointed at the 
lack of a clear proposal but admitted that they had nothing to offer, although George 
McCormick reiterated that the New Orleans plan offered the best chance for a lasting 
agreement.  Moreover, they should try to include all the Gulf and Southern ports in 
their consolidation.  Other committee members were more cautious, believing it best 
to start small.  Brother Sheldon of the Cotton Jammers suggested that the two 
associations should become better acquainted first, forming still closer ties until the 
time would be ripe for complete amalgamation.  It had, after all, taken many years of 
trouble and strife in New Orleans before workers there recognized amalgamation as 
their only salvation. 48  
The Lone Star Association attended the next meeting on October 26 
although the Cotton Jammers again failed to appear.  The Lone Star committee 
welcomed the SBA’s move as long overdue, and they were willing to meet “on any 
proposition that will give us bread and meat.”  Regretting the Cotton Jammer’s 
absence, Lone Star’s President Edward WIggins challenged anybody to prove that 
his organization had at any time acted unfairly.  Wiggins pointed to the previous 
year’s Southern Pacific strike when his men had turned down an approach from 
Southern Pacific officials to take the work.  His men were not scabs despite the 
accusations.  Brother Smith also emphasized his association’s sincerity, adding that 
an agreement would give them more independence:
    In our present conditions our employers want to bring us down less and less, they
    like to handle us as brutes instead of as men.  We must come together and unite 
    else we will run down like a clock, men working against each other can not stand 
    and hold their own against organized capital.49  
48 SBA, Minutes 3:570, 572: SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:130.
49 SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:134.
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Committees from all three associations sat down together the following week.  
Flanked by his fellow chairmen from the two black committees, the SBA’s Garland 
asked them to forget their past differences and ill feeling and to work in harmony.  
Discussions then turned to wage scales.  Fricke  argued for the flat rate wage scale, 
pointing out that under the 121/2 cents per bale scale a black gang had to stow 248 
bales for the same money as a white gang received for a day’s work of nine hours.  
Both black associations agreed they would all have to work to the same scale but 
the Cotton Jammers repeated that amalgamation was a precondition for success.  At 
least some of the Lone Star committee, including President Wiggins, concurred 
although Chairman William Porter voiced the earlier suspicion of some hidden 
grievance being behind all the talk.  The meeting finally agreed to set up a joint 
subcommittee with five members from each organization to continue discussions.  
Before going any further, the subcommittee decided to sound-out their respective 
organizations, particularly on the central issue of amalgamation.50  
The Executive Committee informed the next full SBA meeting that although 
they had no definite proposition the black locals were likely to accept nothing less 
than amalgamation. After some discussion, the meeting concluded that if there was 
no alternative then they would accept amalgamation.  By early January, the joint 
subcommittee formally recommended that “the only reliable and satisfactory solution 
was to adopt the old and tried plan of amalgamation.”  Fricke informed his members 
that, after much hard work and considering all possibilities, the only way to create a 
better understanding and “give equal and positive assurance for the betterment of 
the conditions of all who are employed in the handling of cotton on the wharf” was to 
adopt the New Orleans plan.  Only after amalgamation could the  three associations 
move forward with agreements on working rules, wage scales and work sharing.  
After a lengthy debate at their next meeting, the SBA voted to accept 
amalgamation by 135 votes to nine.  Members of the two black locals, however, 
50 SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:140; SBA, Minutes 3: 570, 573.
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seemed more reluctant to follow the advice of their committees.51    
At the next joint meeting, both black locals reported they had reached no 
decision as yet. For the Cotton Jammers, Chairman Hall explained that his 
association needed more time because many of his people were slow to grasp a 
new proposition: “the white folks seems to understand problems quicker and is able 
to act on and decide a question as soon as it is brought before them, a thing his 
people could not do.”  Hall then revealed a more concrete reason for failing to act: he 
had been told by Parr’s that a white screwmen’s representative had offered to do his 
work for one cent less per bale.  Hall suspected an agent’s trick to prevent 
amalgamation but he wanted confirmation.  Amused at such a transparent agent’s 
ploy, Fricke confirmed that it was a pure fabrication manufactured to stir up trouble.  
Parr, it seemed, had been hoping to convince the Cotton Jammers to sign a five 
year contract.  Since the Lone Stars had also failed to reach a decision and the SBA 
would not reveal their decision prematurely, nothing more came of the meeting.  
When only Hall appeared to represent the Cotton Jammers at the next meeting, 
the SBA sent a delegation to urge the association’s president, George Harris, to 
take action but the momentum had clearly been lost and amalgamation had run its 
course for the moment.  Why the two black associations failed to respond more 
positively to the SBA’s proposal is unclear, although a lingering suspicion as to the 
white association’s motive appears to have played a part.  With their leaders in favor 
of amalgamation, it seems certain that the rank and file of black workers were not 
ready to give up their independence and meet white labor on equal terms52   
As hopes of reaching an agreement with the black associations faded, the 
SBA renewed efforts to persuade Locals 310 and 385 to form a council of ILA 
locals.  These plans had been put on hold in the hope of first reaching an agreement 
with the two black associations.  Both ILA locals were initially reluctant but by the 
51 SBA, Minutes, 3:573, 599-60, 607; SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:140, 148-
51.
52 SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:154-6, 161-2.
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following year Local 385 was pressing the SBA for action and on August 25, 1909, 
the three white locals formed the Galveston Dock and Marine Council.  From the 
outset, the Council sought to include black associations.  Perhaps much of the 
impetus for this came from SBA president, Herman Fricke.  From his position as 
SBA president, Fricke became involved in a network of labor organizations.  As well 
as his SBA role, Fricke at various times served as head of the Texas State 
Federation of Labor and the Dock and Marine Council, and he would go on to lead a 
Gulf Coast district association of ILA locals.  He was at the heart of the amalgamation 
negotiations and that same year organized black teamsters into a Federal Labor 
Union.  When questioned by the Labor Council about the latter action, Fricke 
explained that “he thought the time had come when it was advisable to organize the 
negro, for the white man’s protection if anything was to be accomplished.”  A 
committee visited the black organizations to impress upon them the importance of 
affiliation, and efforts were made to organize new associations among groups such 
as the Mallory Line workers.  At the same time as reaching out to black labor, the 
white locals made every effort to ensure that any new work went to white labor.53 
Despite the Dock Council’s efforts, the black locals remained reluctant to give 
up their independence and throw in their lot with a white labor organization.  The 
Council’s pressure finally paid off in March, 1911, when the leadership of the Cotton 
Jammers announced that they were ready to change their rules and wage scales to 
correspond with those of the white organizations and join the ILA.  The following 
month, the Cotton Jammers joined the ILA as Local 329, taking their seats on the 
Dock and Marine Council soon after.  However, their delegates’ attendance was 
poor in the first few months and many rank and file members still appeared reluctant 
to accept these new affiliations.  By August, some Cotton Jammers were 
negotiating a contract with a non-union stevedore despite the continued efforts of the 
leadership.  The Council enlisted the help of Thomas Woodland, president of the 
53SBA Executive Committee, Minutes, 2:564, 566, 637; Dock and Marine Council, 
Records, 1:3, 15, 21, 45, 89, 90-96; Galveston Labor Council, Records, 2:297.  
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black screwmen in New Orleans and organizer for the ILA’s Southern District.  By 
November, Woodland had successfully persuaded the remainder of the Cotton 
Jammers to affiliate.  Fricke was able to report that at a meeting of the black 
screwmen, 110  of the 114 men present had agreed to join the ILA.  Woodland and 
leaders of the Cotton Jammers were  confident of organizing all of Galveston’s black 
workers, including the Lone Star men, by June of next year.  Woodland’s confidence 
was misplaced, although the round of organizing continued with the formation of the 
long-heralded Gulf Coast Association.54 
Where the SBA had once been reluctant, it now led the way by getting the 
Dock Council to pass a resolution recommending the formation of a Gulf Coast 
branch of the ILA.  When southern locals met at a convention in New Orleans in 
September, 1911, Herman Fricke was chosen as president of the new association.  
The Gulf Coast District Association ensured local autonomy—the Pacific Coast 
already had its own association—and provided the means to  equalize wage rates 
and working conditions and organize the unorganized.   In his convention address , 
ILA President T. V. O’Connor hailed the dawning of a new era.  O’Connor’s speech 
made clear that race was the central issue for the the new association by speaking 
directly to black workers: 
    The black man has got to play fair with the white man and the white man has got to 
    play fair with the black man.  We are not going to attempt social equality, but we 
    can, if properly and thoroughly organized, bring about industrial equality.  The 
    white man is ready to assist you to get the same wages and working conditions 
    which they enjoy but you colored workers must stand ready to assist yourselves.  
O’Connor carefully delineated the extent of the ILA’s ambitions and while uniting 
black and white locals in their demands for better working conditions was the first 
priority, the particular biracial arrangement was to be worked out at local level.  Not all 
black associations were immediately ready to take up this invitation, however.  
Delegates at the convention drew particular attention to the absence of any colored 
locals from Galveston where the Cotton Jammers were still divided over the issue 
54 Dock and Marine Council, Records, 1:114, 122, 129, 178, 186, 196, 215.
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of ILA membership and the Lone Stars remained completely outside the fold.  The 
following year, however, would be very different.55 
The Cotton Jammers, as ILA Local 329, not only attended the second annual 
convention, they used the occasion to push the association into taking a stand on 
amalgamation.  Delegates Smith and Bowdre introduced a resolution calling for two 
locals in the same port working at the same craft to work to the New Orleans plan of 
half and half at each hatch.  After lengthy discussion, the Convention instructed Locals 
317 and 329 to appoint committees and devise a plan for amalgamation.  Both 
locals accepted the instruction and after many meetings the two reached an 
agreement.  At the start of the 1912 season, stevedores and ship agents were 
presented with a joint contract that included the principle of amalgamation.56   
The contract immediately aroused strong opposition from the employers who 
offered their counterproposal to sign the previous year’s contract for a term of from 
two to five years with the SBA only.  When the white screwmen rejected this offer 
and stood firm by the joint contract, employers turned to the Lone Star Association.  
Agents Daniel Ripley and S. Sgitovich, and stevedores Young and Suderman, and 
I. Heffron offered the Lone Stars all their cotton and longshore work for a term of one 
year at a lesser rate than was paid the white screwmen the previous year.  This 
contract covered covered about sixty percent of the entire work done on 
Galveston’s wharves.  The SBA and Cotton Jammers, joined by Local 310, now 
considered themselves locked out and refused to perform any work or go near the 
wharves until a satisfactory contract had been agreed on.  After several days of 
negotiations between the three ILA locals and shipping interests, the employers 
agreed to drop their opposition to amalgamation.  Young and Suderman and the 
Lone Stars were persuaded to void their contract “in the best interests of the port.”  
The screwmen returned to work on September 7 having signed a one year contract 
55 Gulf Coast District, Proceedings, 1911, 2; Galveston Daily News, Sept. 13, 1912.
56 Folder 5; Galveston Daily News, Sept. 3, 1912.
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with five companies that placed the Cotton Jammers on an equal footing with the 
SBA.57 
According to the Daily News, all parties to the dispute had behaved amicably 
although outsiders had tried to stir up racial antagonism.  The newspaper reported 
threatened race troubles “and the extraordinary sale of guns and ammunition to 
laboring men, especially to the negroes.”  The rumors were groundless, however, 
and all sides were reported as happy to sign the new contract.  The majority of 
screwmen were well pleased with the terms of the new contract and any problems 
with the new system would be resolved over the next few weeks.  Overall, there 
was much satisfaction that no cotton had been diverted to other ports.  The News 
did offer one caveat, however: some white screwmen were not pleased with the 
equal division of work, or at the prospect of working side by side in a hold with 
Negro labor.58 
Galveston’s remarkable recovery after the 1900 hurricane demonstrated the 
possibilities of the Progressive movement.  The Commission form of government 
enabled Galveston’s citizens to undertake an ambitious series of public works 
projects to resurrect the city’s infrastructure and economy.  On a lesser scale, and with 
a much less idealistic vision, the port’s waterfront unions also looked to new 
institutions and policies to restore their fading power.  However, while the city 
exemplified progressive reform, organized labor’s approach ran counter to the 
conspicuous blind spot in the progressive vision, segregation.  As the South 
enacted the letter if not the spirit of the separate but equal doctrine, Galveston’s 
waterfront unions felt their way towards biracial unionism.  The ILA, the most 
important of the waterfront’s new institutions, set a standard of biracial unionism at a 
time when Samuel Gompers and the AFL were retreating from their former high 
57 Folder 5; Galveston Daily News, Sept. 3, 7, 1912.
58 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 7, 1912.
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principles.  New Orleans, as always, demonstrated how effective a biracial policy 
could be in combatting the growing influence of technology on the waterfront and the 
power of the big shipping lines.  The “New Orleans plan” of amalgamation became 
the standard for others to follow.  However, in Galveston  the limitations of the ILA’s 
policy become apparent.  Self-interest, rather than any feeling for racial equality, was 
the clear motivation for both black and white labor.  With the ILA and other state and 
national labor organizations prepared to allow local organizations to pursue their own 
inclinations regarding biracial unionism, self-interest had to reach a critical level in order 
to overcome the racial divide.  
Galveston’s SBA had reached that critical level by 1908.  Work for skilled 
screwmen was becoming increasingly scarce and the Southern Pacific strike of 1907 
confirmed how easily an employer could exploit racial divisions to their advantage.  
The SBA finally acknowledged the common interest of workers in uniting against their  
employers irrespective of color and agreed to accept amalgamation.  For the Cotton 
Jammers, amalgamation had become the starting point for any negotiations but 
when this opportunity came in 1908 it was rejected by both the Cotton Jammers 
and the Lone Star Association.  Rank and file workers on both sides of the color line 
appeared reluctant to abandon their racial position.  In 1912, ILA President 
O’Connor had hailed the formation of the biracial Gulf Coast District branch of the ILA 
as the dawning of a new era and that now also seemed true for Galveston.  The 
Cotton Jammers joined the ILA and immediately used the forum of the district 
association to press for amalgamation.  After a brief skirmish with employers, the 
SBA and Cotton Jammers began the 1912 season working side by side.  The 
1912 agreement was a high point for race relations on Galveston’s waterfront but It 
would be short-lived.  There was lingering discontent among some rank and file 
screwmen, the amalgamation contract was for only one year and the Lone Star 
Association remained outside the ILA fold.  Secondly, as a condition of receiving an 
ILA charter, the Cotton Jammers had undertaken to recruit members of the Lone 
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Star Association or drive them out of town which they had failed to do.  The Lone 
Stars had in fact considered joining the ILA just six weeks after the signing of the 
amalgamation agreement.  Left to compete against the combined strength of the 
two ILA associations, the Lone Stars petitioned Local 310 to support their 
application for an ILA charter but were told that there was no room in Galveston for 
another local: the Lone Stars must amalgamate with the Cotton Jammers, a move 
they refused to make.  The Lone Stars continued to provide employers with a ready 
source of alternative labor and, if necessary, a wedge to drive between the other 
two associations.59 
59 ILA, Proceedings,1914, 98-100; LBU, Minutes, 6: 254; 
169
CHAPTER FIVE
“The benefits of organization have been lost sight of.”
The Decline of Union Power.
Galveston’s economic prospects burned bright on the eve of World War 
One as the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 only seemed to confirm the port’s 
future prosperity.  That same year, however, the Houston Ship Channel opened 
thus shifting the economic balance of power in favor of this long time rival.  By 1925, 
it was clear that Houston, and not Galveston, was to be Texas’ major port.  Matters 
were also coming to a head on on the waterfront where employers had slowly been 
winning the struggle between capital and labor since the mid 1890s.  Black 
waterfront workers had benefited from this struggle as employers turned to black 
labor organizations to circumvent the power of white unions such as the SBA.  
These changes had forced the SBA and other white unions to seek the protection of 
the ILA and to abandon their policy of exclusion in favor of biracial unionism.  Biracial 
unionism had enabled waterfront workers in New Orleans to reestablish their control 
over wages and working conditions as black and white workers violated the tenets of 
Jim Crow to work abreast one another aboard ship.  However, conditions in 
Galveston created a more tentative biracial movement that only cautiously moved 
towards the climax of the amalgamation agreement between the SBA and Cotton 
Jammers in 1912.  The following year, Galveston’s Labor Day parade included a 
black section for the first time.  Four black ILA locals joined the parade, including a 
newly-formed Mallory workers Local 807 and three hundred men under the banner 
of the Cotton Jammers Local 329.  The parade also included Locals 385 and 310 
but, ominously, not the SBA: the joint contract of the previous year was already 
falling apart.1   .
The racial balance on the waterfront had been tilting in favor of black 
longshoremen for over a decade but from 1910 they began to make up a majority 
1 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 2, 1913.
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of the workforce in Texas ports.  White unions, who had once fought to exclude 
black labor entirely, were now forced to struggle just to maintain their decreasing 
share of work.  In Galveston, this growing imbalance caused the SBA to abrogate 
the amalgamation agreement after just one season.  The decision led to a bitter 
dispute during which the port’s other ILA unions took the Cotton Jammers’ side 
against the SBA.  Despite this support, where once the Cotton Jammers had been 
receptive to biracial unionism, the SBA’s unilateral abandonment of amalgamation 
left it disillusioned and more prepared to pursue its individual interest.  This shift of 
former roles was completed as the once independent Lone Stars entered the ILA 
as Local 851. 
War in Europe brought an uneasy peace to the docks as a shortage of 
foreign shipping brought widespread unemployment to the industry.  War also 
brought federal oversight to the industry and efforts to equalize the pay rates of 
deep-sea and coastwise workers.  The end of the war sparked off a round of pay 
claims in both sectors but a wave of anti-radicalism was sweeping the country.  
Employers exploited the Red Scare of 1919 to 1920 by pushing their version of 
industrial democracy, the open shop.  In Galveston, this antiunion campaign led to a 
prolonged strike of coastwise workers on the Mallory and Southern Pacific docks.  
With both white and black workers on strike, employers brought in strikebreakers, 
including Mexican immigrant labor, and. open shop campaigners enlisted the 
support of Governor William Hobby and the state government.  Although there was 
little evidence of civil disorder during the strike, Governor Hobby declared martial law 
in Galveston and sent one thousand troops to the city.  The 1920 strike ended in a 
decisive victory for the employers and led to the collapse of ILA power on the 
coastwise docks for more than a decade.  
By 1920, Galveston’s deep-sea locals were also reaching a critical point in 
their history as hand-loading all but replaced cotton screwing and black labor 
replaced white.  Moreover, employers who in the past had often been in 
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A gang of black longshoremen lower a sling of cotton into the hold of a steamer.
Courtesy of the Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas
competition against one another, formed a trade association thus strengthening their 
negotiating position.  With skill differentials fading and employers pressing for an end 
to what they saw as the restrictive practices of the white screwmen, it became 
increasingly inevitable that the SBA would have to give up its independent identity 
and merge with the white deep-sea Local 310.  The new local would also have to 
reach a work-sharing agreement with the Cotton Jammers and Lone Stars that 
granted white labor its rightful share of work.  The two white locals amalgamated to 
form Local 307 in 1924 in a deal that included a fifty-fifty work-sharing agreement with 
the Lone Star Association.  The Cotton Jammers, who had been expelled from the 
ILA the previous year, continued as an independent organization.  The 1924 contract 
set the pattern of biracial unionism on Galveston’s waterfront for the next fifty years 
but where once the SBA had, however haltingly, sought to forge biracial 
understanding, it now became its victim. 
Galveston was still one of the nation’s top three ports at the beginning of the 
decade and second only to New York in 1913.  Moreover, the opening of the 
Panama Canal the following year promised to bring new trade to the port.  As the 
nearest major port to the Canal, Galveston would be the natural conduit for trade with 
Asia and South America.  The Houston Ship Channel would also open in 1914 but 
this had little immediate effect on Galveston’s trade since shipping firms were 
reluctant to use the new Channel for fear of running aground.  The onset of war in 
Europe, however, proved disastrous in the short term.  A shortage of foreign 
shipping brought some ports, including Galveston, almost to a standstill.  Moreover, 
revolution in Mexico hit Galveston’s imports.  According to ILA President O’Connor, 
the assumption that war in Europe would have little effect on working people was 
wrong and no other class of worker was as much affected as longshoremen.  Even 
after the end of hostilities, Herman Fricke reported that commerce and shipping were 
still at a standstill in many Southern ports and many men unemployed.  One 
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consequence of the scarcity of tonnage was an increased demand for high density 
bales, particularly on foreign-bound ships.  A new compress plant with high density 
presses had opened in Galveston in 1913 and the outbreak of war hastened the 
conversion of all presses to high density.  Another important consequence of war for 
labor was an increase in the cost of living.  With longshore wages already badly hit, 
the rise in prices during the war only augmented the distress.2
Despite these setbacks, Galveston recovered fairly quickly after the war 
despite being hit by another potentially devastating hurricane in 1915.  Thanks to the 
protection given by the grade-raising and seawall projects, the city survived with 
relatively little loss of life or property damage although the renewed threat further 
tarnished Galveston’s future.  In the short term, however, the port still carried its long 
history of success coupled with modern facilities and a deserved reputation as the 
“Port of Quickest Dispatch.”  By 1924, Galveston was the second port in the nation 
in the value of its foreign commerce for the first time since 1913 and the fourth since 
1900.  Figures, however, once again revealed the enormous imbalance in 
Galveston’s trade.  Exports totaled $530, 539, 863 with cotton alone accounting for 
$485, 723, 468.  Imports, although up from the previous last year, totaled only $32, 
962, 180.  That same year, the port of Houston celebrated the loading of its one 
millionth cotton bale, having begun a major campaign in 1918 to challenge 
Galveston’s dominance of Texas’ shipping business.  Houston held a crucial 
advantage in intrastate rail freight rates which increasingly forced Galveston to rely on 
cotton and other produce from out of state.  When the Texas Railroad Commission 
upheld this differential in the mid-1920s, Houston began to overtake Galveston, 
becoming the nation’s second cotton port behind Galveston in 1925.  The 
Commission equalized rates in 1930 but the damage had already been done as 
Houston continued to win more markets from Galveston to become the nation’s 
2 Barker, “Partners in Progress,” 90-1; Gulf Coast District, Proceedings, 1915, 11, 18, 
Proceedings, 1917, 5, Proceedings, 1919, 8; Ellis, “The Texas Cotton Compression Industry,” 
301-2.
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leading cotton port that same year.  Aided by the Commission’s decision, 
Galveston regained first place the following year and continued to compete 
successfully for many more years but her days as Texas’ leading port were over.3  
The 1913-14 cotton season began with the waterfront in turmoil as the ground 
breaking amalgamation agreement of the previous season proved all too fragile.  
The first hint of trouble came that May at a meeting of the Dock and Marine Council 
where the white Texas City screwmen charged the SBA with signing a five-year 
contract without consulting them.  Following this unilateral action, the Texas City men 
had signed their own three-year contract.  The Cotton Jammers voiced a similar 
grievance, adding that the Lone Star men had predicted that “the white men of 317 
would stick them and that they would trick the Negro in the end and now that that 
prediction had come true they did not know how to proceed in organizing any more 
colored men or how to hold those that were organized.”4 
SBA President Fricke had opposed his local’s decision but was not able to 
overcome grievances nurtured by the rank and file since the first agreement with the 
Cotton Jammers back in 1895.  The two black associations were blamed for failing 
to respond to the SBA’s repeated attempts since then to negotiate a permanent 
joint agreement.  More particularly, members blamed the joint committee on 
amalgamation for two failings.  Firstly, the contract had not set a new wage scale.  
Secondly, the Cotton Jammers had failed to recruit members of the Lone Star 
Association.  According to the SBA, the Cotton Jammers had 200 members in 
1912 while the SBA had 450.  After amalgamation, the Cotton Jammers began 
recruiting men “right and left” irrespective of their ability to do the work.  They now 
had over four hundred men but, despite assurances to the contrary, had done 
nothing to recruit Lone Star members.  Before amalgamation, the Cotton Jammers 
3 Barker, “Partners in Progress,” iii-iv, 131; Galveston Daily News, Feb. 6, 10, 1924; April 
4, 1924.
4 Dock and Marine Council, Records, 1:17.
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had averaged 60 days work in a season but under amalgamation they received 160 
days work.  The vast majority of new men taken on “did not know how to get aboard 
ship, much less use a cotton screw.”  Whole gangs of such men were sent to work 
abreast of gangs of experienced white men leaving the white men to do nearly all 
the work or lose money.  In their defense, the Cotton Jammers claimed to have 
recruited forty Lone Star men but argued it was impossible to do more because the 
Lone Star leadership was firmly against amalgamation.  The Lone Star association 
refused to even discuss the issue with a committee from the Cotton Jammers.  
Talking on the street, Lone Star members professed to be “perfectly satisfied” with 
their situation.  The association not only had all the work it could handle but was 
promised more if they steered clear of organized labor.  Since the Lone Stars 
refused to meet with them, the Cotton Jammers asked the SBA to take the initiative. 
The SBA’s action not only confirmed the Lone Stars’ belief that they would not stick 
to amalgamation, it threatened to damage the whole ILA movement.5 
The SBA’s five-year contract with the three stevedoring firms of Richard P. 
Williamson, Young and Suderman and the Galveston Stevedore Company 
covered nearly three-quarters of the cotton shipped over Galveston’s wharves.  The 
contract not only excluded the Cotton Jammers, it broke agreements with white 
cotton men in Texas City and Port Bolivar.  In all, the dispute involved three 
thousand white screwmen and four hundred black.  With the new contract due to go 
into effect on September 1, ILA President O’Connor, accompanied by Thomas 
Harrison from New Orleans, visited Galveston in mid August in an effort to persuade 
the SBA to maintain the integrity of the Gulf Coast Association and renew the 
amalgamated contract.  The New Orleans’ screwmen had also signed a five-year 
contract but it was a joint contract that maintained the principles of amalgamation.  
Consequently, they were in a strong position.  According to one union official, “The 
International Longshoremen’s Association views a man as a union man, whether he 
5 ILA, Proceedings,1914, 98-100; ILA  Proceedings , 1915, 127-8; SBA Executive 
Committee, Minutes, 3:26.
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is white or black, once he has been affiliated with the ILA.  The controversy will 
doubtless be decided on that basis.”6 
The ILA acknowledged that the SBA’s had legitimate grievances and were 
not asking for a renewal of last year’s contract but a revision of the new contract to 
accommodate the Negro screwmen on an equitable percentage basis.  Pressured 
by the ILA executive, the SBA agreed to confer with Locals 310 and 385 but still 
refused to budge despite indications that two of the three stevedores were willing to 
make some provision for the Cotton Jammers.  Local 310 supported the 
executive’s view that the dispute was not a matter of color but of union principle and 
upholding an ILA charter.  Despite a warning that they risked forfeiting their ILA 
charter, the SBA began working under the new contract.  After just four days, they 
were forced to quit work when Galveston’s other ILA locals refused to recognize the 
SBA or to deliver cotton.  After a brief return to work pending a settlement, work 
again stopped on the fifteenth.7 
The contract was no longer the main issue.  According to O’Connor, the 
affiliation of the Lone Stars would all but settle the dispute and fresh efforts were 
made to persuade them to amalgamate with the Cotton Jammers.  The Lone Stars 
clung to their independence, denying that they were the sole cause of present 
conditions or that they had played any part in the dispute between the other two 
associations.  A few days later, however, the Lone Star Association agreed to join 
the ILA but under its own charter as Local 851.  Under a new agreement, the three 
screwmen’s locals agreed to maintain a uniform union wage scale but amalgamation 
appeared to be a dead issue for the moment.  The Lone Star Association were 
finally an official party to biracial unionism and membership lists for 1914 gave a clear 
indication of why it was so important to the SBA to bring the the independent black 
6 Galveston Daily News, Aug. 20, 25,1913; Local 310, Minutes, 20:68; ILA, Proceedings, 
1914, 11.
7 Galveston Daily News, Aug. 25, 26, Sept. 2, 4, 8, 15, 1913; Local 310, Minutes, 20:68, 
84.
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association under the jurisdiction of the ILA.  Membership in the SBA and Local 310 
stood at 406 and 341 respectively.  Figures for the Cotton Jammers and Lone Star 
Association were 400 and 385.  Since the two white locals handled only cotton or 
general cargo while the black locals handled both classes of work, the black locals not 
only held an overall majority but heavily outnumbered the individual white locals in 
either class.  The biracial mechanism now offered perhaps the only chance for the 
white locals to negotiate what they considered to be a fair division of work. 8
The settlement shook the Cotton Jammers’ faith in the ILA, particularly since 
they felt that they were the losers.  However, they did not give up on the idea of 
amalgamation and the following year, the Cotton Jammers and Lone Stars placed a 
joint resolution before the Gulf Coast District calling for all locals to ‘to try to 
accomplish amalgamation of the white and colored organizations at the earliest time 
possible.”  The resolution passed but, in Galveston at least, went no further.  
Instead, a new dispute arose when the Cotton Jammers applied for an ILA charter 
to take on coastwise work in Texas City for the firm of J. H. Steele, stevedores for 
the Mallory Company.  Mallory had been absorbed by the Atlantic, Gulf Coast and 
West Indies group which controlled shipping between New York and Gulf Coast 
ports.  Steele may have been acting under the direction of this New York-based 
association when he locked out the white longshoremen’s Local 636 of Texas City 
and replaced them with nonunion black labor supplied by Mallory.  Since the Cotton 
Jammers believed they had lost work by the previous year’s settlement, they felt 
justified in taking on this work.  Both Local 636 and 310 of Galveston opposed the 
charter at the annual ILA convention in 1915.  Local 636 paraded all the accusations 
brought up against the Cotton Jammers during the amalgamation dispute, accusing 
its officials of opposing amalgamation with the Lone Star Association for good 
measure.  Speaking for the Cotton Jammers, W. H. Davis denied the accusations 
adding that they had got the work because they had gone after it.  Negroes were in 
8 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 15, 16, 18, 21; Local 310, Minutes, 20: 84, 98; Gulf Coast 
District, Proceedings, 1914, 19-20.
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Texas City to stay and It was either the Cotton Jammers do the work or lose it to 
nonunion Negroes.9   
O’Connor was again forced to urge compromise on the Galveston locals, 
either by extending the Cotton Jammers’ charter or creating a new local.  Local 310, 
however, opposed any settlement that threatened to replace white labor with black, 
which it claimed was just a ruse by Steele to get rid of organized white labor.  
According to Local 310 delegate Dorman, the stevedore would soon find reason to 
replace Local 329 with nonunion labor.  He ended by noting the irony of the current 
dispute: “329 have been just as loyal union men as could be desired, but lately they 
they have become a little shaky . . .  and recently the members of Local 851 have 
proven that they are the better union men than the members of Local 329.”  
O’Connor reminded the convention of the consequences of failing to reach a 
compromise with black labor.  Savannah, once an all-white port with the highest 
cotton wages in the South, had opposed black labor.  That port was now all Negro 
labor hardly making a living wage, and the same had happened in Mobile.  New 
Orleans had learnt to compromise and they were the example to follow.  Other 
delegates supported O’Connor, arguing that black labor was here to stay and 
should be organized as they make as good union men as any.  Dorman repeated 
310’s opposition but the convention agreed to grant the Cotton Jammers a new 
charter for coastwise work.10 
Other labor leaders shared Dorman’s belief that employers were exploiting 
racial divisions to introduce nonunion labor.  One employer even went so far as to tell 
a delegate to Galveston’s Dock and Marine Council that they wanted black men on 
the wharf so “that they could get better results by having a big bonehead of a white 
man on one side and a big nigger on the other side so that he could drive them by 
using one over the other as a club.”  This tactic was hardly new, but Mallory, in 
9 ILA  Proceedings , 1915, 127-32; Gulf Coast District, Proceedings, 1915, 13; Maroney, 
“Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-1929,” 174-77; Baughman, The Mallorys of Mystic, 201-226.
10 ILA, Proceedings, 1915, 127-32; .
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particular was becoming more insistent in its antiunion policy.  In 1915, Steele locked 
out the white screwmen’s Local 704 in Texas City despite being in the middle of a 
five year contract.  The following year,. Local  864 of Westwego, Louisiana, was also 
locked out by Steele.  In Galveston, Mallory workers had been struggling to maintain 
their union status in the face of company opposition since the defeat of 1898.  In 
1903, Mallory line workers appealed to the other dockside unions for moral and 
financial aid.  Although Mallory officials agreed not to discriminate against union 
members the company continued to find other reasons to lay off men it considered 
unsuitable.  Mallory workers joined the ILA around 1912 as Local 807 but this did 
nothing to improve their circumstances.  The company refused to recognize the new 
local and continued to discriminate against union members thus forcing 807 to 
disband by 1915.  That year, sixty Mallory workers petitioned the ILA convention 
for help.  Most of Mallory’s 350 workers were afraid to lose their jobs yet many were 
forced to work for twenty cents an hour and work extra time without meal breaks or 
overtime pay.  Mallory had no need to exploit racial divisions as long as its 
discriminatory policies were successful.  However, in Houston the company faced a 
very different situation.11  
Black longshoremen were the first to organize in the Port of Houston when 
fifteen men organized ILA Local 872 in 1913, the year before Houston became a 
deep water port.  These men, who worked for thirty cents for days and forty cents 
nights, were sent to Galveston to learn cotton screwing.  The following year, Local 
872 agreed to the formation of a white local, Local 896, and screwmen were brought 
in from Galveston to train the new men.  The two locals agreed upon a ninety-nine 
year contract to share work and work abreast one another according to the New 
Orleans system.  White and black foreman alternated, taking charge of all gangs 
irrespective of color.  However, this biracial agreement was quickly put to the test.  In 
11 Dock and Marine Council, Records, 1: 55; Gulf Coast District, Proceedings, 1914, 10; 
Gulf Coast District, Proceedings 1916, 9-10; Gulf Coast District, Proceedings 1917, 6; ILA, 
Proceedings, 1915 , 48, 63.
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1915, when members of Local 872 celebrated Labor Day, union president Bob 
Roberts led a group of nonunion men to work.  Violence flared when the union men 
returned to reclaim their jobs.  Earnest Williams, who was almost stabbed to death 
during this struggle, replaced Roberts as union president.  Some time after this 
confrontation, nonunion black workers formed an independent group known as the 
“Buffaloes.”12 
The appearance of this independent group gave Mallory the leverage to try 
to pry apart the biracial agreement.  The Mallory-controlled Southern Steamship 
Company refused to continue with fifty-fifty working, offering instead to work Local 
872 and nonunion black labor but not the white Local 896.  Local 872 refused to 
accept an offer that excluded the white local and went on strike, resulting in the lock 
out of both locals.  With only two locals the ILA had little power in the port and, 
despite repeated appeals, the District Association was unwilling to risk calling a 
general strike to support the Houston men.  The strike lasted for four years, during 
which time the “Buffaloes” took on Mallory’s work.  The dispute was settled on 1919 
with the formation of a new coastwise local while 872 and 896 became deep-sea 
locals.  Mallory, however, had succeeded in enforcing the open shop in Houston.  In 
1916, Gulf Coast District President Fricke had recognized that this antiunion offensive 
by employers was becoming more organized and insistent: 
    Big corporations, wealthy firms and individuals are combined in the crusade 
    against our members in several parts, and nothing will satisfy their greed for power 
    and money but the disruption of some of our locals and the reduction of the 
    workers to a state of peonage.
However, Mallory’s actions were only a prelude to the full-scale offensive that would 
hit Galveston with full force after World War One.13 
In contrast to the solidarity displayed by the two Houston locals, the gains 
12 Terrell, “A Short History of the Negro Longshoreman;” Hill, A Brief History of ILA Local 
872; Labor Movement in Texas Collection, Box 2E306: Folder 7.
13 Terrell, “A Short History of the Negro Longshoreman;” Hill, A Brief History of ILA Local 
872;  Gulf Coast District: Proceedings 1916, 9, 11, 30-1; Labor Movement in Texas Collection, 
Box 2E306: Folder 7; Gulf Coast District, Proceedings, 1919, 14.
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made in Galveston over the past few years threatened to evaporate.  A delegate to 
the ILA conference in 1915 conceded that in Galveston “the benefits of organization 
and the protection it affords our members has to a great extent been lost sight of.”  
This situation was made worse by the presence up to one thousand nonunion black 
workers and repeated appeals from officials of Locals 329 and 851 for the ILA to 
send a black organizer met with little response.  However, after the Texas City 
controversy there was no further serious dispute over the next few years as locals 
struggled to find what work they could.  The effects of war in Europe were felt on 
Galveston’s waterfront as early as the beginning of the 1914 season.  A committee 
from the Labor Council met with city commissioners in an effort to secure 
employment for the men thrown out of work by the war.  The work shortage did 
nothing to bring agreement between the white and black screwmen.  According to 
the Galveston Union Review, deep sea longshoremen averaged as little as 21/3 
days work per week while coastwise men fared little better with an average of 31/3 
days.  However, with war looming on the horizon, Galveston had reestablished at 
least a minimum of fraternal cooperation by the beginning of 1917.  Locals agreed 
not to take each other’s work and despite several disputes matters were settled at 
local level.  Even the Cotton Jammers had reestablished themselves as "true and 
faithful union men.”14  
When the United States entered the European war in April, 1917, the ILA, 
the US Shipping Board and employers agreed to set up a National Adjustment 
Commission with twenty-four local boards to arbitrate wages and working conditions 
for the duration.  Industrial unrest had been disrupting the country during the war 
years and this three-way agreement was designed to ensure stability in the 
transportation industry during wartime.  However, the adjustment boards had no 
powers of enforcement although participants were expected to abide by their 
14 Galveston Labor Council, Minutes, 3:385; ILA, Proceedings, 1915, 12; Dock and 
Marine Council, Records, 1:43, 148; Gulf Coast District, Proceedings, 1917, 26; Local 307, 
Minutes, 1922-1931, 125; Local 310, Minutes, 22:93, 97, 122. 
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decisions.  In Galveston, as elsewhere, federal control of the industry prompted a 
series of wage claims.  In September, 1917, National Adjustment Commission 
awarded Local 310 a wage raise to fifty cents per hour with seventy-five cents for 
nights and one dollar for Sundays and holidays.  Screwmen and deep-sea 
longshoremen were given their raise without having to appeal to the national board.  
The coastwise workers, however, had greater trouble in securing their raises.   15  
Coastwise lines came under the supervision of the US Railroad 
Administration and, while some efforts were made to equalize wages between the 
coastwise and deep-sea longshoremen, the board generally accepted the existing 
dock hierarchy.  Local 807, perhaps encouraged by the promise of federal 
oversight, had reorganized by 1917 and claimed to represent 95 percent of 
Mallory’s workers.  In September, Local 807 made a wage claim for a scale of forty, 
sixty and eighty cents which was turned down by Mallory.  Local 807 called a strike 
but quickly returned to work when the local Adjustment Commission set an hourly 
rate of thirty-five cents for a ten hour day.  However, the Commission had no power 
to enforce its decisions in the coastwise trade.  After working a few days under the 
new agreement, the local struck again claiming discrimination in favor of new 
employees.  This charge was then withdrawn but the union demanded recognition of 
its business agent to see that working agreements were carried out.  When Southern 
Pacific granted Local 385 a raise in January, 1918, Mallory agreed to pay the same 
rates but still refused to recognize Local 807.16 
As the war in Europe came to an end, the federal government’s priority 
shifted from maintaining industrial stability to controlling the cost of living.  Federal 
arbitration in the deep-sea sector proved so successful that the system was 
15 Maroney, “Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-1929,” 211-2; Arnesen, Waterfront 
Workers of New Orleans, 221-2.
16 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 222-4; ILA, Proceedings, 1919, 160-2, 
251; Gulf Coast District, Proceedings, 1918, 8-9; Labor Movement in Texas Collection, Box 
2E304 Folder 7.
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renewed in September, 1919.  Coastwise lines, however, were to be returned to 
private control.  In October, coastwise workers were refused a pay raise while deep-
sea longshoremen were awarded the same raise the following month thus restoring 
the wage differential and creating dissatisfaction among coastwise workers.  Wage 
parity between the two sectors now became a central goal for the ILA but 
employers and the National Adjustment Commission dragged out negotiations until 
all coastwise lines had been returned to private hands by the spring of 1920.  
Having regained full control of the industry, coastwise employers launched a  
concerted effort to break the power of the ILA—an assault that was part of a broad 
campaign against radicalism and organized labor in the 1920s.17   
The end of the war brought a period of economic uncertainty to the country 
and social and political upheaval.  Wartime production ceased while demobilization 
led to rising unemployment while inflation kept the cost of living high.  In addition, the 
Great Migration of blacks from the rural South to the industrial north had begun during 
the war years.  Political radicalism was also on the rise following the Bolshevik 
revolution of 1917 and the country was rocked by a series of bombings during 
1919, including one aimed at Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer.  More than four 
million workers were involved in a series of strikes as unions sought to build on the 
small gains made under during wartime.  In Seattle, Federal troops were sent to 
Seattle to end a peaceful five-day general strike.  In the summer of 1920, race riots 
erupted in northern cities during the summer of 1920.  In the heightened patriotic 
atmosphere of the immediate postwar period, radicalism provided a ready-made 
explanation and scapegoat for social unrest.  Radicals, blacks and organized labor all 
found themselves stigmatized as anti-American Bolshevik revolutionaries and 
targets for federal repression.  During the Red Scare, or Palmer raids, that were at 
their height from February 1919 to January 1920, police carried out a series of mass 
17 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 228- 34; Maroney, “Organized Labor in 
Texas, 1900-1929,” 211-2.
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arrests of suspected communists and other radicals and many were deported.18 
Employers capitalized on this anti-radical fervor in their bid to end the wartime 
experiment in industrial democracy and roll back the gains made by unions under 
federal arbitration.  Their main strategy was to establish the open shop which 
represented American values of democracy and equality and, so business leaders 
claimed, was open to all workers union and nonunion alike.  By contrast, the union or 
closed shop was branded as un-American.  Numerous local and state open shop 
associations had sprung up by 1920 and, early in 1921, twenty-two state 
associations met to officially adopt their “American Plan.”  Despite the seemingly 
patriotic title, the employers’ goals was to eliminate the gains made by trade unions 
during the war, or even eliminate unions altogether by imposing open shop 
conditions.  While employers professing to uphold the principles of democracy and 
equality, employers used a variety of legal and extralegal coercive measures to 
enforce their plan.  These measures included firing or refusing to hire union members 
and circulating blacklists of union men.  Many nonunion employees were forced to 
sign “yellow dog” contract agreeing to have nothing to do with organized labor.  
Employers could also look to friendly courts for labor injunctions which prohibited 
union activity in or near the workplace.  Among the less democratic methods used 
were the planting of company spies and the employment of private detective 
agencies and private armies as strikebreakers.  The use of what were essentially 
hired thugs often led to violence.19 
Organized labor had made only small gains under federal arbitration and still 
sought further improvements in wages and working policy.  The key to achieving this 
goal was the right to organize and bargain collectively and unions recognized that the 
open shop deliberately threatened these rights.  As AFL Secretary Frank Morrison 
argued, it was the union shop that represented democracy by allowing workers to 
18 Schmidt, Red Scare, 24-7.  See also Murray, Red Scare.
19 Bernstein, The Lean Years, 91, 144-57; Schmidt, Red Scare, 24, 32-5, 
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bargain collectively and have a voice in their working conditions.  In the so-called 
“open” shop, an employer might provide a system of corporate welfare but he 
retained absolute control over wages, hours of work and working conditions.  For 
Morrison, there was no difference between the nonunion employer and the the 
antebellum slave owner:
    Both provided amusement for their workers.  The slave owner prided himself on 
    being “a good master.”  The nonunion employer says: “I protect my employees.”  
    In neither case was the slave or is the employee permitted to protect themselves.
Like the industrialists, union officials used the rhetoric of patriotism as each side staked 
its claim to be the upholders of true “Americanism.”  As Herman Fricke declared in his 
address to the 1921 Gulf Coast District Convention, “Labor . . . speaks from the 
standpoint of American citizenship.”  Moreover, he continued, it was American labor 
that was battling to preserve American democracy and institutions against reactionary 
employers.  The open shop movement was not a campaign for the open shop but 
was solely intended to destroy trade unions and eliminate collective bargaining.  Yet 
Fricke recognized that labor was caught between two converging forces, “the 
conscienceless autocrats of industry and the followers of European fanaticism.”  He 
was speaking from experience: these forces had converged on Galveston in 
1920.20 
The cause of the 1920 coastwise strike lay with the failure to achieve wage 
parity in 1919.  Despite four months of further talks in Washington, the issue was still 
unresolved when private companies resumed control of coastwise shipping.  
According to the ILA, these companies immediately changed their attitude by 
refusing to recognize the union: “our members were advised to throw their buttons 
overboard; failing to do so, they had to submit to abuse, threats and many other 
unlawful acts.”  There was more than a little justification to this charge.  Mallory had 
always been antiunion, despite denials to the contrary, but the Southern Pacific 
company was now displaying a similar attitude.  In Galveston, Southern Pacific took 
20 Galveston Union  Review, May 21, 1920;Gulf Coast District, Proceedings, 1921, 21-2.
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control over of its own stevedoring work, thus giving it direct control over its 
workforce.  In Houston, black Local 872 found themselves locked out of the 
Southern Pacific dock after the settlement of 1919.  With Southern Pacific refusing to 
allow ILA men on the wharf there was a clear threat of nonunion men taking over the 
port.  With no arbitration in sight, nine hundred Southern Pacific workers in Galveston 
struck on February 4 for a wage increase from 60 to 90 cents per hour ordinary time, 
and from 80 cents to $1.20 for Sundays and overtime.21   
The men returned to work two weeks later and according to President 
Anderson were “well contented,” with the prospect of further talks and arbitration. A 
few days earlier, a strike by coastwise longshoreman and freight handlers in New 
Orleans had also ended pending arbitration.  In March, however, strikes erupted all 
along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts after coastwise workers in New York struck for 
wage parity with deep sea workers.  On March 19, ILA members in Galveston 
refused to load a vessel already partly loaded by nonunion labor at Port Arthur.  The 
following day, the black Mallory workers joined the white Southern Pacific workers in 
a strike in support of parity.  Business interests in Galveston feared the strike would 
jeopardize the expected development of trade with Cuba and the West Indies.  
However, attempts to reach a settlement stalled by early April as shippers refused 
to raise wages unless granted their application to the interstate commerce 
commission to raise freight rates.22 
The stalemate held through April, although Mallory announced that at least 
one vessel a week would sail for New York.  However, despite statewide 
newspaper advertisements, Mallory was having trouble securing and holding on to 
willing strikebreakers even though the company brought in armed guards for 
protection.  When only a small force of nonunion labor began unloading the 
strikebound Alamo, local merchants suggested that a “volunteer’ force should unload 
21 ILA: Proceedings, 1919, 532; ILA, Proceedings, 1920, 15, 16; Galveston Union 
Review, Feb. 6, 1920; Galveston Daily News, Feb. 5, 1920.
22 Galveston Daily News,Feb. 5, 21; March 16, 19, 20; April 9, 1920.
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the vessel.  The merchants were careful to point out that their suggestion was not 
meant as a “slap” at union labor, or an attempt to help Mallory break the strike.  The 
unions regarded the use of armed guards as a provocative move designed to place 
them in a bad light.  There had been no violence but union officials, concerned the 
the sight of armed company men could provoke trouble, passed a resolution 
emphasizing the need for peace and law and promising union men would act like 
good citizens.23 
Unable for the moment to secure a workforce in Galveston, Mallory began to 
reroute vessels to Port Arthur where a stevedore was ready with three hundred 
nonunion workers.  The position of both sides began to harden as J. B. Denison, 
now in New York as Mallory’s general manager and vice president, announced that 
the line might permanently move its business to Port Arthur.  While this 
announcement alarmed Galveston’s merchants, the frustration of the strikers also 
began to show.  Angry strikers harassed scabs as they boarded a streetcar at the 
docks after unloading the Alamo.  Later that same day, a Houston-Galveston 
interurban car was fired on, although it was not carrying strikebreakers, with a bullet 
narrowly missing the conductor.  Several more shots were fired at a second car 
carrying sixty-five strikebreakers.  The Daily News, always quick in the past to 
condemn any threat of labor violence, revealed that there was no evidence that 
striking longshoremen had been involved in either incident.  With the Alamo finally 
unloaded, Mallory announced the cessation of their Galveston operations and gave 
no assurance that the line would return at the end of the dispute.  As the Southern 
Pacific began importing strikebreakers, Mayor Sappington appealed to Hobby for 
help in maintaining order and four Texas Rangers were sent to Galveston.  On May 
19, black longshoremen in Port Arthur stopped a streetcar carrying black 
strikebreakers who were shot at and beaten.  Rumors suggested that Galveston 
Negroes had a hand in the attack.  Back in Galveston, Anderson addressed a mass 
23 Galveston Union Review, April 23, 1920; Galveston Daily News, April 21, 23; May 6, 7, 
1920.
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meeting of one thousand from the courthouse steps.  He predictably laid the blame 
for the strike on Morgan and Mallory, singling out Mallory as “that running sore of 
Galveston.”  With Mallory now hiring white labor and Morgan black, a reversal of 
previous policy, both lines were guilty of trying to exploit racial divisions.24 
With no end to the six-week old strike in sight, representatives from the 
Texas Chamber of Commerce and the Galveston Commercial Association called 
on Governor William Hobby to provide protection for the strikebreakers in 
Galveston.  Texas had acquired a reputation for progressive reform in the 1890s 
when Governor James S. Hogg used reform to ward off the Populist threat to the 
Democratic party.  Although Hogg was motivated by political expediency rather 
than conviction, he did establish the principle of an active state government.  This 
tradition continued into the second decade of the new century, broadening into a 
broad range of reforms including prohibition, women’s suffrage, and business 
regulation.  Governor Hobby upheld this legacy but national fears of militant workers 
and strikes found a receptive audience in Texas.25  
The open shop movement first appeared in Texas around 1903 to 1904 
when Citizen’s Alliance groups formed in Houston, San Antonio, Waco and 
Beaumont.  These organizations successfully enforced open shop principles against 
opposition from streetcar and typographical unions by provoking a strike having 
previously arranged to have a force of strikebreakers on hand.  The movement 
resurfaced in 1919 with the formation of the Southwestern Open Shop Association 
to coordinate activities throughout the southwest.  According to F. O. Thompson, 
general manager of the Southwestern Association, “It is not the purpose of  the 
open shop to discriminate against the union man or any other persons, but to give all 
a chance to enjoy the privileges delegated them under the constitution.”  
Businessmen like Thompson found powerful political allies willing to use the power 
24Galveston Daily News, May 6, 12-15, 1920.
25 Gould, Progressives and Prohibitionists, xii-xiii, 270.
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of the state to to impose their version of labor relations on the workforce.  
Gubernatorial candidate Joseph Weldon Bailey played on these fears during the 
1920 campaign, making support for the open shop movement a major part of his 
platform.  Although Hobby was not seeking reelection, the open shop was a major 
political issue26 
When open shop advocates met Governor Hobby, they exploited the few 
minor incidents of violence for all they were worth, claiming that no protection could 
be expected from the Galveston police because “practically 100 per cent” are union 
men.  They also voiced  support for Mallory’s open shop drive, arguing that it was 
useless to make contracts with Galveston’s waterfront unions: “they violate them as 
fast as they are made.  The unions have no property interests of moment, they can 
not or will not make contracts that are enforceable and it is folly to temporize with 
them.  Only from the state can we expect such measure  of protection as will allow 
us to operate.”  The pro-business lobby then threw in the race card for good 
measure, claiming that the Dock and Marine Council which controlled the waterfront 
was composed of five Negroes and four white men.  In fact, The Council was 
composed of around fifty delegates not nine and the majority were white.  
Nevertheless, Hobby accepted these exaggerated or specious claims at face 
value.  As his biographer recorded many years later, Hobby regarded the 
Galveston situation as out of control:
    A strike that had started on orders from a  New York union, largely in sympathy 
    with New York port workers, had become a bitter gang-type war on the freight-
    clogged docks.  It was reported that Galveston authorities, concerned over the 
    political power of the unions, were slow to interfere even when physical violence 
    was used against the strikebreakers.
Other reports carried ominous warnings of vigilante groups and imminent race riots.  
Whatever the source of these reports, they did not come from authorities in 
26 Todes, “Organized Employer Opposition to Unionism in Texas, 1900-1930,” 24-49, 77-
80; Anderson, “Americanism, Unionism and the Galveston Longshoremen’s Strike of 1920; 
Galveston Daily News, June 8, 1920. 
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Galveston and bore little connection to the real situation.27 
Hobby immediately sent Adjutant General W. D. Cope to Galveston to 
investigate conditions and with authority to take any action necessary to enforce state 
law.  Twenty-nine units of the Texas National Guard, including three machine gun 
companies, were assembled to await further orders and an emergency 
appropriations bill for $100,000 was presented to the state legislature.  Galveston’s 
City Commissioners protested to Hobby and called for a  mass meeting of citizens.  
According to the Commissioners, not only had the governor been misinformed, his 
action in calling on the militia was unwarranted.  With few exceptions, the strikers were 
law abiding and peaceful, and considering the duration of the strike and the number 
of men involved there was less disorder and violence than had occurred elsewhere.  
The police department was coping and had not refused protection to strikebreakers.  
I. M. Barb, president of the Galveston Labor Council, further pointed out that Mallory 
had no ships and the Morgan men were working behind a high fence which 
prevented the strikers from getting within half a mile of the docks.  With the docks 
also protected by Rangers and a strong force of armed guards, it was impossible for 
the men to cause trouble even if they so desired.  Even Morgan’s general agent 
admitted there was “scarcely any difficulty” obtaining labor.  H. H. Haines, manager 
of the Galveston Commercial Association and party to the Texas Chamber of 
Commerce appeal, countered the calls for moderation by suggesting that Hobby 
was not responding to the Chamber of Commerce ‘s appeal but to “numerous 
telegrams of complaint sent to Austin from merchants and bankers throughout the 
state”28   
Cope met with all sides in the dispute, telling them his only purpose was to 
ensure the movement of freight.  With nonunion labor loading freight from the Alamo 
into railway cars, union leaders claimed that they were not preventing shipments.  
27Galveston Daily News, June 3, 1920; Clark, The Tactful Texan, 133.
28 Galveston Daily News, June 4, 1920.
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However, the Daily News estimated that Morgan had only shifted four cargoes since 
the beginning of the strike, instead of the normal sixty-six.  Some loads were being 
diverted to New Orleans or sent by rail but freight was being held up by strike.  
Despite the earlier protests from officials in Galveston, Hobby declared martial law in 
Galveston on June 6. and over one thousand troops, led by Brigadier General 
Jacob F. Wolters, entered the town.  City Commissioners renewed their protests, 
describing Hobby’s decision as “the biggest outrage ever perpetrated on a 
peaceful community . . . . your action plays into the hands of those who desire to 
establish the open shop in Galveston and use military force to accomplish that end.”  
Despite the vehemence of their protest, the Commissioners could do little else 
except prevent the troops from billeting on city property in Menard Park.29   
F. O. Thompson triumphantly declared that an open shop association would 
be organized in Galveston.  According to the head of the Southwestern Association, 
“The only solution to the strike is the establishment of the open shop . . . .  Give us 
law and order and we can bring in the open shop and put it into successful 
operation.”  Thompson was unwilling to reveal the names of the new association’s 
members but membership of the open shop movement and local Chamber of 
Commerce were often the same and he undoubtedly found plenty of support 
among Galveston’s business community.  The current city government had been 
elected the previous year on a “City Party” platform that advocated tax reform 
favoring workers’ interests at the expense of business and the well-off.  Voters 
approved these reforms in a referendum in May, 1920, despite strong opposition 
from business groups such as the Young Men’s Progressive League, Galveston 
Commercial Association and Galveston Merchants’ Association.  Now the 
commissioners appeared to be favoring the cause of strikers who were holding up 
freight and disrupting local and state commerce.  Moreover, Mallory, which had 
already threatened to move its operations to Texas City, was being courted by 
29 Galveston Daily News, June 5-9, 1920.
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Houston interests thus adding to the list of grievances.30  
The policy of the coastwise locals had been to wait out the strike and the 
declaration of martial law strengthened that resolve.  The Labor and Marine Councils 
sent Hobby a joint resolution condemning martial law but they did not call a general 
strike as some observers had been expecting.  Despite continuous rumors that 
deep sea locals would join the strike, the coastwise workers insisted that a general 
strike was not in their best interest.  The purpose of the troops was to break the 
strike and establish the open shop but the striking locals would not be frightened into 
returning to work, nor would they escalate the dispute by involving other waterfront 
locals.  Since escalation would play into the hands of the open shop movement, 
labor leaders believed that their only choice was to remain peaceful and expect the 
troops to be removed sooner rather than later.  The longshoremen claimed that 
practically all of the men out on strike were already working at other jobs and earning 
as much as they ordinarily made in longshore work.  Many were finding work with the 
deep sea lines in Galveston and Houston, or working on the causeway and seawall 
extension, and there was the usual recourse to work in other trades.31   
With no immediate end to the strike in sight, the Mallory company again 
began to exploit racial divisions.  Mayor Sappington, while expressing his support 
for the strikers, had already suggested that some shipping interests believed that 
white labor leaders saw the Mallory strike as an opportunity to expand the white 
labor force: “The number of negroes on the Galveston waterfront has been 
increasing rapidly and white labor leaders are understood to be tactfully trying to 
swing the balance of power further towards whites.  It is for the reason that white 
organized labor is generally more intelligent and considered more dependable as to 
their labor affiliations.”  Such rumors had surfaced before during strikes but now 
Mallory increased the stakes by throwing a new element into the racial mix.  On June 
30 Galveston Daily News, June 3, 6, 1920; Angel, “Controlling the Workers,” 15, 16.
31 Galveston Daily News, June 9, 10, 1920.
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10, two hundred Mexican laborers began work unloading the Comal.32 
Immigration from Mexico had been increasing since 1900 and particularly 
following the revolution of 1910.  Demand for labor also increased as railroads and 
irrigation fed the growth of agriculture and the European war created a further labor 
shortage.  As cheap Mexican labor became vital to agriculture, immigration into 
Texas more than trebled between 1900 and 1920 from 71,000 to almost 252,000.  
These official figures took no account of the number of illegal immigrants crossing the 
border.  A 1917 Immigration Act tried to limit immigration by imposing a tax and 
literacy test but Texas agricultural and industrial employers won an exemption for 
Mexican laborers despite opposition from organized labor, Southern nativists, and 
eugenicists.  By 1930, the number of Mexican immigrants in the state was 
approaching 684,000.33   
Although one local resident recalled many Mexicans in Galveston during the 
1880s and 1890s, the 1900 census recorded only 156 foreign born residents from 
Latin America in the city.  However, grade raising and other public works projects 
offered increased opportunities for unskilled labor in the early decades of the new 
century.  Galveston’s waterfront workers undoubtedly took advantage of these 
opportunities but employers also took advantage of alternative sources of cheap 
labor.  In 1908, Local 385 President Anderson complained to the Labor Council that 
the street railway company was using  imported Mexican labor.  The large casual 
component of Anderson’s union were most at threat from this and he wanted the 
company to use local white labor.  However, another delegate rather pointedly 
remarked that despite all the complaints about Mexican labor, “when you wanted an 
able-bodied white man to do the work of the Mexican—that of wading in water knee 
deep—they were invariably suffering from sciatic or some other ‘attic.’”  Undeterred, 
Anderson introduced a resolution opposing the influx of Mexican labor at the 1911 
32 Galveston Daily News, June 7, 11
33 Foley, The White Scourge, 45-6, 51-9; Maroney, “Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-
1929,” 25. 
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ILA convention, one of several such resolutions introduced during the decade.  
However, there was no evidence that immigrant labor was providing a direct threat 
to longshoremen until 1918 when the Mallory Company began to use Mexican 
labor in Texas City and Galveston.  Local 807 had immediately recognized the 
potential threat: “The danger lies in the future, in the event there comes a 
disagreement  . . . it is probable that the broker will employ these Mexicans.”  This 
prediction was now proving all too accurate.34   
The introduction of immigrant labor gave a new basis for black and white 
solidarity on the waterfront.  Just as the Open Shop movement wrapped itself in the 
rhetoric of Americanism, Galveston’s white and black dockworkers used the language 
of nationalism to separate themselves from immigrant labor.  Local 807, for instance, 
had accused Mexican immigrants of un-American cowardice in returning to Mexico 
during the war to avoid the draft.  It was also claimed that “it requires from two to five 
Mexicans to do the work of one white or colored men.”  The Dock and Marine 
Council appealed to the US Secretary of Labor to investigate the practice of 
employers using Mexican immigrant labor, brought into the United States under the 
pretext that labor was needed for agriculture, to colonize industrial centers and break 
strikes and lower wages.  Governor Hobby’s office declared that there was no 
evidence of immigrant labor being used in Galveston yet at the same time Morgan 
and Mallory were declaring their right to “employ men of any race, color or 
nationality.”  A union official responded in terms that made explicit the boundary 
between the American worker and immigrant labor:   
    I, for one, will never agree to any such un-American terms as those submitted by 
    the steamship companies, which would displace American citizens in favor of alien 
    peons who are absolutely without any desire for a decent standard of living, and 
    who pass their lives huddled together under their filthy ponchos when they are not 
34 Grover, “Recollections of Life in Galveston;” Turner, Women, Culture and Community, 
21; Galveston Labor Council, Minutes, 2:243, 245; ILA, Proceedings, 1911, 98; ILA, 
Proceedings, 1919, 388, 444.
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    at work.35 
Immigrant labor was no the only threat to citizenship as martial law and 
National Guard troops replaced the city commissioners and regular regular police 
force.  One consequence of martial law was that military police began to close down 
the gambling dens, bawdy houses and bootlegging operations that had troubled 
military authorities since 1897 and the stationing of regular troops at the newly-built 
Fort Crockett.  By 1913, there were seven thousand soldiers in Galveston and 
another eight thousand in Texas City, all with money to spend in Galveston’s 
notorious red-light district.  Soldiers frequently fought with blacks and Mexicans 
among the brothels and bars of the segregated district and the army itself had to 
quell one major disturbance in April, 1917.  Besides these affronts to military 
discipline, health was another concern.  War brought a new urgency to these 
concerns and military officials tried, unsuccessfully, to close down Galveston’s 
brothels that same year.  Under the authority of martial law, the army again tried to 
make the city safe for respectable soldiers by closing brothels and enforcing 
prohibition.  Martial law was also used to coerce local citizens, particularly those who 
supported the strikers.  A general order prevented local shopkeepers, 
restauranteurs and hotel keepers from refusing to serve strikebreakers.  General 
Wolters halted a protest meeting called by the city commissioners and banned all 
political meetings.  Military police also broke up a regular meeting of the Labor 
Council.  Wolters also fueled rumors by claiming that there had been a sudden 
demand for ammunition especially among the Negro population.  The most 
egregious excess of authority came at the end of August when Colonel Billie 
Mayfield and five military policemen dressed in civilian clothes attempted to arrest G. 
V. Sanders, editor of the Houston Press, at a dinner in Houston.  Wolters had given 
verbal instructions for Sanders’ arrest if he came to Galveston because the Press ran 
35 Anderson, “Americanism, Unionism and the Galveston Longshoremen’s Strike of 
1920;” ILA, Proceedings, 1919, 388, 444; Galveston Daily News  April 6, June 17, August 21, 
1920. 
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articles criticizing the stationing of troops in Galveston.  The illegal arrest was only 
prevented when friends of Sanders came to his aide.  Despite such high -handed 
action, some of Galveston’s citizens refused to be cowed.  A tailor was arrested for 
refusing to sew a chevron on a soldier’s shirt because he did not care to do work for 
“scab protectors.”  A few days later, a motor man was arrested for running his street 
car through a detachment of cavalry.  Similarly, local Negroes refused to help black 
strikebreakers who had to be housed on Morgan wharf.36  
Ironically, the only casualties suffered by the occupying troops were self-
inflicted.  One guardsman accidentally shot himself while showing his pistol to his 
sister-in-law and an officer who failed to stop his automobile when challenged at night 
was shot and killed by the sentry.  Injuries aside, it was costing the state four 
thousand dollars a month to maintain five hundred troops in Galveston while the city 
was paying seven thousand dollars for an idle police force.  Hobby came to town in 
late July, meeting business and judicial leaders but not the mayor or city 
commissioners.  Hobby declared that he must have an “absolute demonstration” 
that local forces could ensure the uninterrupted movement of freight before 
withdrawing the troops.  The city meanwhile appealed to the courts to end martial 
law claiming Hobby had acted unconstitutionally by sending troops to stop trouble 
where none existed.  However, the Commissioners’ accusation that the whole affair 
was an excuse to enforce the open shop failed to convince the court.37 
By mid-August there were signs that the strike was weakening.  Following the 
lead of longshoremen in New York, a joint meeting of Galveston’s striking locals 
agreed to return to work pending arbitration if the companies agreed to dismiss their 
strikebreakers.  While these terms were accepted in New York, in Galveston 
Morgan and Mallory stipulated that “no discrimination will be made in the 
employment of labor as to union or nonunion.”  Furthermore, no union officials or 
36 McComb, Galveston, 152-55; Remmers, Going Down the Line, 11; Galveston Daily 
News, June 15, 17, 21, 29; Aug. 31, 1920.
37 Galveston Daily News, July 22, 27, Aug. 3, 4, 24.
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walking delegates would be allowed on the piers of either company.  The 
companies stood by their right to employ any man, regardless of race, color or 
nationality.  The strikers unanimously rejected these terms, withdrew their offer of 
arbitration and renewed their original wage demands.  With martial law in place to 
protect their strikebreakers, employers saw little need to make concessions  
However, a Citizen’s Committee, which included white union officials, had been 
working with the city commissioners to persuade Hobby to end martial law.  A 
proposal for a force of Texas Rangers to oversee local police finally convinced the 
governor and martial law ended on September 30 and a force of thirty-five Texas 
Rangers replaced five hundred National Guard.38 
The end of martial law did not signal a softening of the state’s militant anti-labor 
policy.  Galveston, the most unionized city in the state, undoubtedly represented a 
major prize for the open shop movement but their goal was always much larger than 
one strike or city.  On September 22, Hobby introduced an Open Port bill to a 
special session of the legislature.  The bill confirmed the Governor’s right to use the 
full power of the state whenever a  strike disrupted a port’s commerce and set 
punishments for anyone violating the right to work.  Despite the protests of 
organized labor, the legislature, enlarged the act to include all common carriers such 
as railroads, streetcars and pipelines.  The act effectively prevented unions from 
picketing or otherwise interfering with non-striking workers.  As one Senate supporter 
explained: “If you refuse to pass this bill, you are pandering to the worst element in 
Texas.  You are framing conditions so that we may soon have Lenines and 
Trotszkys among us.  This is not a political matter, but a matter on which the good 
government of the State of Texas is at stake.”  Stigmatizing Galveston’s 
conservative waterfront unions as even potentially revolutionary clearly had more to 
do with the virulently anti-radical mood of the time than reality but, nevertheless, the 
38 Galveston Daily News, Aug. 16, 21, 24, 19, 30.
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bill was passed by an overwhelming majority the following month.39 
Local 807 finally capitulated in early December, settling the strike on Mallory’s 
terms.  One hundred and twenty-six men went back to work alongside nonunion 
labor.  No walking delegates or stewards were allowed on the docks except as 
longshoremen and the company chose its foremen and clerks.  Workers were given 
a raise from sixty to sixty-seven cents for eight hours and one dollar for overtime, the 
same terms offered in other Atlantic and Gulf Coast ports.  Mallory also agreed to 
supply free ice water.  More significantly, the company agreed to employ only 
Negro longshoremen.  Southern Pacific, however, insisted on employing both white 
and black labor thus prolonging the strike on its docks until February 1, 1921.  
However, many Local 385 men had still not been reemployed by the following 
June.  Weakened and demoralized by the strike’s failure, Locals 385 and 807 gave 
up their ILA charters in 1922 to be replaced by company unions in 1924.40   
Governor Hobby was considered a progressive but his actions in 1920 set a 
pattern of anti-unionism for later, more reactionary governors to follow.  Hobby’s 
successor, Governor Pat Neff, would use the Open port Bill to break a strike by 
railroad workers just two years later.  In 1925, the State Federation of Labor 
successfully challenged the constitutionality of the bill in the test case Ratliff v State.  
In 1929, a Federal court ruled the Open Port Bill a violation of both the Texas and 
United States Constitutions.  During the 1920 strike, the Galveston Open Shop 
Association had declared: “Our opposition is not against the unions, but against 
autocracy of any source, whether labor or capital.  We heartily commend the action of 
the governor in the sending of troops here.”  Governor Hobby had willingly colluded 
with business interest, who misrepresented conditions in Galveston, to use the 
overwhelming repressive power of the state to break a largely peaceful strike and 
39 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 23, 1920, Todes, “Organized Employer Opposition to 
Unionism in Texas, 1900-1930,” 79; Angel, “Controlling the Workers,” 23-25. 
40 Galveston Daily News, Dec. 14; Maroney,  “Organized Labor in Texas, 1900-1925,” 
219.
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enforce the open shop in Texas ports.  Whatever other qualities the open shop 
movement possessed, a sense of irony was not one of them.41  
While the coast wise lines overwhelmingly won the 1920 strike, the struggle 
between capital and labor on the deep-sea docks had been moving to its less 
dramatic conclusion.  Black and white screwmen had been fighting a rear guard action 
against changes in the industry since the 1890s although black worker also benefited 
from these changes.  As employers turned them to the Cotton Jammers, and later 
the Lone Stars, to circumvent the SBA’s control over wages and working conditions 
the numbers of black workers in the industry rose.  By 1910, Negroes accounted for 
35 percent of all longshoremen in Texas.  By 1920, that figure was over 54 percent.  
This increase in the number of black longshoremen had played a central role in the 
SBA’s decision to end the amalgamation experiment in 1913.  The issue resurfaced 
in early 1917 when Local 310 appointed a committee to investigate a more equal 
division of work on the waterfront.  The committee was discharged and then 
reappointed a few months later without result.  In 1919, the SBA sought the backing 
of the deep-sea longshoremen on the question of taking on cotton work done by the 
Lone Stars.  The ILA locals had agreed in 1917 not to take each others work and 
after much discussion the SBA decided to “go a little bit slow” rather than break the 
agreement.  There were other signs of the waning power of the white screwmen.  In 
late 1919, the SBA appeared to be suffering financially as dues were raised and 
benefits and some salaries cut.  By 1922, membership had fallen from a peak of 
nearly six hundred to 371.  The following year, no delegates were sent to the ILA 
and State Conventions and the initiation fee was reduced in an effort to boost 
membership.  Most tellingly, the issue of taking work from the Lone Stars resurfaced 
although the SBA also discussed reducing the number of its gangs by ten.42 
Labor relations in New Orleans had been relatively settled since the troubles 
41 Angel. “Controlling the Workers,” 25-6; Galveston Daily News, June 11. 
42 Northrup, Organized Labor and the Negro, 138; Local 310, Minutes, 22:106; Local 310 
Executive Council, Minutes, 6: 6:3-6;  Local 307, Minutes, 1922-1931, 27, 54, 70-9; 
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of 1907 to 1908 when labor leaders shifted to a conservative policy more akin to 
that of of Galveston’s unions.  The port’s unions reached a new understanding with 
employers based upon the mutual advantages of cooperation between labor and 
capital.  The cornerstone of this new understanding was the five-year contract which 
guaranteed stability and continuity to both sides.  As in much of the country, 
however, this situation changed in the immediate post war years as New Orleans 
was hit by a series of strikes.  According to Arnesen, neither labor nor employers 
were able to gain the upper hand during this volatile period between late 1918 and 
early 1920.  However, in 1920, there was a decisive shift in the political balance 
which, as in Texas, turned the open shop into a campaign issue.  The Democratic 
machine in New Orleans had always relied on the support of white, working-class 
voters and so had not interfered in biracial agreements or labor troubles but this 
changed in 1920 when anti-labor politicians were elected at local and state level.  
The end of high wartime production also brought an economic downturn which, in 
1921, forced the the ILA to advise black and white longshoremen to accept a 
voluntary reduction in wages rather than risk more serious cuts.  With plenty of willing 
strikebreakers, including many ex-servicemen, and a favorable political climate, the 
New Orleans Steamship Association of employers was prepared to challenge the 
port’s screwmen for the first time since 1907.43 
In September of 1923, the habitual round of contract wrangles broke out 
along the South Atlantic and Gulf Coasts.  In New Orleans, four thousand black and 
white screwmen and longshoremen went on strike demanding an increase from 
eighteen to twenty-one cents per bale for hand-stowed cotton.  The Steamship 
Association claimed that such an increase would place the port at a further 
disadvantage to its rivals, particularly Galveston.  The Association also wanted to 
end restrictive practices, particularly the traditional distinction between screwmen and 
longshoremen which meant that when a ship finished loading cotton, gangs of 
43 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 204-10, 236-49,
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screwmen would have to be replaced by ordinary longshoremen to load general 
cargo, or vice versa. a time-consuming arrangement.  The solution to these 
problems was eliminate the unions by imposing the open shop.  The Steamship 
Association recruited armed police to protect its nonunion labor which led to a 
waterfront riot of strikers against police and strikebreakers.  The strike ended after the 
US Shipping Board, which operated four lines accounting for 30 to 35 percent of the 
port’s tonnage, reached a settlement with the white and black screwmen’s 
associations.  The two unions continued the strike against the Steamship Association 
but eventually men were forced to return to work on the employers terms or find 
jobs elsewhere.  The strike was the first major defeat for New Orleans’ black and 
white screwmen and for biracial unionism.  Solidarity was no longer enough to 
counter a combine of determined employers backed by political and judicial allies.  
The two screwmen’s associations and biracial cooperation all continued after the strike 
but with greatly reduced power: two-thirds of the port’s tonnage was being handled 
by the open shop labor of the Steamship Association.44 
Contract negotiations on the Gulf Coast began in earnest a week after the 
beginning of the New Orleans dispute.  In Texas, waterfront workers now had to 
negotiate with a new trade association, the Master Stevedores Association of 
Texas,.rather than individual stevedore firms.  Galveston stevedores had formed an 
association in 1918 which quickly expanded into a larger statewide body.  The 
Stevedores' Association denied that it was anti-labor but the organization did enable 
employers to present a united front and negotiate agreements that bound several 
ports to the same conditions.  ILA locals asked the Stevedores' Association for a 20 
percent increase for longshoremen from 65 to 80 cents per hour ordinary time and 
$1 to $1.20 for all overtime.  Screwmen were after a 23 percent increase from 
twenty to twenty-four cents per bale hand-stowed.  Despite a rumor that all Texas 
locals would strike if an agreement was not reached by the time the old contact 
44 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 16, 24; 1923; Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New 
Orleans, 244-9.
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expired on September 30, work continued beyond the while locals further along the 
Gulf in Mobile and Gulfport struck in early October.45 
On October 11, Galveston, Houston and Texas City appeared to have 
reached a settlement when the Stevedores Association agreed to the 
longshoremen’s wage increase.  The screwmen were not granted an increase.  
While negotiators in Galveston worked out the details of the new contract, the New 
Orleans strike continued which raised the question of whether the Galveston locals 
should handle diverted vessels and those loaded by scab labor.  ILA President 
Anthony Chopek had ordered all locals not to handle vessels loaded in New 
Orleans by nonunion labor.  Galveston’s SBA and Local 310 were prepared to 
follow this directive but the two black locals were reported to have worked two such 
ships.  White and black locals held a six-hour joint meeting to settle the matter and, 
after further meetings of the individual locals, the two white locals and the Lone Stars 
announced they would not work vessels from New Orleans.  The Cotton Jammers, 
however, would only agree not to work vessels usually handled by the other locals.  
Vessels consigned to their regular agents would be worked as usual.  One Houston 
local, probably the Buffaloes, was also prepared to continue normal working.  The 
previous year, the Cotton Jammers had argued against a rise in ILA dues because 
they were suffering from a shortage of work.  Up to eighty Cotton Jammers had to 
find work in Houston that year and conditions had not changed.  Still suffering from a 
severs shortage of work, the Cotton Jammers felt they had no alternative but to 
disobey President Chopek’s order.46
In October, the Cotton Jammers compounded their breach of ILA discipline 
by signing a one year contract with R. P. Williamson, a stevedoring firm that had 
been employing the two white locals.  Nine gangs were put to work on a prohibited 
vessel, the S.S. Jolee, as the other locals scrambled to reach an agreement with the 
45 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 22, 24, 27; Oct. 1, 2, 1923.
46 Galveston Daily News, Oct. 11, 14, 16, 17, 1923; Gulf Coast District, Proceedings, 
1924, 19-21; ILA, Proceedings, 1923, 296.
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Stevedores’ Association.  The joint negotiating committee had tried to insert a clause 
in the new contract allowing for sympathy strikes.  The stevedores, having 
previously won an agreement for no strikes under any circumstances, were refusing 
to sign.  The contract with Williamson’s threatened the permanent loss of this work to 
the black local, forcing negotiators to drop the sympathy strike clause as long as all 
work was restored to former workers.  The Stevedores' Association agreed to 
employ only union labor, but they reserved the right to decide which union labor.  
After a token half-day stoppage in Galveston, locals in Houston and Galveston 
conceded the stevedore’s terms.  The final contact included the previous year’s 
clause that: “there shall be no stoppage of work or lockout under any 
circumstances.”47   
Having lost to the Stevedores' Association, the white locals tried another tactic 
to regain the lost work.  In November, the Dock and Marine Council found the Cotton 
Jammers guilty of violating Article 15 of the ILA Constitution.  The Council also 
affirmed that the 1917 agreement whereby locals would not touch each others work 
would be readopted and enforced, a move the SBA opposed.  The Gulf Coast 
District confirmed the Galveston verdict the following month, finding the Cotton 
Jammers guilty of taking work from the SBA and Local 310.  The Cotton Jammers 
were suspended and fined five hundred dollars but then had their ILA charter 
revoked in March, 1924.  The SBA immediately reminded the Stevedores' 
Association of their agreement to hire only union labor.  The stevedores, however, 
insisted that they would continue to use the banned local thus forcing the to seek a 
court injunction to enforce the agreement.  Such wrangling did little to solve the 
problems of the waterfront.  The solution would depend on new variants of two old 
remedies, the fifty-fifty system and amalgamation.48
The Stevedores' Association made its ideas public that August, ahead of the 
47Gulf Coast District, Proceedings, 1924, 19-21;  Galveston Daily News,  Oct. 19-21; Nov. 
15, 1923.
48 Local 307, Minutes, 1922-1931, 125, 133-6, 172.
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coming cotton season and contract negotiations.  In a Daily News interview Walter 
Terry Smith, president of the ship agent’s Daniel Ripley Company, recommended 
that longshoremen and screwmen should perform the same work.  The crux of the 
interview, however, was Smith’s suggestion for a fairer division of labor.  Galveston 
possessed the best-equipped wharves and boasted the quickest dispatch of any 
southern port, but were the hundreds of thousands of dollars paid out to labor 
reaching the “proper channels” so as to benefit the city as a whole?  By “proper 
channels,” Smith meant the city’s white merchants.  According to him, the proportion 
of black labor on Galveston’s waterfront had risen to 65 percent in recent years with a 
corresponding rise in wages: wages that were being spent in the stores of black 
shopkeepers.  Smith allowed that black labor performed well but acknowledged the 
preference for white labor yet his argument for racial preference was coded in 
economic terms.  By introducing the fifty-fifty system, “merchants east of Twenty-fifth 
street should be greatly benefited and the merchants west of Twenty-fifth street 
would also retain their present advantage.”49  
Despite Smith’s public support for the new system, demand for the fifty-fifty 
system seems to have come from the white locals and merchants rather than the 
employers, and still less from the black locals as in former times.  Where once the 
white locals had fought to exclude black labor, they and the local white shopkeepers 
now had much to gain from accepting a fair division of work.  Stevedores had always 
insisted on employing who they chose and had wanted to continue employing the 
barred Cotton Jammers.  The Stevedores' Association agreed in principle to the 
white locals receiving a larger portion of work but only on “a percentage basis to be 
left to the judgment of the MSAT.”  Furthermore, this acceptance was conditional 
upon two points, one being the recognition of the Cotton Jammers.  The other 
condition was more far-reaching: the amalgamation of the white locals so that “the 
water front work should be done entirely by two locals, one colored and one white; 
49 Galveston Daily News, Aug. 6, 1924. 
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that the locals do all work, whether longshore or cotton.”  
The erosion of the screwmen’s skill differential was making the elimination of 
job distinctions an inescapable choice and the idea of amalgamating the screwmen 
and longshoremen’s locals had circulated in Galveston for several years.  The 
proportion of general cargo was small compared to cotton but the traditional division 
of labor on the waterfront had long been a thorn in the side of the ship operators.   
During contract negotiations in 1922, stevedores asked the SBA to allow 
longshoremen to load cotton aboard general cargo ships when the amount was less 
than fifty bales but the request was turned down.  That same year, Local 310 
revived an old grievance by claiming that they were unjustly levied a percentage by 
the SBA for working cotton when they had a standing rule giving preference to SBA 
men.  The SBA again refused to grant any concessions.  In early 1923, Local 310 
took the matter a stage further by inviting the SBA to discuss the issue of 
amalgamation and committees from the four deep sea locals met in February to a 
more equal division of work between the races.  The talks came to nothing and the 
SBA voted against amalgamation in early May.  In November, 310 voted 
unanimously not to pay a percentage when employed by the SBA to work cotton.  
The SBA was further pressured by the fact that both the Cotton Jammers and Lone 
Stars had agreed to change their working practices some time before.  Black gangs 
loaded general cargo and then divided into gangs of five to work cotton.  Moreover, 
in New Orleans white and black longshoremen had agreed to eliminate the distinction 
between screwmen and longshoremen in an effort to resolve their long-running 
dispute.50 
The SBA were ready to accept the inevitable.  The Association met to 
discuss the stevedores’ proposal on August 27 and by September 19 had 
reached agreement with Local 310 to ratify amalgamation effective October 1.  The 
screwmen would join the deep-sea longshoremen to form Local 307.  The only 
50 Galveston Daily News, April 4, 1914; Local 307, Minutes, 1922-1931, 24, 38, 63, 64, 
78.   
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remaining barrier was to reach an agreement with the two black locals.  On October 
1, a joint meeting between Local 307 and the Lone Star Association agreed on a 
fifty year contract to split work on a fifty-fifty basis.  White and black gangs would 
work on the same ship but alternating between fore and aft hatches rather working 
side by side as in the New Orleans plan.  ILA President Chopek backed the plans, 
declaring the fifty-fifty system “a wonderful idea [that] will benefit everybody.”51
The Cotton Jammers, however, were less convinced by amalgamation and 
the fifty-fifty system than the other locals or their erstwhile ILA president.  The Cotton 
Jammers insisted on maintaining their “individual recognition and organization” and all 
efforts to persuade them to accept amalgamation with the Lone Stars failed.  On 
October 11, the Lone Stars and Local 307 signed a new contract with the 
Stevedores' Association, the US Shipping Board, and the Deep Sea Steamship 
Agents which also covered Houston and Texas City.  Stevedores had wanted to 
do away with the bale limit but a joint committee negotiated an agreement that set 
bale limits at 240 by hand and 105 with tools.  The stevedores also agreed to hire 
only ILA labor although the contract included a no strike clause and gave stevedores 
more control over the choice of foremen and walking delegates, and over the 
working of gangs.  Working rules still set the number of men or gangs depending on 
type of work and also settled lesser grievances on both sides, including an anti-
pilfering clause and an injunction against employers using sarcastic or abusive 
language.  The new system went into effect on October 20 when 870 men, half 
white and half black, set to work on thirteen ships.52
The Cotton Jammers, who had once led the way in seeking full recognition 
from white labor now found themselves outsiders.  They remained with Williamson 
who won a new contract with the US Shipping Board that November.  However, 
the rewards for independence were small.  Williamson’s contract was worth 
51 Local 307, Minute s, 1922-1931, 208; Galveston Daily News, Sept. 30; Oct. 9, 1924.
52 Galveston Daily News, Oct. 10, 11, 21; Nov. 1, 1924; Local 307, Minutes, 1922-1931, 
212, 214-6, 225; 
207
$600,000 over the next year compared to the total wharf payroll of the same 
amount just for the month of November.  The six largest stevedoring companies 
alone paid out $300,000 that month.  H. Levy, a former president of the Galveston 
Merchants’ Association, praised the “unusually loyal and commendable” concessions 
made by the Negro longshoremen.  Levy was sure that the Negroes would have 
as much work as they could do while giving the white men of the city their rightful 
share.  However, a Daily News editorial made it clear that money, not loyalty 
underpinned the new agreement.  The Negro longshoremen’s sacrifice was not a 
condition imposed by the employers but one dictated by the general public 
interest:
    No question of relative efficiency was involved.  It was simply a matter of bringing 
    about a more equitable distribution of the enormous pay roll controlled by the 
    employers of wharf labor.  So important is this source of local income . . . that it 
    reaches back into every channel of retail trade.  
Whether the equal division of work was a concession won from the stevedores by 
the white longshoremen in exchange for amalgamation, or a condition urged upon 
stevedores by local merchants the result favored both at the expense of black 
longshoremen.  As Levy explained, “The general consequences of the new 
arrangement are too well understood to require detailed discussion.”53 
With a fifty-fifty work-sharing agreement with the Lone Star Association also in 
place, the now independent Cotton Jammers were the one remaining threat to long-
term stability on the waterfront.  Although expelled from the ILA in 1923, the Cotton 
Jammers continued to work at union scale until 1925 when the association offered 
two companies a reduction in rates.  The port’s other employers informed Local 307 
that although they were unwilling to see a general reduction in wages, they could not 
afford to operate at such a disadvantage.  Employers made the reinstatement of the 
Cotton Jammers a condition for maintaining the current wage scale and they and ILA 
officials worked to persuade the Cotton Jammers to rejoin the ILA.  For their part, the 
53Galveston Daily News, Oct. 11; Nov. 1; Dec. 14, 1924.
208
Cotton Jammers insisted on receiving their former number of Local 329 and of 
working exclusively for two companies, the Harrison-Leyland line and and the J. H. 
Steele Steamship Company.  The problem was resolved in October when the 
Cotton Jammers accepted an invitation to rejoin the ILA thus binding them to 
collective wage agreements.  Unlike the two white locals, however, the Cotton 
Jammers and Lone Stars did not amalgamate.  Moreover, the Cotton Jammers 
maintained a further measure of autonomy by continuing to contract for all the work of 
their two companies while all other work was split fifty-fifty between Local 307 and 
Lone Star Local 851.54 
Biracial unionism on Galveston’s waterfront had developed along with the 
port’s economic success since 1865.  In 1914, that success seemed destined to 
continue as the opening of the Panama Canal promised to attract new trade.  That 
same year, however, the opening of the Houston Ship Channel all but assured that 
much of that trade would eventually find its way to the piers of Galveston’s longtime 
rival.  Galveston’s trade suffered badly during the war but the port quickly recovered 
to again become one of the nation’s leading ports.  By 1925, however, Galveston’s 
halcyon days were drawing to a close.  Although the port remained central to the 
city’s economy for many more decades, Galveston became more notorious for its 
reputation as a wide-open city for bootleg liquor and illegal gambling than renown for 
its port facilities.  The ossification so perceptively described by Edna Ferber in 1940 
had begun.  Biracial unionism had similarly reached its limit.
The SBA and Cotton Jammers began the year of 1913 working side by 
side but their groundbreaking amalgamation agreement did not survive its first year.  
For the past two decades, the SBA had tried to enlist the support of the Cotton 
Jammers and Lone Stars in their struggle to maintain wages and working conditions 
in the face of changes in technology and the employment structure.  These changes 
54 Galveston Daily News, Sept. 29, Oct. 6,1925; Gulf Coast District, Proceedings, 1926, 
28-30.
209
brought new opportunities for black laborers and after 1910 they were beginning to 
make up the majority of the labor force in the deep-sea sector.  When the Cotton 
Jammers finally agreed to join the SBA as members of the ILA, the black 
association quickly pressed the Gulf Coast District Branch to implement its policy of 
amalgamation.  Despite opposition from employers, the SBA agreed to share work 
with the Cotton Jammers on a fifty-fifty basis provided the black association absorb 
the Lone Star Association.  This stipulation reflected a new concern among the white 
screwmen of being outnumbered by the the two black associations.  The Cotton 
Jammers began to take on new hands but the Lone Stars refused to give up their 
independence.  Rank and file SBA members, fearful of being swamped by 
unskilled black labor, brought the amalgamation agreement to a early end.  The 
SBA’s action created mistrust and threatened to drive a permanent wedge between 
biracial cooperation but the three organizations reached a settlement when the Lone 
Stars also joined the ILA.  However, this settlement did not include the renewal of 
the fifty-fifty agreement.  Instead, the three locals simply agreed to maintain the 
status quo by agreeing not to take work from each other.  The agreement did, 
however, mark a significant switch in the position of the two black associations.  With 
the Lone Stars finally within a biracial structure, the Cotton Jammers had become 
less willing participants.
Federal involvement during the war maintained this status quo as the 
government, employers and unions entered into a three-way arbitration agreement.  
Organized labor used the moderate gains made during this period as a stepping 
stone to further improvements in wages and working conditions.  However, a new 
mood of anti-radicalism gripped the country in the immediate postwar years; a mood 
employers exploited to attack organized labor and impose their version of industrial 
democracy, the open shop.  When Galveston’s coastwise unions, the white 
Southern Pacific workers’ Local 385 and black Mallory workers’ Local 807, struck for a 
long-delayed wage raise in 1920, the coastwise companies seized their chance.  
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When strikebreakers and armed guards proved insufficient to break the first biracial 
strike on the port’s coastwise docks, open shop advocates easily persuaded 
Governor Hobby to declare martial law in Galveston.  The sending of troops to 
Galveston was unwarranted but effective.  Coastwise employers successfully 
forced through the open shop on their piers and shattered the two unions.
Employers in New Orleans also used the post war period to launch their 
assault against the biracial Dock and Cotton Council, and particularly the power of the 
screwmen and deep-sea longshoremen.  As in Galveston, employers in New 
Orleans won a decisive victory largely because of political support at state and local 
level.  As always, events in Galveston’s deep-sea sector followed a more 
moderate path towards compromise.  The employers’ main concern was to end 
restrictive practices rather than break union power which required the SBA to accept 
the inevitable and amalgamate with the deep-sea longshoremen.  As a part of the 
same agreement, the new local entered into a fifty-fifty work-sharing agreement with 
the Lone Star Association. The white screwmen lost their independence while 
ordinary longshoremen gained regular access to cotton work.  The new Local 307 
agreed to raise the daily bale limit but maintained the union scale of wages.  The 
white local also gained a disproportionate share of work under the fifty-fifty system at 
the expense of the Lone Star Association, which had apparently gained little from 
joining the biracial structure.  The Cotton Jammers remained within the ILA but 
preferred to work independently rather than enter the work-sharing agreement  
Where once this association had identified its class and race interests with biracial 
cooperation, it now chose to distance itself from joint agreements.  The two black 
locals gained little from the arrangement other than a recognized and regular share of 
work, but in the segregated South this was in itself something of a gain.  This final 
compromise fixed the pattern of biracial unionism on Galveston’s waterfront for the 
next fifty years.
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“The pervasive ambition was to work cotton.”  Despite the decline of the craft of 
cotton screwing, loading continued to rely on strength and experience in 
handling unwieldly cotton bales.
Courtesy of the Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas  
Conclusion
 “A standing they could not otherwise have attained”
Waterfront workers in New Orleans had provided the model for biracial 
unionism since the formation of the Cotton Men’s Executive Council in 1880.  
Except for a period during the severe depression of the 1890s, black and white 
screwmen in that port had successfully controlled wages and working conditions by 
maintaining a united front against employers.  The screwmen reinforced this front in 
1903 when they agreed upon a fifty-fifty division of work with white gangs working 
side by side with black gangs.  This biracial agreement left employers virtually 
powerless to exploit racial divisions at a time when Jim Crow was legalizing the 
segregation of the races across the South.  The power of this biracial alliance fell 
away before the open shop movement of the early 1920s as employers launched 
a final assault on what they perceived as the restrictive practices of the waterfront 
unions.  This employers’ assault left screwmen and and deep-sea longshoremen 
with their unions intact but the biracial Dock Council stripped of its former power.  
Wages for nonunion workers fell and as unions lost their control over the hiring 
process the bane of casualization, the shape-up, appeared on the waterfront by the 
late 1920s.  According to Arnesen, the biracial alliance between white and black 
unions survived this new order but the former power of the Cotton Men’s Executive 
Council and the Dock and Cotton Council vanished forever.  As Arnesen notes:
    The commercial elite’s victory, in imposing the open shop and destroying the
    waterfront labor movement, buried one of the few significant exceptions to the rule 
    of white supremacy in the Deep South.1 
Biracial unionism in New Orleans grew out of intense competition among 
waterfront workers and its strength led to an often adversarial relationship with 
employers.  The less competitive atmosphere of Galveston generated a more 
tentative biracial alliance and a greater willingness on the part of both workers and 
1 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 253-5
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employers to maintain stability through compromise.  Nevertheless, like Arnesen’s 
work, the history of Galveston’s waterfront provides a study of black and white 
worker’s consciousness and how the conflicts between race and class were worked 
out in practice.  This study thus adds to our knowledge of race and the labor 
movement and the course of biracial unionism in the South, as well as Texas labor 
history.  What this study adds to Arnesen is a more detailed examination of this dual 
consciousness, particularly from the viewpoint of the black worker.  As Arnesen 
acknowledged, no union records were available to him and he, rightly, was not 
prepared to indulge in “historical ventriloquism.”2  Manuscript records for Galveston’s 
white unions are extensive although we still receive only a partial glimpse into this 
workers’ world since the details of speeches and arguments were not recorded 
nearly often enough.  Nevertheless, individual voices, including those of black union 
officials, did appear in these records, and in the proceedings of the ILA and Gulf 
Coast District and local newspapers.  Through these voices, and the decisions made 
by each union, we can more fully comprehend the particular course taken by biracial 
unionism on Galveston’s waterfront.
Like New Orleans, Galveston’s waterfront was dominated by white labor and 
particularly the Screwmen’s Benevolent Association, which from its formation in 1865 
was at the forefront of organized labor in the port.  Because they held particular skills 
in a specialized industry, white cotton screwmen played a key part in the overall 
profitability of cotton shipping: they earned the highest wages and stood at the head 
of the occupational hierarchy in Southern ports.  The screwmen’s skill in loading the 
maximum amount of cotton into a vessel enabled the SBA to establish a high 
degree of control over wages and working conditions and to became the most 
powerful union on Galveston’s waterfront.  One aspect of that control was the 
exclusion of black workers from membership in the association and from working as 
screwmen on Galveston’s piers.  This policy was partly a matter of job 
2 Arnesen, Waterfront Workers of New Orleans, 64.
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protection—the union wanted to control the labor supply by excluding all nonunion 
labor—but also of racial ideology.  Many early SBA members were not native 
southerners but the working class foreign immigrants and native-born northerners 
who joined the association shared many of the South’s racial assumptions.  
Nevertheless, southern white unions such as the SBA were pulled by two 
contradictory impulses when faced with the challenge of black competition: either to 
exclude the black worker entirely from competition in the labor market, or to include 
him as an ally against employers in the union movement.  Since exclusion was not 
always possible given the number of unskilled black workers in the postwar South, 
white unions in certain industries such as longshoring were forced towards the latter 
policy.  Moreover, many black workers themselves were not prepared to accept 
exclusion and for some, like their white counterparts, organized labor offered the 
means to achieve better wages and working conditions.  Organized labor also 
offered black workers a means to achieve status within their own community and to 
compete against white labor in the job market.  And when given the opportunity, 
unions were also a means to fight with white labor for economic equality in a world 
which increasingly denied black people social and political equality.
Black labor unions first appeared on Galveston’s waterfront sometime in the 
1870s although black workers made little headway at first in an industry dominated 
by white labor.  Formed in 1879, the Cotton Jammers would break this dominance 
with the help of Norris Wright Cuney.  Cuney was one of the state’ s leading black 
Republican politicians and a member of Galveston’s black elite.  Despite his color, 
Cuney’s abilities also earned him respect and acceptance among Galveston’s white 
business community.  Because much of their wealth depended upon cotton, 
merchants were concerned about what they regarded as the high shipping costs 
which they blamed on the SBA’s high wages and working restrictions.  Cuney 
seized his chance in 1883, using his influence with the business community to win a 
contract for the Cotton Jammers to load cotton.  The SBA immediately responded 
215
with a strike against the use of black labor.  The strike was short-lived, however, as 
internal dissension forced the SBA to accept that black labor had won a place on 
Galveston’s docks.  In truth, it was little more than a foothold, since Cuney was the 
only black stevedore and the white stevedores, many of whom were SBA 
members, continued to hire only white labor.
In 1885, Cuney was also instrumental in black labor replacing white on the 
coastwise docks of the Mallory company.  When a white union struck in support of a 
promised restoration of wages, the Mallory company immediately turned to Cuney 
to provide black workers at the old rate of pay.  Cuney had secured his contract for 
the Cotton Jammers by undercutting the SBA’s wage rates, a tactic largely forced on 
black workers because of the exclusionary practices of white labor.  Nevertheless, 
lower wage rates was a key economic advantage for black labor in securing work.  
Employers could exploit this situation, threatening to replace one group of workers 
by the other and driving down wages for both both races.  For the staunchly 
antiunion Mallory company, black workers provided a cheaper alternative to 
unionized white labor.  Faced with losing jobs, the white union offered a work-
agreement which Cuney was prepared to accept.  However, his workers, having 
been promised regular employment, rejected the offer.  The displaced white 
workers turned to the Knights of Labor, an order dedicated to the principle of 
organizing all workers irrespective of race, skill or gender.  The Knights’ influence 
could be seen in the formation of Galveston’s first biracial Labor Council in 1884 but 
the Mallory strike exposed the limitations of the Southern order.  The Knights made 
race the central issue of the dispute but, despite the general boycott by KOL locals 
in Galveston, black workers became Mallory’s permanent workforce.   
Black workers had made significant inroads against white exclusion, but they 
were not content to remain outside of the labor movement or continue as cheap 
labor.  In the deep-sea sector, the Cotton Jammers sought recognition from the 
SBA and LBU in the late 1880s although the white unions had firmly rejected this 
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overture.  During the 1890s, black workers in the coastwise trade began their long 
campaign for union recognition and higher wages against the Mallory Company .  In 
1898, a four-week strike by Mallory workers drew a large number of blacks into 
organized labor.  The strike’s leaders, several of whom had long been at the 
forefront of organized black labor, affiliated their union with the AFL, the first of the 
port’s waterfront unions to make such a move.  The strikers further demonstrated their 
commitment to class rather than racial interests by attacking black strikebreakers 
brought in to replace them.  This clash led to the killing of several bystanders, 
including a white screwman and, although Galveston’s other waterfront unions had 
little involvement in the strike, the screwmen’s funeral became a demonstration of 
biracial support as black and white unions paraded together.  Despite such support 
and commitment, the strikers did not have the financial strength to overcome the 
determined antiunion stance of the Mallory company. 
The 1890s also saw changes in the industry that weakened the power of the 
deep sea unions, and particularly the SBA.  High density cotton bales and the larger 
capacity of modern steamers were making the screwmen’s skills obsolete.  In 
addition, larger foreign-owned shipping firms were breaking the traditional ties 
between white screwmen and stevedores.  These companies were willing to use 
ordinary longshoremen, and particularly black workers, to hand load cotton at lesser 
rates than the white screwmen.  The threat of losing work and lower wages 
convinced the SBA’s leadership to approach its black rival, the Cotton Jammers, 
with a view to equalizing wage rates.  The black association reacted cautiously, 
agreeing the two associations should not compete for work but declining to give up 
its economic advantage by raising its wages to the level of the white screwmen.  
However, both organizations faced increasing pressure from employers to lower 
rates and increase production making biracial cooperation the only effective means to 
prevent an employer forcing concessions in wages and working conditions by 
playing one race against the other.  By 1898, the Cotton Jammers agreed to raise 
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their wage rates to a level similar to the SBA’s.  This decision split the Cotton 
Jammers in two as members who were unwilling to compete on equal terms with 
white labor left to form a new  Lone Star Association.  While self-interest had 
subsumed race for Galveston’s white screwmen, black screwmen were now 
permanently, and often bitterly, divided.  Despite all efforts of the Cotton Jammers 
and SBA, the Lone Stars refused to enter into a biracial agreement and continued to 
work below scale.   
In the first years of the new century, the SBA sought support in their struggle 
against the growing power of employers by joining the Texas State Federation of 
Labor and the ILA but a biracial agreement with the two black unions remained a key 
goal.  Although prepared to cooperate, the Cotton Jammers were not willing to 
simply throw in their lot with the white association.  Any agreement had to be on 
certain terms, and after 1903 those terms were the adoption of the New Orleans 
plan of amalgamation.  The SBA was not yet ready to accept the idea of work-
sharing, particularly if an agreement did not include both black associations.  
However, white screwmen and deep sea longshoremen were increasingly confined 
to working for those small, independent stevedores or agents who still maintained 
their ideological allegiance to white labor.  With black labor gaining more and more 
work, the SBA was forced to reconsider its position.  In 1908, the SBA leadership 
overcame internal opposition from rank and file members to broker a deal with both 
the Cotton Jammers and Lone Stars based upon the New Orleans plan.  Despite 
initial enthusiasm from the leadership of the two black unions, they were unable to 
convince their members of the SBA’s sincerity and the deal fell apart.  All parties, in 
fact, appeared torn between the willingness of leaders to recognize the necessity of 
a biracial alliance for mutual protection, and the racial hostilities of rank and file 
members.
The next phase of biracial unionism came with the formation of the Gulf Coast 
District Branch of the International Longshoremen’s Association.  The Gulf Coast 
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District advocated a policy of biracial unionism at a time when the AFL had long since 
fallen from its earlier ideal of recruiting black workers.  This policy had clear limits: white 
unions sought self-protection by offering black workers industrial equality but through 
separate unions.  Both white and black union leaders made it clear that social equality 
was not the goal.  The Cotton Jammers joined the ILA in 1911 and immediately 
pressed the district branch to implement its policy of amalgamation in Galveston.  
Despite opposition from employers, the SBA and Cotton Jammers reached a 
work-sharing agreement based upon the New Orleans plan and began the 1912 
season working side by side.  By this time, however, black workers were becoming 
a majority on the waterfront.  To offset this trend, the Cotton Jammers had 
undertaken to absorb the Lone Star Association as a part of the amalgamation 
agreement.  When the Lone Stars refused to give up their independence, the SBA 
found itself at a numerical disadvantage and summarily  ended the agreement after 
just one season.  This mutual distrust among rank and file members on both sides 
that surfaced in 1908 reappeared as this decision seemed to confirm that, in 
Galveston at least, economic self-interest was not sufficient to overcome the racial 
barrier.  This rift was partly healed when the Lone Stars agreed to join the ILA.  At 
least now all of Galveston’s waterfront unions were within the biracial structure of the 
ILA but the promise of amalgamation had slipped by for ever.  
Waterfront workers faced another challenge in the years immediately after the 
end of World War One as employers throughout America launched an attack on 
organized labor using the open shop as their chief weapon.  Employers capitalized 
on postwar anti-radical fervor to stigmatize unions and draw political and judicial 
support for their coercive measures.  Galveston’s coastwise workers felt the full force 
of this assault during 1920 when a largely peaceful strike by the white Southern 
Pacific workers and black Mallory workers was effectively ended by Governor 
William Hobby’s imposition of martial law.  Mallory workers had fought a long 
struggle for their right to union recognition but this defeat shattered both Mallory and 
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Southern Pacific locals.   
Galveston’s deep-sea locals suffered far less at the hands of the open shop 
movement than the coastwise locals or their deep-sea counterparts in New Orleans.  
After the collapse of the amalgamation agreement in 1913, both white and black 
locals focused more on protecting their own share of the labor market than taking a 
united stand against employers.  Ironically, the traditional conservatism and non-
militant approach of these locals, worked in their favor in the early 1920s.  Unlike the 
New Orleans’ Steamship Association, Galveston’s deep-sea employers saw little 
need to confront the power of its ILA locals.  In truth, with the locals split by 
demarcation disputes rather than united in a biracial alliance, there was little left to 
confront.  Galveston’s Master Stevedores’ Association sought only an end to 
restrictive practices, particularly the distinction between screwmen and 
longshoremen, and a guarantee of long term stability.  There was a certain air of 
inevitability, then, to the agreements reached in 1924 and 1925 which served to 
confirm long-standing trends, most notably the passing of the screwmen’s craft.  With 
the amalgamation of the white screwmen and deep-sea longshoremen, the only 
remaining issue was the racial balance of the workforce.  Faced with combined 
pressure from employers, local merchants and white unions, the Lone Stars were 
forced to accept an uneven compromise of work sharing with the new white local.  
The Cotton Jammers, once at the forefront of biracial unionism, remained within the 
ILA but refused to enter into the work-sharing agreement.  This final compromise in 
1925 settlement  set the pattern of biracial unionism on Galveston’s waterfront for the 
next fifty years. 
Employers undoubtedly held the upper hand after 1925 even though their 
victory was less complete than in New Orleans.  White screwmen and deep-sea 
longshoremen lost their individual organizations but they retained at least some of 
their former power, maintaining control over work rotation and hiring which continued 
through the union hiring hall rather than the shape-up.  By restricting membership, 
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ILA locals in Texas were able to avoid the worst effects of casualization.  Some of 
the screwmen’s tradition and status also survived.  Gilbert Mers, who began his 
longshoring career in Corpus Christi in the late 1920s, recalled that “The pervasive 
ambition was to work cotton.”  Hand stowing cotton remained a physically 
demanding job but it was also the highest paid.  As Mers explained, the 
combination of high pay and masculinity kept cotton as the most prestigious and 
sought after of longshore work.  Union rules continued to recognize cotton-stowing’s 
place in the waterfront hierarchy by allowing a man to leave his assigned gang when 
offered cotton work.  The bale limit was removed in 1929, which meant that the men 
could earn more by loading more but the work required less gangs and became 
harder, especially for older hands.  Despite the loss of this bastion of worker’s 
control, other traditions continued.  Although employers decided how many men 
would work a particular job, cotton stowing continued to be done by the three-gang, 
fifteen men system until at least 1987.  Tradition survives into the present day where 
screwmen and cotton jammers are still listed among the skills of the current Galveston 
ILA Local 20.3 
This pattern was ended not by the ILA or even employers, but by the 
federal government which achieved what segregation could not by bringing an end 
to biracial unions on the waterfront.  In the early 1970s, the government began a 
court action against the ILA claiming that separate locals violated the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.  However, officials for black locals in the Gulf Coast District defended 
separation, arguing before the court that by having their own unions, Negroes:
    have been able to better themselves by being able to hold high positions in their 
    locals, and have been recognized in the community as a separate, powerful voice 
    for the Negro communities, and has attained for them and the Negro people of the 
    community, a standing which they could not have otherwise attained.
Like black longshoremen from an earlier era, these modern day counterparts still saw 
3 Rubin, The Negro in the Longshore Industry, 125; Mers, Working the Waterfront, 9-27; 
ILA Local 307, Working Rules, 1956.
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class identity as a important means of racial advancement.4  
Unions in Galveston fulfilled several purposes for both white and black 
workers: as benevolent society and social club as well as a means to protect wages 
and working conditions.  For the men who joined the Cotton Jammers and 
Galveston’s other black waterfront unions, their association served as a means to 
advance their racial as well as class interests.  At first, unions represented a means of 
breaking the monopoly of the white screwmen and longshoremen by taking 
advantage of the black worker’s position as cheap labor.  However, for the Cotton 
Jammer, the unions also became a means for seeking industrial, if not social equality 
and it was they who first tried to establish a working relation with the port’s leading 
white unions.  Although white unionists rejected this first approach they faced a 
straightforward choice: could their economic self-interest overcome prevailing racial 
attitudes allowing them to accept the need to recruit the black worker, or would 
employers gain the upper hand by playing one race against the other.  
In comparing Galveston with New Orleans, we see how local conditions 
played a crucial role in this decision with the intense competition in the latter port 
fostering a stronger biracial tradition.  Black unions faced a more ambivalent choice, 
and here, too, local conditions played a decisive role.  The volume of the cotton 
trade and structure of the industry in Galveston enabled the Cotton Jammers and 
Lone Stars to pursue alternate strategies.  While the biracial agreement of the New 
Orleans plan became the benchmark for the Cotton Jammers, the Lone Stars 
remained less willing to trust the white union movement and continued to find work as 
cheap labor.  The Cotton Jammers regarded its black rival as little more than scab 
labor but as conditions changed so, ironically, did the position of these two black 
unions.  Even more ironically, this shift came at the high point of biracial cooperation 
as, for one brief season, men from the Cotton Jammers and SBA worked abreast 
4 Rubin, The Negro in the Longshore Industry, 134.
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one another loading cotton.  From that point on, biracial unionism in Galveston 
became more a means of dividing up the available work along racial lines than a joint 
strategy to protect wages and working conditions against the growing power of 
employers.  This course was largely dictated by changes within the industry and the  
decline of cotton screwing as a craft.  The division of work clearly favored white 
workers at the expense of the more numerous black longshoremen but, equally 
clearly, the stronger biracial compact in New Orleans led to the almost total defeat of 
both white and black unions.  In Galveston, then, biracial unionism ultimately 
achieved little more than to provide stability rather than any meaningful challenge to 
the racial codes of the  South,  However, even this level of cooperation represented 
a small but significant  exception to the separation of Jim Crow.  Moreover, for black 
unionists of this counter tradition, unions gave them a standing they could not  have 
otherwise obtained. 
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